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ABSTRACT 
 
As the global competitive environment becomes increasingly complex and volatile, 
organisations look to networks to complement skills, resources, agility and capabilities. 
This research program aims to achieve a better understanding in the role of alliance 
portfolios in the development of dynamic capabilities of innovation and 
commercialisation. Through a case study approach examining the network of The 
Michener Institute for Applied Health Sciences, this research program uses a grounded-
theory methodology to construct a conceptual framework, which is generalised to other 
healthcare firms’, alliance portfolios and potentially to other industries. The central 
assertion of this research program is that within complex and high-velocity 
environments, the character of a firms’ alliance portfolio facilitates the extent to which 
dynamic capabilities are created that result in new market opportunities, ultimately 
leading to competitive advantage. The results suggest that alliance portfolios develop 
dynamic capabilities (specifically, innovation and commercialisation) when comprised 
of individual alliance relationships that establish variables of trust; strategic fit of 
resources and vision; secure partners that operate within the same industrial sphere 
and/or core business as the hub-firm; and a personal commitment to the alliance. 
Further, those individual alliance relationships that experience variables including lofty 
expectations; fuzzy decision making processes; lack/loss of strategic focus; differences 
in corporate cultures; and poor transference/application of dynamic capabilities across 
different industries were unsuccessful in the development of dynamic capabilities. 
Initial results also suggest that the cumulative experience of the dedicated alliance 
function (Kale, Dyer, and Singh; 2002), and the resulting dynamic capabilities 
established therein, have the ability to transition (Arndt, 2008) to the alliance portfolio 
(Wassmer, 2010). The alliance portfolio not only acts as an egocentric catchment of an 
organisation’s respective alliances (Baum, 2000), but can also acts as a cumulative set 
of dynamic capabilities, resources, and opportunities. 
 
Key Words: Alliance; Alliances; Alliance Function; Alliance Portfolio; Dynamic 
Capabilities; Innovation; Commercialisation; Case Study 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Researchers use many different terms in different ways, creating potential confusion 
about intended meanings. For clarity and the purposes of this study, the following key 
terms shall have the following meanings: 
 
Alliance Portfolios: Wassmer (2010) defines alliance portfolios “as a focal firm’s past 
as well as ongoing strategic alliances”, with Baum (2000) defining as “a focal firm’s 
egocentric alliance network (p. 144 and 143, respectively).” 
 
Commercialisation of Knowledge Assets: Lichtenthaler (2005) states “External 
knowledge commercialisation (exploitation) describes an organisation’s deliberate 
commercialising of knowledge assets to another independent organisation involving a 
contractual obligation for compensation in monetary or non-monetary terms (p. 233). 
 
Core Competencies: Prahalad and Hamel (1990) define core competencies as “the 
collective learning in the organisation, especially how to coordinate diverse production 
skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies (p. 82)”; are “also about the 
organisation of work and the delivery of value (p. 83)”; “are the engine of new business 
development (p. 83)”; “are the glue that binds existing businesses (p. 83)”; and finally 
that “core competence does not diminish with use (p. 83)”, as they “are enhanced as 
they are applied and shared (p. 83).” 1 
 
Development of core competencies: depending on the competency of focus, intended to 
reflect specific or complete phase(s) of the competency development process, including 
identification, creation, development, cultivation, advancement and retrenchment.  
 
Dynamic Capabilities: Baretto (2010) defines dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s 
potential to systematically solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense 
opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change 
its resource base (p. 271).” 
 
                                                        
1 Prahalad and Hamel (1990) propose that core competencies are identified by three requirements, including 
i) providing access to a wide variety of markets; ii) provide a significant contribution to the customer value 
proposition; and iii) the identification and duplication should be difficult for rivals to copy.  
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Fungibility: Defined by Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “being of such a nature that 
one part or quantity may be replaced by another equal part or quantity in the satisfaction 
of an obligation.” Applied to resource-based view, defined as “to what extent are 
resources valuable to other applications?”  
 
Grounded Theory: Corbin and Strauss (2008) define grounded theory as “a specific 
methodology developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) for the purpose of building theory 
from data (p. 1).”  
 
Health Care Firm’s: In the context of this research program, is intended to reflect 
clinical (hospital) partners; OEM’s, or original equipment manufacture firm’s associated 
with the applied health sciences; academic institutions offering healthcare education; 
non-profit healthcare advocacy and education organisations; other for-profit firm 
specialising in healthcare education (e.g. curriculum development; simulation 
technologies; etc.); and where appropriate, government partners and funders (e.g. 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care).     
 
Innovation: Kline and Rosenberg (1985) propose that “we might think of innovation as 
a new product, but it may also be i) a new process of production; ii) the substitution of a 
cheaper material, newly developed for a given task, in an essentially unaltered product; 
iii) the reorganisation of production, internal functions, or distribution arrangements 
leading to an increased efficiency, better support for a given product, or lower costs; or 
iv) an improvement in instruments or methods of doing innovation (p. 279).”   
 
Interorganisational Networks: The literature base provides an extraordinary degree of 
varying definitions. In the context of this research program, ‘interorganisational 
network’ refers to the complement of formal and informal alliance partner organisations 
that a hub-organisation interfaces with formally or informally develop dynamic 
capability in pursuit of competitive advantage (Provan, Fish, and Sydow, 2007).  
 
Network: Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve and Tsai (2004) define networks as “a set of 
nodes and the set of ties representing some relationship, or lack of relationship, between 
nodes (p. 795).”  
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Research & Development: Snow, C. C., Fjeldstad, O. D., Lettl, C., & Miles, R. E. 
(2011) define the essence of research and development to be “the generation, selection 
and development of ideas (p. 11).”  
 
Resources: Maijoor and Witteloostuijn (1996) define resources as “those 
tangible/intangible assets that are tied semi-permanently to the firm (p. 550)”.  
 
Resource Schema: Danneels (2011) defines resource schema as the mental model that 
managers hold of their firm’s resources and contains answers to questions such as ‘what 
are our resources?’ and ‘what are the potential applications of our resources (p. 21)?’ 
 
Skunkworks: Traditionally characterised as an approach to radical innovation through 
team-driven approach, often operating with limited organisational 
bureaucracy/structures (Fosfuri & Ronde, 2009).  
 
Whole Network/ Interorganisational Network: While Kilduff and Tsai (2003) define 
whole networks as “the complete set of ties among all actors in the network”, Provan et. 
al. (2007) indicates that “a whole network is viewed here as a group of three or more 
organisations connected in ways that facilitate achievement of a common goal (p. 482)”. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
The central assertion of this research program is that within complex and high-velocity 
environments, the character of a firm’s alliance portfolio facilitates the extent to which 
dynamic capabilities are created that result in new market opportunities, ultimately 
leading to competitive advantage. 
 
The intersection of fields reflected in this research program include the resource based 
view (Barney, 1991, 2001; Priem & Butler, 2001); dynamic capabilities (Teece & 
Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003; Danneels, 2011); networks (Provan & Milward, 1995; 
Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007; Wassmer, 2010); and innovation and commercialisation 
within an alliance portfolio (Aarikka-Stenroos & Sandberg, 2007, 2009; Moller & 
Svahn, 2003, 2005, 2009).  This research program aims to leverage and integrate these 
research fields to explore and examine the role of the alliance portfolio in the 
development of dynamic capabilities of innovation and commercialisation, the 
perceived costs and benefits of this process, and how the alliance portfolio evolves over 
time to meet the strategic goals of the hub-firm. 
 
The expected outcomes of the study will provide healthcare organisations and 
respective managers a greater appreciation for the identity of the alliance portfolio 
within an organisation; insights and clarifications as to how managers view, recognise 
and potentially leverage (dynamic) capabilities; a greater appreciation for the variables 
associated with a successful/unsuccessful instance of commercialisation/innovation 
within the context of an alliance portfolio; clarification to the costs and benefits 
associated with the management of an organisations alliance portfolio (Wassmer, 2010); 
and the role of the alliance function (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002) in the establishment, 
management and cultivation an organisational alliance portfolio. 
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CHAPTER 2 - STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1 AN INTRODUCTION OF CORPORATE STRATEGY & STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Scott (2000) defines the origin of “strategy” from the Greek phrase “strategio, meaning 
a general, stratos meaning an army, and agein meaning to lead (p. 1/15).” The phrase 
“strategic management” can reflect a number of different definitions and interpretations.  
Lamb (1984) defines strategic management as: 
 
“…an ongoing process that evaluates and controls the business and the 
industries in which the company is involved; assesses its competitors and sets 
goals and strategies to meet all existing and potential competitors; and then 
reassesses each strategy annually or quarterly [i.e. regularly] to determine how it 
has been implemented and whether it has succeeded or needs replacement by a 
new strategy to meet changed circumstances, new technology, new competitors, 
a new economic environment., or a new social, financial, or political 
environment.”   
 
In reviewing the transition from corporate strategy to strategic management, Grant 
(2005) outlines a static environment in the 1950s/1960s, whereby large, central 
bureaucratic departments were created in large organisations to assess the external 
environment, in an attempt to copy/duplicate those strategies most successfully 
employed by competitors.  Ansoff (1980) summarises the development of the strategic 
management field (systems, methodologies) over a 40-year period beginning in the late 
1940s, including top-down “control, long-range planning, strategic planning, strategic 
management, strategic issue management and surprise management (p. 132).” The 
introduction of the “strategic issue management system”, which has become more 
commonly referred to as the strength, weakness, opportunities and threats (or SWOT) 
framework, was revolutionary with focus on action towards specific issues, as 
determined by a variety of stakeholders.  This framework would become highly 
influential in strategy development and in enterprise risk management.  As markets 
became increasingly complex, decreased regulation and global competition increased, 
there was a marked transition to strategic management approaches where the specifics 
and attributes of the firm (rather than the characteristics of a respective industry) were 
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assessed to secure a sustainable competitive advantage (Floyd, 2000).  This perspective 
has been led by Porter (1985) who has advocated that firms can choose, and develop a 
specific approach to the constructs of the industry through their respective value chains 
to secure uniqueness, either through a cost leadership, differentiation, or niche 
approach.  The choice of strategic positioning is aligned to the constructs and attributes 
of the external industry defined through the application of Porter’s 5-Forces Model. 
 
While the process of strategic management varies, there is a general hierarchy including 
mission, which outlines why an organisation exists; vision, which defines where an 
organisation wants to go; corporate strategy and objectives, which identify what needs 
to be completed; and departmental/personal objectives which outline what activities 
specific departments/individuals are responsible for completing (Niven, 2002).  To 
inform the above decisions, strategic management facilitates a process of analysis, 
which often includes a review of the political, economic, sociological, technological, 
and international (PESTI) components of the external environment (Ansoff, 1980).  
Strategic analysis is also applied to the industry environment (Ansoff, 1980), which 
often includes a competitive assessment via Porter’s 5-Forces model (analysis of buyer 
power; supplier power; threat of new entrants; threat of substitutes; and overall 
competitive rivalry) (Porter, 1980).  Once the strategic analysis and overall strategic 
choices have been made, the final (and perhaps most critical) processes within strategic 
management include the implementation and ongoing monitoring, evaluation and 
correction of strategy (Ansoff, 1980). 
 
Throughout this modern period between 1940-1985, strategy and the application thereof 
was largely thought of as the role of corporate leadership, or a ‘command and conquer’ 
perspective.  More contemporary perspectives have focused on the role of middle 
management in the development, implementation and renewal of strategy (Floyd and 
Wooldridge, 2000), as well as the recognition and impact of installing strategy 
development processes within the public sector (Bryson, 1988).  Floyd et. al. (2000) 
further elaborate this perspective in positing “that the information flows and patterns of 
social influence that transform ideas and initiatives into new capabilities have their 
nexus at the middle levels of the management hierarchy …”, and that “middle 
management is ‘where the action is’ in a capability-based view of strategy (p. xvi).”  
This perspective interfaces successfully with that of complexity theory, insofar as those 
with the densest social networks/contacts, those closest to the ‘strategic action’, and 
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those charged with implementing such strategies and securing results are most 
appropriate to influence overall strategic intent.  An additional perspective is offered by 
MacIntosh and MacLean (1999) who in their examination of strategy research, present a 
clear distinction between the content and process approaches, whereby “if one likens the 
issue to a journey, the content approach has a clear destination but the means of 
transport is indeterminate whereas with the process approach the transport is known and 
in motion, but the journey is something of a “mystery tour (p. 300).”  
 
Due to the significant complexity of the macro and industrial environments, 
organisations must identify, cultivate and grow their respective capabilities, and as is 
often the case, partner and align with other profit/non-profit organisations to 
complement their respective value chain.  This most recent era of the 2010s is 
witnessing a transition from corporate social responsibility (CSR) to corporate shared 
value (CSV) (Porter and Kramer, 2011).  Alliances and networks are evolving from 
corporate “hub” centric leadership models to more distributed community network 
models, as illustrated via the iPhone© Apps development network.  Johnson (2010) 
submits that the within the current era the focus from a defined corporate value chain 
will transition to a “customer value proposition (CVP)”, where CVP is defined as a 
“product, service, or combination thereof that helps customers do more effectively, 
conveniently, or affordably a job that they’ve been trying to do (p. 24).  In reflecting on 
an application of this business model with a company called “Threadless”, Karim 
Lakhani commented (Chafkin 2008): 
 
"The customers end up playing a critical role across all its operations: idea 
generation, marketing, sales forecasting.  All that has been distributed." 
 
The strategic management approach has moved beyond a stable, linear assessment of 
external industrial characteristics and/or internal resource allotments/idiosyncrasies.  As 
illustrated above, within the modern era the process of strategic management reflects a 
fluid, rich and evolving interplay between internal stakeholders; external suppliers, 
competitors, non-government organisations and government agencies; and with the 
firm’s customer base itself.  This rich, asymmetrical interplay between communities, 
interests and insights provides the environment for relevant capability development, 
new industry birth, and ultimately sustainable competitive advantage to the hub/focal-
firm. 
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2.2 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT & COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) suggest “the fundamental question in the field of 
strategic management is how firms achieve and sustain competitive advantage (p. 590).” 
Several alternative perspectives have been developed to explore the essence of 
sustainable competitive advantage, including leadership, industry structure analysis 
(Porter, 1980), and dynamic capabilities (Teece et. al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000).  Where Porter (1980) focuses “strategic positioning” of a firm within a set of 
external industry constructs, the resource based view, or RBV, focuses on the specific 
internal capabilities of a respective firm as the source of sustainable competitive 
advantage (Grant 2005).  As Grant (2005) describes, the focus on distinctive capabilities 
resulted in large-scale divestment of those divisions, processes and activities not directly 
aligned to an organisations “core business.” This divestment and resulting strategic 
focus increased the reliance on alliances, partnerships, joint-ventures and networks as 
increased cooperation via networks was established. 
 
Given the experience, impact and insights of the most recent global recession, the 
demand for new perspectives within the field of strategic management have been 
considerable.  The very essence of strategic management, the pursuit of a sustainable 
competitive advantage, has been questioned by academic scholars and management 
practitioners alike, including the social costs, impacts and results of such intents (Porter 
and Kramer, 2011).  In examining the general theme of capitalism, and by extension 
strategic management theory, Porter and Kramer (2011) suggest that the fundamental 
trust between business leadership and society has been broken, insofar as the pursuit of 
value (and by extension profit) has in some circumstances created negative externalities 
that have largely been borne by society.  Porter and Kramer (2011) recommend focusing 
on “corporate shared value” (CSV) rather than “corporate social responsibility” (CSR), 
which is argued has been largely peripheral to the core intent of most businesses.  In 
transitioning from CSR to CSV, Porter and Kramer (2011) suggest that some core 
requirements include “…the ability to collaborate across profit/non-profit boundaries.” 
(p. 64); that “shared value, which involves creating economic value in a way that also 
creates value for society by addressing its needs and challenges (p. 64)”; and finally that 
the areas for largest opportunities for shared value cultivation include “…health, safety, 
environmental performance, and employee retention and capability (p. 69).”  Drawing 
on this observation, this study aims to understand how a hub/focal-firm can achieve 
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corporate shared value through the engagement of a dynamic alliance portfolio.  The 
study is set in the healthcare sector since this sector features such collaborations such as 
firms seeking to use diverse technologies to address complex healthcare needs.  The 
differences and distinctions between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate 
shared value (CSV) are important to clarify.  The result of CSR has been limited at best, 
with key stakeholders unconvinced with the overall impact; and with many shareholders 
displeased at the perception that corporations would be involved in activities (and 
associated costs) that could be deemed outside the “core business” of the organisation 
(Porter and Kramer, 2011).  The long-time economic argument against CSR has been 
that it is the firm’s intent to maximise profits and maximise the associated dividend to 
shareholders.  Thus, it is the decision of the individual shareholder to decide what social 
causes to support, and not the decision of the organisation.  With CSV, Porter and 
Kramer (2011) argue that in order to maximise profits and therefore maximise the return 
to shareholders is to focus on corporate “policies and operating practices that enhance 
the competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and 
social conditions in the community in which it operates (p. 66).” This contemporary 
narrative illustrates the importance not only of dynamic capabilities, but by extension 
the ability of interorganisational relationships (and specifically alliance portfolios) to 
share, cultivate and build dynamic capability to (profitably) advance solutions to 
societies greatest challenges and needs.  With increased emphasis and engagement of 
collaborative relationships, the field of strategic management requires a better 
understanding of how such alliance portfolios contribute towards establishing a 
competitive advantage within hub/focal-firms. 
 
2.3 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE & NETWORKS 
 
While Porter and Kramer (2011) describe CSV as “a more sophisticated form of 
capitalism”, the concept of CSV could also be viewed as a specific organisational 
business model, where networks of customers, competitors government agencies and 
research institutions collaborate in pursuit of CSV (Porter and Kramer, 2011).  
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) define a business model as “the rationale of how an 
organisation creates, delivers, and captures value (p. 14).” Osterwalder and Pigneur 
(2010) suggest that a business model can be defined through nine building blocks 
(including customer segments; value propositions; distribution channels; customer 
relationships; revenue streams; key resources; key activities; key partnerships; and cost 
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structure) illustrating how an organisation intends to secure economic rents, or profit.  If 
Porter and Kramer (2011) outline the vision of what is to be achieved via CSV, 
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) provide a convincing road map of how and what to 
accomplish within a chosen strategic intent. 
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CHAPTER 3 - RESOURCE BASED VIEW (RBV) PERSPECTIVE 
 
3.1 RBV & COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
There is an established history of reflecting on the characteristics of a firm’s resources 
and ability to apply such resources to an “image” of the industry with the purpose of 
securing a sustainable competitive advantage, growth and profit (Penrose, 1959).  
Wernerfelt (1984) provides a key observation in positing, “for the firm, resources and 
products are two sides of the same coin (p. 171).” This observation establishes that from 
an RBV perspective, the core relationship between resources and the ability of a firm to 
create one or more products.  By extension, the leveraging of a firm’s resources to 
create products reflects the capability of innovation and commercialisation, a central 
focus of this research program.  In considering the organisational “resource position”, 
both at a point, and over time (dynamic), specific market (product) opportunities can be 
designed/developed to create “barriers”, ultimately outlined and managed through a 
“resource-market/product matrix” (Wernerfelt, 1984).  While the resource-
market/product matrix provides an excellent portfolio framework, it provides limited 
insights as to how specific resource idiosyncrasies/complements are acquired (outside of 
mergers/acquisitions) and/or built. 
 
In aiming to define the source and sustainability of competitive advantage, Barney 
(1991) posits complementing the traditional industrial analysis with a comprehensive 
assessment and cultivation of those capabilities in which a firm is distinct.  More 
specifically, Barney (1991) suggests balancing the external (industrial) threats and 
opportunities with a deeper consideration of internal capabilities, recognised as the 
strengths and weaknesses components of the traditional SWOT analysis framework.  In 
a fundamental shift, perhaps recognising the philosophical difference between 
traditional economic theory and strategic management, Barney (1991) recommends that 
rather than perceiving resources as homogeneous and somewhat “fixed” within a firm, 
strategic resources should be considered “heterogeneous…and that these resources may 
not be perfectly mobile across firms, and thus heterogeneity can be long lasting (p. 
101).” In aligning the above conditions of resource heterogeneity and immobility in 
sustaining a competitive advantage, Barney (1991) posits, “a competitive advantage is 
sustained only if it continues to exist after efforts to duplicate that advantage have 
ceased (p. 102).” In extending this framework, Barney (1991) identifies the attributes 
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required for considering a strategic resource contributing towards a sustainable 
competitive advantage, including that a resource must be “valuable”, “rare”, 
“imperfectly imitable”, and “no readily available substitute” resources”, or “VRIN” (p. 
105,106).  The resulting linear framework assumes the constructs firm resource 
heterogeneity and immobility, identifies those resources that contribute towards a 
sustainable competitive advantage through the “VRIN” attributes. 
 
Priem and Butler (2001) largely criticise the RBV perspective, and specifically but not 
exclusively Barney (1991), in suggesting that the RBV perspective:  
i) fails to meet the qualifications of what is required to be deemed a theory 
(specifically the ability of the RBV perspective to be presented/positioned as 
“if/then statements”; “falsifiability”(p. 27));  
ii) lacks clear definitions related to the core terms of resource, competitive 
advantage, sustainable; presents equally simplistic assumptions through the 
“immobility” and “heterogeneous” framework conditions;  
iii) that the generalisability of the framework is too wide;     
iv) that the framework avoids defining “how” to apply to specific strategists; 
v) and finally that the literature development and subsequent empirical 
advancement had been largely “static”. 
 
In response to this criticism, Barney (2001) clarified that “the ability to restate a theory 
in ways that make it tautological provides no insights about the empirical testability of 
the theory whatsoever (p. 42).” Further, Barney (2001) provides insights to the degree 
of which each strategic resource component (value; rarity; “imperfectly imitable”, and 
no readily available “substitute” resources) can explicitly be parameterised to support 
empirical testing.  In addressing the generalisability of the RBV perspective, Barney 
(2001) suggests that given “the value of particular resources depends on the specific 
market context in which they are applied (p. 51)”, strategists can “use resource-based 
logic to ensure that they nurture and maintain those resources that are sources of a 
firm’s current strategic advantages (p. 49).” In regards to the challenges in defining 
critical RBV terms such as “competitive advantage”, Barney (2001) strikes a 
conciliatory balance between perspectives and agrees that ambiguity stifles RBV 
development, thus stating that:  
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“rather than refer to the definitionally ambiguous “competitive advantage,” 
researchers should specify exactly what it is they are trying to explain: above-
industry-average profits (as in Priem & Butler), a firm improving its efficiency 
and effectiveness in ways that competing firms are not (what might be called 
“strategic advantage,” as in Barney, 1991), or economic rents (as in Barney, 
1986a, as cited by Barney, 2001) (p. 48).”  
 
Kraaijenbrink, Spender and Groen (2010) summarise the central critiques of the RBV 
through eight categories, including “(a) the RBV has no managerial implications, (b) the 
RBV implies infinite regress, (c) the RBV’s applicability is too limited, (d) SCA is not 
achievable, (e) the RBV is not a theory of the firm, (f) VRIN/O is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for SCA, (g) the value of a resource is too indeterminate to provide for useful 
theory, and (h) the definition of resource is unworkable (p. 351)”, with the later three 
criticisms having the more significant relevance.  These criticisms are significant given 
the alignment to the concept dynamic capabilities and how dynamic capabilities may 
contribute towards satisfying and/or rationalising specific criticisms.  It is recognised 
that scholars utilise a wide variety of definitions and intents to describe/refer to core 
research concepts (e.g. definition of terms such as resource, capability, dynamic, 
dynamic capability, alliance, network, competitive advantage, etc.).  Rather than reflect 
and aspire to developing new definitions, this research program will explicitly identify 
the choice definitions (constructs) as it relates to the research aims, objectives. 
 
Throughout the RBV literature the emphasis on strategic resources and resulting 
strategic resource bundles (Barney 1991; Priem & Butler 2001; Barney 2001) provide a 
striking resemblance and alignment to dynamic capabilities.  With dynamic capabilities 
representing those distinct capabilities that a firm ultimately chooses to design and 
cultivate in order to establish and/or maintain a sustainable competitive advantage, 
strategic resources can be thought of the central building blocks of such (dynamic) 
capabilities (Wang and Ahmed, 2007). 
 
More recently, it has been suggested that through the significant contributions towards 
and overall longevity of the RBV perspective (including but not limited to Penrose 
1959; Wernfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Teece, Pisano & Shuen 1997, Priem & Butler 2001, 
Winter 2003 and Kraaijenbrink, Spender and Groen 2010) that the RBV has advanced 
to a resource-based theory (RBT) (Barney, Ketchen Jr. and Wright, 2011).  Barney et. 
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al. (2011) argue that in order for the RBT to continue to advance and remain relevant, it 
must continue to explore/examine/clarify future research applications, including: 
 
i) interlinkages with other perspectives; 
ii) process of resource acquisition and development; 
iii) the micro-foundations of resource-based theory; 
iv) resource-based theory and sustainability; and 
v) method and measurement issues within resource-based theory. 
 
In building this research program, what follows is an examination of the links between 
RBV, RBT and dynamic capabilities.  Within this broad “capability perspective” (Floyd 
et. al., 2000), the acquisition and/or development of dynamic capabilities through the 
engagement of a firm’s alliance portfolio will be explored within specific case of the 
healthcare industry.  It is argued that this ultimately leads to corporate shared value 
(CSV). 
 
 
3.2 RBV, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, AND INTERORGANISATIONAL 
NETWORKS 
 
Barney (1991) posits that in order for resources to contribute towards a competitive 
advantage they must reflect and achieve the VRIN attributes/requirements.  Barringer 
and Harrison (2000) identify interorganisational relationships as a means to secure 
VRIN attributes/requirements, largely through increasing the amount/quality of ideas 
through an increased “brain trust” (p. 373); and through increasing market penetration 
opportunities and overall brand reputation.  Barringer and Harrison (2000) also identify 
however that the means (interorganisational relationships) of establishing a competitive 
advantage may in fact negate the VRIN attributes, insofar as a resource cannot 
necessarily meet the VRIN attributes if multiple organisations are in essence reward for 
participating/engaging in such a relationship.  This research program will explore and 
examine under which conditions (within the context of resource theory) managers make 
the basic decision to obtain VRIN resources through the engagement of an alliance 
portfolio (a form of an interorganisational network), rather than building or buying such 
resources (Raab & Kenis, 2009). 
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3.3 PORTER’S 5-FORCES & RESOURCE BASED VIEW (RBV) 
 
As described within the above sections, a major focus of strategic management research 
is the investigation to the requirements in achieving a sustainable competitive 
advantage.  Porter’s contributions (1980; 1985) represented a significant break in 
traditional literature insofar as he focused on firm performance within an industry 
environment that could be described as dynamic.  Through the 5-Forces model 
(comprising of the threat of new entrants; threat of substitute products; buyer bargaining 
power; supplier bargaining power; and the overall competitive rivalry) Porter (1985) 
postulates that firms ultimately make a conscious decision as to how best position their 
respective strategy within a specific industry structure.  Thus, the major decision of the 
firm is to determine and clarify, what specific activities build the desired strategy in 
alignment to the industry structure.  Porter (1980) clarifies that such strategies are 
thematic, representing a choice between differentiation (focus on super-normal margin), 
cost leadership (efficiency) and niche. 
 
Alternatively, the resource based view perspective (RBV) aims to determine how a firm 
aims to secure a sustainable competitive advantage via its unique resources, and 
resulting configurations.  As outlined in the section below, resources are the 
foundational building blocks of capabilities, or bundled resources directed towards the 
accomplishment of a specific, defined intent.  Wang and Ahmed (2007) describe 
resources as the basic building blocks to amount a strategic approach, with capabilities 
representing a general proficiency in prioritising and deploying resources to an intended 
outcome.  Core capabilities are those which align and advance to the organisational 
strategy, with dynamic capabilities representing “the processes of transforming firm 
resources and capabilities into outputs in such forms as products or services that deliver 
superior value to customers; such transformation is embarked on in such a swift, precise 
and creative manner in line with the industry’s changes (Wang & Ahmed, 2007; p 36).” 
 
In comparing and contrasting Porter’s framework with the RBV perspective in regards 
to sustainable competitive advantage, Spanos and Lioukas (2001) summarise that 
“whereas Porter views strategy as being primarily industry driven, the resource-based 
perspective posits that the essence of strategy is or should be defined by the firm’s 
unique resources and capabilities (p. 910).” In considering the complementary aspects 
of the two-perspectives, Spanos and Lioukas (2001) suggest that:  
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“it could be argued that the resource-based approach, by emphasising firm-
specific efforts in developing and combining resources to achieve competitive 
advantage, provides the “Strength-Weaknesses” part of the overall SWOT 
framework, while industry analysis supplied the “Opportunities-Threats” part 
(Foss, 1996) (p. 911).” 
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CHAPTER 4 - DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES 
 
As the rate of change within the global competitive environment and resulting industrial 
markets continues to accelerate, firms have increasingly focused on building, acquiring 
and positioning unique resources and resource bundles to pursue sustainable 
competitive advantage (Teece, et. al., 1997; Eisenhardt et. al., 2000; Barreto, 2010).  
Where the RBV provides an appreciation of a firm’s heterogeneous resources and 
resulting bundles within a more stable environment, dynamic capabilities provide an 
understanding of how such resources are deployed/bundled to achieve (if not a fleeting 
or temporary) competitive advantage (Barreto, 2010).  Helfat and Peteraf (2009) posit 
“what is unique about the dynamic capabilities concept is that it also addresses that 
Holy Grail of strategic questions: how to sustain a capabilities-based advantage in the 
context of environmental change (p. 99).” 
 
Teece et. al (1997) define dynamic capabilities “as the firm’s ability to integrate, build 
and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments (p. 516).” Wang and Ahmed (2007) define dynamic capabilities “as a 
firm’s behavioural orientation constantly to integrate, reconfigure, renew and recreate 
its resources and capabilities and most importantly, upgrade and reconstruct its core 
capabilities in response to the changing environment to attain and sustain competitive 
advantage (p. 35).” Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, Teece and Winter 
(2007) define dynamic capabilities as “the capacity of an organisation to purposefully 
create, extend, or modify its resource base (p. 1)”, and that this definition “applies to 
not-for-profit organisations (p. 6).” Dynamic capabilities represent those specific 
capabilities that a firm ultimately chooses to design and cultivate, thus becoming 
distinct, with the aim of obtaining and building a sustainable competitive advantage.  
This perspective complements Porter’s (1980) industrial framework model insofar as 
the focus is internally within the internal-control of the firm, rather that the competitive 
forces within a given market/industry.  Teece et. al. (1997) describe the resulting 
capability developments and there respective choices as heterogeneous, and sticky, 
inferring a certain time requirement or condition of such resource and resource 
complement choices.  Teece et. al. (1997) also highlight the importance for internal and 
external competency development, stating that:  
Page 15 
 
“Winners in the global marketplace have been firms that can demonstrate timely 
responsiveness and rapid and flexible product innovation, coupled with the 
management capability to effectively coordinate and redeploy internal and 
external competencies (p. 515).” 
 
Wang and Ahmed (2007) propose a cascading approach in describing the core elements 
and components ultimately required for a dynamic capability in describing a cascading 
assembly of resources, capabilities, core capabilities and dynamic capabilities.  Wang 
and Ahmed (2007) describe resources as the basic building blocks, with capabilities 
representing a general proficiency in prioritising and deploying resources to an intended 
outcome.  Core capabilities are those which align and advance to the organisational 
strategy, with dynamic capabilities representing “the processes of transforming firm 
resources and capabilities into outputs in such forms as products or services that deliver 
superior value to customers; such transformation is embarked on in such a swift, precise 
and creative manner in line with the industry’s changes (Wang & Ahmed, 2007; p 36).” 
Given the unit of analysis of dynamic capabilities is that of the firm, Teece et. al. (1997) 
focus on processes, positions and paths, whereby “…the competitive advantage of firms 
lies with its managerial and organisational processes, shaped by its (specific) asset 
position, and the paths available to it (p. 518).” Additionally, Barreto (2010) suggests 
that advancing the concept of dynamic capability into a formalised theory would benefit 
from contributions towards the literature gap pertaining to the boundaries and 
conditions in which dynamic capabilities are effective.  Barreto (2010) states: 
 
It is important that future research attempt to identify not only new types of firms 
for which dynamic capabilities are an important concept but also the types of 
firms for which the concept is less useful.  Without such information, the risks of 
this literature becoming a “big tent” will be higher, reducing its practical value (p. 
277-278). 
 
Teece et. al. (1997) recognise the development of specific capabilities, and their 
respective integrations resulting in long-term consequences in terms of a firm’s abilities 
and overall competitive direction.  Thus dynamic capabilities represent an ability not 
only of the firm to be proficient, distinct, efficient and effective in their respective 
process and resulting product/service outcomes, but these internal processes and 
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resulting products/services must be alignment with the demands of the external 
competitive environment.  It is within this perspective, that dynamic capabilities are 
recognised as a significant contributor towards a firm’s ability to secure a sustainable 
competitive advantage.  Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) criticise this perspective 
suggesting, “long-term competitive advantage lies in resource configurations, not 
dynamic capabilities (p. 1118)”, which seems overly absolute in its perspective, 
suggesting a degree of mutual exclusivity between theoretical approaches which is 
rarely supported/observed in the literature.  However, in their later contribution, Wang 
and Ahmed (2007) recognise resources and resource bundles as the foundation of 
capabilities, core capabilities, and ultimately dynamic capabilities.  Thus, rather than 
resources or dynamic capabilities being solely responsible in securing a sustainable 
competitive advantage, perhaps, as Wang and Ahmed (2007) suggest, it is the 
advancement and comprehensive integration of resources, capabilities, core capabilities 
and dynamic capabilities, and all the requirements to support, including organisational 
learning, creation of alliances, network involvement, and integration into 
commercialisation ends that ultimately contributes to a sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
 
 
4.2 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES & SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
In order for firms to position towards a sustainable competitive advantage, it has been 
proposed that such resources and resulting capabilities must be valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and non-substitutable (critical), or “VRIN” components (Barney, 1991; 
Wang and Ahmed, 2007).  Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) summarise the central 
criticisms of the RBV and resulting dynamic capabilities approach, as being vague, non-
directional and non-alignment with empirical developments.  In their review, 
development, and compare/contrast of existing literature, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) 
provide the following summary table outlining the re-conceptualisation of dynamic 
capabilities (p. 1111) (shown below):  
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Table 1: Traditional and Reconceptualisation View of Dynamic Capabilities, as presented 
by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000)   
  
Perhaps most importantly, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) suggest that the realisation of a 
sustainable competitive advantage, the central intent of dynamic capabilities, is more 
complex, asymmetrical and varied than traditionally postulated.  Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) go so far as to suggest possible business model components to assist in the 
development of such dynamic capabilities, including rapid prototyping, real-time 
information, clustered teams/alliances, and extensive communication as a means to 
align internal (firm) capability development and the competitive industrial-market. A 
key insight offered by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) is that as change within the 
environment becomes less moderate and more volatile, the ability for organisational 
leaders to identify, develop, recognise and evolve capabilities is mitigated; however, 
they suggest that organisations can alter capabilities through leveraging, creating, 
accessing and releasing resources.  Helfat et. al. (2007) posit “strategy matters most 
during times of change”, and “to survive and prosper under conditions of change, firms 
must develop the ‘dynamic capabilities’ to create, extend and modify the ways in which 
they make their living (p. 1).” 
 
In their review and assessment of the current empirical literature base, Wang and 
Ahmed (2007) identify three major component factors of dynamic capabilities, 
including adaptive, absorptive and innovation capabilities.  The adaptive capability 
refers to the nimbleness of the firm in recognising industrial shifts (opportunities and 
threats), and ultimately positioning organisational resources to secure competitive 
advantage.  The absorptive capacity reflects the learning culture and effectiveness of an 
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organisation.  An organisations ability to learn and apply such knowledge and/or 
intelligence is critical to organisational growth, change and development.  Finally, a 
firm’s ability to innovate and create new products, services, markets, networks, and 
processes is essential for organisational growth and regeneration.  Wang and Ahmed 
(2007) propose a conceptual framework integrating the major components and 
integration of dynamic capabilities (provided below) (p. 39): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: From Wang and Ahmed (2007)  
 
The essence of the above framework is that dynamic capabilities are developed in 
response to a dynamic, or volatile industry.  The alignment between the resulting 
dynamic capabilities and the firm’s strategy is critical, insofar as the resulting strategic 
focus leads to a distinct, value creating set of capabilities, which in turn, Wang and 
Ahmed (2007) propose have a direct impact on firm performance.  A key inference of 
their model is that dynamic capabilities do not have a direct impact to firm performance; 
rather, it is an indirect relationship/contribution.  The candidate would suggest that a 
core criticism of the conceptual framework relates to the directional relationships 
outlined within the framework itself.  More specifically, are firms able to “design and 
build” specific dynamic capabilities, align to an overall strategy, develop a set of 
distinct capabilities that lead to high performance; or are high-performance 
organisations successful because they defaulted (by choice) the right mixture and 
balance of capabilities that were ultimately required in the future market environment?   
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4.3 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES, SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE & 
NETWORKS 
 
The alignment between the literature of dynamic capabilities and interorganisational 
networks is significant.  Firms choose to participate in interorganisational networks for 
a variety of reasons, including access to unique resources, markets, distribution channels 
and/or customers; the opportunity to learn, grow and share in the collaborative 
development of intellectual property; and the development and cultivation of specific 
competencies, including “production, marketing, distribution, regulatory approval, and 
access to new technologies (Gulati 1998a, p. 299).  These empirical findings within the 
network literature align to the main component factors of dynamic capabilities, insofar 
as the central resulting focus of these factors is to identify and pursue new market 
opportunities; to integrate and embed organisational learning into commercialisation 
objectives; and to create new products, services and markets through innovation (Wang 
& Ahmed, 2007).  Where the literature of dynamic capabilities suggests the specific 
factors required to establish such capabilities, the network literature base suggests 
specific insights in how such ends may be achieved through collaborative relationships 
with other organisations and/or networks.  More specifically, Barreto (2010) suggests 
that “Eisenhardt and Martin (2000, p. 1110) argued that dynamic capabilities are 
important not only in high-velocity markets but also in “moderately dynamic” markets, 
that is, those where “change occurs frequently, but along predictable and linear paths (p. 
262).” 
 
Beyond the alignment and fit between the literature of dynamic capabilities and network 
theory, some fundamental questions can be considered within current literature gaps, 
especially as it relates to the application of these theoretical insights in strategic and 
managerial practice.  For example, the literature within dynamic capabilities suggests 
that firms should focus on building capabilities that best support, align and advance 
their respective core business, does it by extension infer that in order to operationalise 
the development of such capabilities, that organisations should seek and align their 
respective alliances and/or network involvements to those which are aligned to their 
core business? To take this consideration a step further, do managers consciously or 
unconsciously seek out such partners, specifically within the dynamic capabilities of 
commercialisation and innovation? And given the dynamic nature of the competitive 
market, how does the development and effectiveness of these (dynamic) capabilities 
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evolve over time, and what is the impact in regards to the complement of 
alliances/network partners? The integration between the literature bases of dynamic 
capabilities and interorganisational networks (specifically alliance portfolios) provides a 
rich opportunity to explore these fundamental questions, which the candidate intends to 
contribute towards via this research program. 
 
 
4.4 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS & GENERAL CRITICISM 
 
An empirical case study of Smith Corona, Danneels (2011) identifies the failure to adapt 
as the primary reason for the firm’s commercial failure.  As Danneels (2011) explains, 
Smith Corona was successful only once in creating a new operational competence in 
electronics, but failed to capitalise in developing an appropriate business model to 
support such a capability.  Danneels (2011) recognises the concept of “resource 
cognition”, defined as “the identification of resources and the understanding of their 
fungibility (cf. Denrell, Arvidsson, and Zander, 2004; Marino, 1996; as cited by 
Danneels 2011), and results in resource schemas (p. 21)”, which is significant given 
“understanding resource cognition is critical to advancing the theory of dynamic 
capability (p. 26).” Danneels (2011) offers insight on the central questions required to 
achieve resource cognition, including “what are our key resources and competencies, 
and what is the range of their potential uses (p. 27).” Within this empirical case study, it 
is suggested that Smith Corona was unable to achieve clarity to these critical questions, 
and as a result, remained fixed, or stuck in historical schemas, which in-turn act as 
strategic blinders to perceived (current and future) value and application of existing 
resources to new markets and opportunities.  Understanding the process in which 
managers and organisations ultimately achieve resource cognition remains a critical gap 
in the existing literature (Danneels, 2011).  Achieving competency in resource cognition 
(through and in conjunction to interorganisational relationships) and appreciating if such 
relationships can create new dynamic capabilities is a central focus of this research 
program.  As a general criticism, in drawing from the Smith Corona case one must be 
careful in considering the scope of generalisability, given the focus of a single company.  
Secondarily, while the Smith Corona case study provides interesting insights and 
resulting concepts (e.g. resource cognition), one must appreciate that reflections in 
hindsight are often presented in greater linearity and clarity than experienced in reality.  
This criticism should be appreciated not only within the Smith Corona case, but also in 
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any manager’s application of strategic management concepts such as dynamic 
capabilities. 
 
It is important to recognise that the theory and conceptual application of dynamic 
capabilities is not limited to large, established organisations.  Newbert (2005) identifies 
that the process of firm formation, lead by entrepreneurs, is in fact a dynamic capability, 
whereby activities/processes such as “developing a model and/or prototype, purchasing 
materials, buying and/or renting facilities and/or equipment, investing their own money, 
committing full time to the venture, hiring employees, and engaging in promotional 
efforts are significantly and positively related to new firm formation success for all 
nascent entrepreneurs (p. 67).” This is significant not only for new (small) business 
formation, but increasingly for medium to large firms whom are actively investing in 
“intrapreneurship” and subsidiary “spin-offs” to support the development of specific 
dynamic capabilities (e.g. commercialisation and innovation) and growth.  Secondly, 
while the unit of analysis is the entrepreneur and the resulting small business, the 
theoretical alignment between the development and cultivation of dynamic capabilities 
within this perspective suggests a degree of scalability to larger firms, insofar as the 
consistent tension between internal development/positioning and the external market 
needs and requirements. 
 
The concept of dynamic capabilities is not without criticism. Winter (2003) concisely 
summarises the bulk of criticism in stating: 
 
“Many strategy scholars remain sceptical about the value of the concept of 
‘dynamic capabilities.’ While some see dynamic capabilities as the key to 
competitive advantage (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997), others seem to doubt 
that there actually are such things. Still others believe that they exist, but suspect 
that they are ‘born, not made’—i.e., they doubt that deliberate efforts to 
strengthen such capabilities are a genuine option for managers. And some 
believe that while they are a genuine option, they are not necessarily something 
that confers competitive advantage. (p. 991).” 
 
Winter (2003) suggests that there are differing levels of capabilities, including 
“operational capabilities” as well as dynamic capabilities, and suggests that “ad hoc” 
decision making may allow a firm to actually be more effective in its response and more 
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efficient in its required resources to solve the strategic management challenge, given a 
lack of investment (and opportunity cost) required to establish a set of dynamic 
capabilities. In discussing core capabilities, Leonard-Barton (1992) describes a related 
perspective in suggesting that the development of core-capabilities both mitigates and 
advances development. More specifically, Leonard-Barton (1992) posits that: 
 
“Values, skills, managerial systems, and technical systems that served the 
company well in the past and may still be wholly appropriate for some projects 
or parts of projects, are experienced by others as core rigidities-inappropriate 
sets of knowledge. Core rigidities are the flip side of core capabilities. They are 
not neutral; these deeply embedded knowledge sets actively create problems. (p. 
118)”  
 
As is the case with other macro concepts and constructs, the phrase “dynamic 
capabilities” carries a wide variation of definitions and intent. As with any research 
program, it is essential that a clear definition of terms and phrases be established to 
clearly delineate the variables and topic of study. For this reason, and in recognition of 
the related criticism related to dynamic capabilities, the established definition for this 
research program is provided by Barreto (2010): 
 
 “A dynamic capability is the firm’s potential to systematically solve problems, 
formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-
oriented decisions, and to change its resource base (p. 271).” 
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CHAPTER 5 - DYNAMIC CAPABILITY: INNOVATION & 
COMMERCIALISATION  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout the developed world, graduates of healthcare education face an industry in 
transition, with core challenges related to cost of care, quality of care (including patient 
safety) and overall access to care. Industry innovations and resulting commercialisation 
offer significant contributions to these macro-societal challenges, while offering the 
lead organisation an opportunity for growth, recognition and financial contribution 
towards core business priorities.  The resulting section integrates the capabilities of 
innovation and commercialisation together, via the perspective that innovation without 
commercialisation is just an idea (Johnson, 2010). In response, networks such as the 
MaRS  Discovery District located in Toronto, Ontario Canada, which situates research, 
business and capital together, providing entrepreneurs with educational, consulting and 
access to financial capital resources
2
. 
 
 
5.2 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIC CHANGE & BUILDING 
DYNAMIC CAPABILITY 
 
In considering the intent of building new dynamic capability in innovation, MacIntosh 
and MacLean (1999) provide an applicable framework explaining how rapid, 
fundamental and transformational change is approached. MacIntosh and MacLean 
(1999) explain that organisations (resulting from external and/or internal requirements, 
ultimately leading in failing performance) are forced to contemplate and learn “how to 
do to things differently”, or in greater context, build new dynamic capability illustrated 
below through the “bifurcation zone” (p. 305): 
 
 
                                                        
2 (http://www.marsdd.com) 
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Figure 2: From MacIntosh and MacLean (1999) 
 
As organisations transition out from the “bifurcation zone” MacIntosh and MacLean 
(1999) observe that initially, focusing on the traditional means/strategies (through a 
corresponding increase in control/focus) leads to an initial increase in performance, 
followed by a rapid performance decline (identified via curve [1]). Alternatively, the 
new methods lead to an initial/immediate drop in performance, which results in 
“switching pressures” back to the traditional methods; however, if the pressures to 
resort back to traditional strategies are withstood, the organisation eventually transitions 
to an increased level of performance (identified via curve [2]). Those firms that 
ultimately follow curve [2] have demonstrated an ability to create new dynamic 
capability. This process, and the need to constantly learn, evolve and build dynamic 
capability are repeated throughout the longevity of the firm.  From an empirical 
standpoint, the case study involving Smith Corona (Danneels, 2011) provides a unique 
illustration involving the integration of the above framework, the inability of a firm to 
create dynamic capability, and the resulting corporate failure.  
 
A closely related concept in strategy literature is that of “skunkwork projects” which are 
typically developed by small teams investigating new technologies, strategies, and/or 
approaches. Similar to the above framework offered by MacIntosh and MacLean 
(1999), skunkwork projects are often seen as counter to the traditional way of doing 
things, or considered outside the focus/intent of the core business. There is typically 
immense pressure to end such projects due to the (perceived) high costs and limited 
benefits, however such projects can lead to revolutionary change and developments 
(Rich, 1994).  
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While different concepts, the framework of MacIntosh and MacLean (1999) and that of 
skunkwork projects offer unique and powerful insights as to why strategic change (of 
the rapid, revolutionary, transformational perspective) is so difficult to achieve, and why 
strategic inertia is often the empirical result. Organisations that have successfully grown 
and secured super-normal profits over a sustained period of time will experience a 
preference for past processes and allocations, leading to a “sticky”, if not increasingly 
irrelevant culture (Manjumdar, 1999). These insights will be critical in the design and 
development of the data collection and analysis phases of this research program, insofar 
as these themes will be examined within the context of building dynamic capabilities 
(new ways of doing new things) within/between interorganisational relationships.      
 
 
5.3 INNOVATION, COMMERCIALISATION & THE ORGANISATIONAL 
BUSINESS MODEL 
 
In defining innovation, Kline and Rosenberg (1985) propose that “we might think of 
innovation as a new product, but it may also be i) a new process of production; ii) the 
substitution of a cheaper material, newly developed for a given task, in an essentially 
unaltered product; iii) the reorganisation of production, internal functions, or 
distribution arrangements leading to an increased efficiency, better support for a given 
product, or lower costs; or iv) an improvement in instruments or methods of doing 
innovation (p. 279).” The definition above provides a critical distinction in considering 
innovation, insofar as it reflects not only reflects specific product/service innovation, 
but also reflects “a new process of production”, which alternatively could be described 
as a “business model”. This is critical, as demonstrated via Apple’s iTunes/iPod™ 
technologies, where an innovative business model was necessary to support, sustain, 
and grow the adoption of the innovative product/service.  Christensen (2009) suggests 
that when dealing with disruptive (as apposed to sustaining) innovations, the lack of a 
corresponding innovative business model “spells suicide” for the commercialisation 
process/results.  
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This result is a (simplified for conceptual illustration and clarity) process whereby 
specific dynamic capabilities impact and integrate to support an initial innovative idea 
to commercial launch (Christensen 2003, 2009; Johnson, 2010; Rothaermel & Hess, 
2007): 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Influenced and informed by Christensen 2003, 2009; Johnson, 2010; Rothaermel 
& Hess, 2007 
 
Each of the segments illustrated in the above model represent specific, integrative 
dynamic capabilities, including the management of human capital, innovation of both 
business models and products/services, and commercialisation. While the focus of this 
research program is centred on the dynamic capabilities of innovation and 
commercialisation, human capital management has been recognised above as the 
genesis to innovation and commercialisation. As Simon (1991) states:  
 
“all organisational learning takes place inside human heads; an organisation 
learns in only two ways: (a) by the learning of its members, or (b) by ingesting 
new members who have knowledge the organisation didn’t previously have (p. 
125).”   
 
Lichtenthaler (2005) states “External knowledge commercialisation (exploitation) 
describes an organisation’s deliberate commercialising of knowledge assets to another 
independent organisation involving a contractual obligation for compensation in 
monetary or non-monetary terms (p. 233).” 
 
5.4 INNOVATION, COMMERCIALISATION & DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES  
 
As developed in the previous sections above, an organisation establishes a business 
model to “deliver value in return for compensation (Johnson 2010, p. 6).” In examining 
why so many innovations fail to secure the commercial objectives Christensen (2009) 
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compares the legislative process, one complete with mitigation and bargaining of 
original intent, to that of advancing an innovative idea/business model within an 
established organisation. In regards to disruptive innovation, Christensen (2003) states 
that based on empirical analysis (mainly within the industries of hardware technology 
and steel manufacturing) that: 
 
“In sustaining circumstances – when the race entails making better products that 
can be sold for more money to attractive customers – we found that incumbents 
almost always prevail. In disruptive circumstances – when the challenge is to 
commercialise a simpler, more convenient product that sells for less money and 
appeals to a new or unattractive customer set – the entrants are likely to beat 
incumbents (p. 32).” 
 
Christensen (2003) provides an applicable healthcare example in the development of 
angioplasty procedures, where rather than providing a direct alternative to open heart 
surgery, the procedure offered a temporary treatment for patients who were receiving no 
treatment whatsoever. Following the themes of dynamic capabilities, Christensen 
(2003) suggests that innovations (both business models and products/services) should 
be focused on customers that are “non consumers” (p. 288), thus requiring an alternative 
approach and offering to new segments. Alternatively, Christensen (2003) recommends 
creating product/service offerings that are “just good enough”, and that result in “low-
end disruption” (p. 288). Christensen (2003) recognises the role of dynamic capabilities 
in securing a sustainable competitive advantage in stating “It is better to develop 
competencies where the money will be made in the future than to cling tenaciously to 
those skills that made you successful in the past (p. 289).” While Wang and Ahmed 
(2007) describe dynamic capabilities within the context of a cascading framework 
(inclusive of resources, capabilities, core capabilities, dynamic capabilities), Christensen 
(1997) describes organisational capabilities in terms of resources, processes and values, 
or “RPV Framework” (p. 191). In utilising either framework, both perspectives provide 
guidance and direction to strategists to which innovations to pursue/commercialise. As a 
general criticism, in reviewing Christensen’s contributions (1997; 2003; 2007) one must 
be careful to the generalisability of the findings and recommendations, as Christensen’s 
work was largely completed within the computer disk-drive industry. Application and 
generalisation to other industrial settings without caution lends these findings and 
resulting theory to being tautological.   
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CHAPTER 6 - STRATEGIC ALLIANCES, NETWORKS & 
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIOS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS 
 
Within the well established literature of strategic alliances, the concept of constellations; 
clusters; alliance portfolios; inter-organisational, integrated and whole networks has 
received significant interest within the last 30-years (Gulati 1998a, 1999; Gomes-
Casseres 1994; Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995; Barringer and Harrison 2000; 
Wassmer 2010). The research field proposes several alternative, if not complementary 
paradigms of which alliance networks originate from including the fields of sociology 
(dyads), economics (transaction cost economics), computer science (information 
management) and strategy (sharing of select resources; distribution of collective risk; 
etc.). Barringer and Harrison (2000) identify interorganisational relationships as being 
one of a number of specific forms, including a joint venture; network; consortia, 
alliance, trade association; and interlocking directorate. While appreciating that these 
forms are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and further that relationships (and the 
respective forms) evolve and change over time, the focus and interest of this literature 
review and research proposal will focus specifically on interorganisational networks.  
 
In examining and researching interorganisational networks, Barringer and Harrison 
(2000) summarise the major theoretical paradigms within the field, including: 
 
i. Transaction costs economics; 
ii. Resource dependency; 
iii. Strategic choice; 
iv. Stakeholder theory; 
v. Organisational learning and institutional theory.  
 
Rather than relying on a single paradigm to examine, understand and appreciate 
interorganisational networks, Barringer and Harrison (2000) propose that “blending the 
theoretical paradigms together may provide an even more useful means of 
understanding the formation of interorganisational networks” (p. 382). While the 
theoretical perspectives described above hold potential value for future research, the 
intent of this research program will primarily be focused on the resource dependence 
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perspective (Barney, 1991; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; 
Priem & Butler, 2001; Wang & Ahmed, 2007; Snow, Fjeldstad, Lettl and Miles 2011), 
with influences from the strategic choice and stakeholder theory of the firm 
perspectives. The theoretical perspectives of transaction costs economics, organisational 
learning and institutional theory will not be a major focus of this research program, and 
if reflected, will be done so peripherally.  
 
In their summary article on interorganisational networks at the network level, Provan, 
Fish and Sydow (2007) illustrate that the peer-reviewed literature associated with the 
general topic areas of ‘networks’, ‘alliances’, and ‘clusters’ is significant3. The literature 
base can be further defined to include the four major relational perspectives in 
researching network relationships, including: dyadic/triadic alliance networks; the 
impact of the alliance network to an organisation; the impact of an organisation to an 
alliance network; and finally the emerging field of ‘whole networks’ (Provan, Fish and 
Sydow, 2007). It is this final network perspective, the unit of analysis as the network 
itself, that is unique and also the most challenging in terms of applied research.  Based 
on the review of the empirical research, Provan et. al. (2007) recommend the following 
directions and macro-areas for consideration in future whole network research: 
 
i. network properties and processes 
ii. network governance and operations 
iii. network development, dynamics and evolution 
iv. network outcomes and effectiveness 
 
Provan et. al. (2007) summarise the methodological challenges in applying current 
research methods to whole networks given the unit of analysis is the network itself, core 
resource challenges such as time, money are frequently realised. In addition, Provan et. 
al. (2007) identify the issue of “boundary”, or “network bounding” as a central 
challenge, insofar as “network boundaries generally must be more carefully defined and 
delineated, so that it is clear which nodes and ties are included in the network and which 
are not (p. 504).”  
 
                                                        
3 Using the InfoTrac Search Engine, 46,500, 5,309 and 14,717 matched articles, respectively. Provan, K.G.; 
A.C. Fish and J. Sydow. 2007. Interorganisational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical 
literature on whole networks. Journal of Management 33(3): 479 - 516.  
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Within the network literature, there is a wide application and reference to terms such as 
networks, network clusters, and alliance portfolios, which are often used 
interchangeably to refer to any network engagement on behalf of a firm (Wassmer, 
2010). Grounded and derived from the network literature base, Wassmer (2010) defines 
alliance portfolios as “as a focal firm’s past as well as ongoing strategic alliances”, with 
Baum (2000) defining as “a focal firm’s egocentric alliance network.” For the purpose 
of clarity, this research program will examine the role of a specific network relationship, 
that of the alliance portfolio, in the development of dynamic capabilities within 
healthcare firms. This is a critical distinction, and one that fits well with the theory of 
dynamic capabilities insofar as the focus of analysis remains on a focal firm, and the net 
outcome resulting from the engagement of a portfolio of alliances (both past and 
present). It is also acknowledged that the more generic phrase “interorganisational 
networks” will be used throughout the research program, which reflects the general 
established practice within the network literature base.   
 
The purpose and intent of interorganisational networks can take a number of forms, 
including marketing networks, commercialisation networks, strategy networks, research 
and development networks, technology networks, supplier networks and distribution 
networks (Moller et al. 2003; Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg, 2009). In explaining the 
intent of various networks, Moller et. al. (2005) suggests: 
 
“The way economic value is created is fundamentally changing. The increasing 
importance of knowledge, technological complexity, global competition, and the 
availability of digital information technology are driving this change (Castells, 
1996). Individual companies, even major multinationals, such as ABB, IBM, 
Microsoft and Nokia, cannot internally master all the relevant value activities of 
the value chain from product innovation to customer care, nor is it economically 
sensible for them to try (p. 1274).”  
 
Thus, the engagement with interorganisational networks/alliance portfolios, as an 
attractive and potentially effective business model for firms to secure a competitive 
advantage has been established within the literature. From a business development and 
commercialisation perspective, a firm’s involvement within an interorganisational 
network could help secure resources, learning, capabilities and contacts critical to the 
development of product/service offerings (innovation), and the successful launch of 
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such products/services within the competitive marketplace (commercialisation). Moller 
et. al. (2009) suggests the employment of such network strategies to help navigate the 
development and commercialisation efforts within specific markets: 
 
“…“high-velocity markets” (as defined by Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), 
characterised by nonlinear and unpredictable change, with blurred market 
boundaries and ambiguous and shifting market players, with no evidently-
successful business models (p. 450)”.   
 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) propose that the sustainable competitive advantage of an 
organisation rests with the core competencies in which an organisation identifies, 
cultivates and leverages within the competitive environment. In defining core 
competencies, Prahalad and Hamel (1990) propose that that core competencies should 
provide access to diverse markets; contribute towards the value proposition as it is 
dedicated to the customer; and be difficult for competitors to identify, interpret, and 
ultimately, copy. Core competencies reflect the “know-how”, or “collective corporate 
learning” that can be applied to product development (innovation), relationships with 
customers or suppliers, and/or commercialisation objectives.  The core competencies of 
innovation and commercialisation are significant from a contextual and directional 
perspective. While the focus of organisational competencies has had a significant 
contribution to the field of strategic management and development, the lack of 
perspective or applied focus to how such competencies evolve over time and through 
major industrial transformations suggests a degree of stability that is rarely observed in 
most industrial settings. This specific criticism of competencies can be considered 
strength of the dynamic capabilities literature. A major source of innovations and 
breakthroughs occur within or with the collaboration of universities and colleges and 
industry. Litan, Mitchell and Reedy (2007) suggest that given the mandate of basic 
sciences (and the associated innovation) within universities and colleges, 
commercialisation as a core competency has been considered outside the defined 
university role. Isett and Provan (2005) posit that interorgansational networks within the 
public industry may operate differently than those in private industry, given the 
dynamics associated with government financing and resulting legislation/regulation.  
 
The capabilities and functions of innovation and commercialisation remain a critical and 
timely challenge for non-profit organisations. Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg (2009) 
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propose that the establishment and integration of the R&D and commercialisation 
networks are critical to the overall commercial success of the product/service launch 
phase. The authors also suggest that the integration of government agencies, for-profit, 
and non-profit entities within the collaborative R&D and commercialisation networks 
all play significant roles and provide critical contributions to the success of the 
product/service introduction. While the insights provided by Aarikka-Stenroos et al. 
(2009) are encouraging, the methodology suffers from a limited scope insofar as the 
research program contrasts the effectiveness of two separate networks within the 
context of fundamentally different projects, and arguably differing industry space 
(product development and launch).  Such a small sample of participants and 
investigation to limited industrial sectors in the same geographic environment 
potentially limit the overall validity and generalisability of these insights.  In leveraging 
a network perspective to describe how to best influence the creation of new business 
fields, Moller et. al. (2009) summarises that “proactive firms possessing strong learning 
and networking capabilities not only survive in the dynamic environment of new 
business fields, but can also influence the birth of future innovations and new product 
developments (p. 457).” 
 
Recently the network literature has focused on the creation of “intentional nets” as a 
means for individual firms to not only innovate, but also commercialise such 
innovations.  Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg (2007) derived a synthesised conceptual 
framework outlining the integration of strategic network theory in the context of an 
infused innovation and commercialisation network (p. 6) (shown below).  
 
 
Figure 4: Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg (2007) 
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Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg (2007) describe the conceptual framework above as “a 
preliminary framework describing the creation and management of a net needed to 
commercialise a radical innovation (p. 6).” The framework provides the rationale and 
emerging core requirements for network formation, and the initial creation and 
evolution of the network. The themes outlined within the framework created by 
Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg (2007) strongly reflect the suggested macro-themes for 
future network research outlined by Provan et. al. (2007), including network structure, 
network development, network governance, and network outcomes. It is this final 
macro-theme, that of network outcomes, that this model could potentially be further 
developed and enhanced. The framework developed by Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg 
(2007) could be advanced in three-specific ways. First, the articulation and definition of 
a “radical innovation” requires clarity and consensus beyond the subjective “newness” 
of an invention. Secondly, while the conceptual framework provides an excellent 
description of the core “means” of network establishment and evolution, it remains 
silent in identifying the “ends” or results of network engagement/participation. Lastly, 
the conceptual framework has experienced nominal application and exposure to an 
audience beyond select case studies. Based on these criticisms and reflections, the 
model could be potentially expanded to include a more comprehensive perspective of 
network establishment, evolution and outcomes. In attempting to advance such a 
conceptual framework, methodologically Corbin and Strauss (2008) support leveraging 
and synthesising the existing literature (together with initial conceptual frameworks) to 
provide an informed and directed preliminary/initial theory to begin the grounded 
theory process. As such, the candidate intends to employ a case study approach together 
with a grounded theory methodology to advance the core aims and objectives of this 
research program.  
 
In summarising the literature, Barringer and Harrison (2000) identify that the literature 
suffers from a “halo effect,” suggesting that the research base associates positive 
outcomes and general organisational success with network involvement and 
engagement, whilst rarely suggesting or identifying the costs and disadvantages to 
network involvement. While this challenge is identified, no recommendations or 
insights are suggested as to how best to rectify this perceived imbalance within the 
literature. In addition, the literature base tends to be historical in perspective, analysing 
and assessing generally what networks accomplished, or how the operated within a set-
term or project. The dynamic nature of the network, and the state of effectiveness over 
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time is rarely investigated.  As a whole, the literature suggests that engagement with 
networks are positively associated with organisational learning and 
competency/capability development, however as a further criticism, these generic 
benefits tend not to be examined with any significant degree of rigor as to the 
effectiveness in transferring such capabilities, the costs resulting from network 
engagement, and how network effectiveness is secured over the long-term.  
 
 
6.2 NETWORK-ALLIANCE PORTFOLIOS & DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES OF 
INNOVATION, COMMERCIALISATION 
 
In examining dynamic capabilities and innovation (and by extension commercialisation) 
within the biotechnology industry, Rothaermel and Hess (2007) posit “Dynamic 
capabilities facilitate not only the ability of an organisation to recognise a potential 
technological shift, but also its ability to adapt to change through innovation (Hill and 
Rothaermel 2003, as cited by Rothaermel and Hess 2007).”  Their fundamental criticism 
is related to the state of literature base with the fields of RBV and dynamic capabilities, 
insofar as the core aspect of “heterogeneity” is widely assigned to only a single level of 
perspective without specific reference to the source. More specifically, is the source of 
advantage/dynamic capability (in this case innovation) located at the individual, firm or 
network level (Rothaermel & Hess 2007, p. 898).  Rothaermel & Hess (2007) further 
suggest that the current literature fails to appreciate the integration and interdependency 
between the level of the individual, firm and network, and its relation to creating and 
sustaining heterogeneity at any/all of these respective levels.  
 
In regards to building capabilities through alliance portfolios, Rothaermel & Hess 
(2007) state that: 
 
“industries characterised by complex and rapidly expanding knowledge bases, the 
locus of innovation lies within a network of learning composed of incumbent 
firms, new entrants, and research institutions, rather than within the boundaries of 
individual firms. Thus, to build new capabilities within an emerging technological 
paradigm, incumbent firms frequently need to leverage their external networks to 
source new technology (p. 901).” 
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Rothaermel & Hess (2007) also acknowledge the integration between the resource 
based perspective, dynamic capabilities and alliance portfolios: 
 
 “Although the resource-based view tends to focus on the importance of the 
internal asset base of the firm, researchers have recently posited that network 
relationships may allow a firm to leverage unique resource combinations. Dyer 
and Singh (1998) highlight relation- specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, 
complementary resources and capabilities, as well as effective governance as 
antecedents to an interorganisational competitive advantage (p. 901).”  
 
Through their results, the authors found that innovative output, defined as the amount of 
patents obtained within a given time-period, was positively correlated to intellectual 
human capital; that while increasing expenditures on R&D is correlated with an increase 
in innovative output, it does so at a diminishing rate; and finally that while acquiring 
firms with a capability in innovation can increase the innovative output of a respective 
firm, there was no support in the data that network participation (alliances) led to an 
increase in innovative output. In explaining why networks had no positive correlation to 
a firm’s innovative output, Rothaermel & Hess (2007) suggest that: 
 
“The successful transformation and implementation of codified knowledge 
obtained in an alliance still requires that the firm has the ability to assimilate and 
apply this knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1989, as cited by Rothaermel & 
Hess, 2007). Thus, by controlling for this internal ability, encompassing both 
intellectual human capital and R&D capability, we see that alliances, as a stand-
alone mechanism, appear to be of little value to firm innovation. Although a firm 
can acquire the requisite dynamic capabilities to innovate through acquisitions, 
we find, in contrast, that the firm must already possess prior R&D capability for 
alliances to be a viable mechanism for innovation, as is highlighted in the 
significant interaction effects across levels of analysis (p. 915). 
 
Rothaermel & Hess (2007) did however find interdependencies in heterogeneity 
throughout the levels of the individual, firm and network, but found a disproportionate 
impact within the level of the individual. Further, while strength in human capital 
(individual) had a direct contribution to innovative output, those at the firm and network 
level were complementary (p. 916). In the classic build-buy-partnership decision, within 
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the context of the biotechnology industry, innovation was best supported through 
investment in human capital, with mitigated contributions resulting from increases in 
R&D spending, and little to no impact from alliance/network involvement.  
 
One final theme reflected in the innovation literature is that more is not always better 
(Christensen 2003; Rothaermel & Hess 2007). In order to build specific dynamic 
capabilities in innovation (and resulting commercialisation) organisations must be 
intentional in choosing those investments and contributors that are best suited within 
their respective industries, organisations and product/service/business models at-hand.  
 
Evolving from strategic alliances and networks, Snow, Fjeldstad, Lettl and Miles (2011) 
describe the most recent form of interorganisational collaboration as “communities”, 
whereby the “community is focused on the innovation and commercialisation of 
technology (p. 8), which have resulted in approximately “60 solutions” to-date.  
Through a single case study of Blade.org, Snow et. al. (2011) illustrate the development 
of dynamic capability of innovation and commercialisation through a dedicated, 
multifaceted interorganisational environment involving ~250 participating firms.  Snow 
et. al. (2011) posit that interorganisational networks, or “collaborative community of 
firms” (p. 11) can be designed and cultivated to match and leverage the experience, 
capabilities and resources of differentiated firms, including “prospectors, defenders, and 
analysers (p. 5)” representing a close resemblance to Porter’s (1980) generic strategies 
of differentiation, cost leadership and niche, respectfully. Snow et. al (2011) make a 
critical distinction of the Blade.com model which is that it an intentional model built 
through explicit organisational design, rather than an informal open source community 
which has dominated the software industry over the past decade. As with all single case 
studies, one must be careful in accepting the generalisation and resulting application to 
other environments. Directionally, the Blade.com case study provides insight to an 
alliance portfolio where the benefits and focus is centralised largely on a hub-firm, in 
this case IBM, the owners of the blade server technology. It should be recognised that 
this is one approach of interorganisational collaboration leading to the development of 
dynamic capability in innovation and commercialisation, and that other, less structured 
(and perhaps) intentional collaborations may lead to similar results.  
 
The relationship of relationship formalisation and resulting organisational design will be 
explored further in the interviews of this research program.   
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CHAPTER 7 - RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AIMS & OBJECTIVES 
 
As illustrated in the preceding literature review chapters, the pursuit of competitive 
advantage through the establishment of dynamic capabilities (specifically innovation 
and commercialisation) through both specific alliance and subsequent alliance portfolios 
can be an effective strategy. While the current literature provides a comprehensive 
breadth of characteristics and factors related to alliance relationships, the aim of this 
research program is to explore, specifically, the factors and variables related to the 
establishment of dynamic capabilities amongst firms; what factors and variables are 
relevant; how managers interact and perceive this process; how dynamic capabilities are 
developed; where the resulting capabilities reside. Subsequently, the candidate also 
intends to explore the relationship between individual alliance agreements, and the 
transition to an organisations alliance portfolio.  Finally, the alliance portfolio itself will 
be explored, in terms of the management; evolution and overall benefits of such an 
alliance portfolio. Specifically, the development of dynamic capabilities, and the role 
and impact of an organisation’s individual alliance relationships and that of the alliance 
portfolio represent the core (applied) strategic management problem to be 
examined/explored. To this end, the candidate will focus this research program to the 
following research questions, aim and objectives:    
 
Research Questions:  
i) What role do alliance portfolios play in the development of dynamic capabilities 
within healthcare firms?  
ii) Do the resulting dynamic capabilities reside within and/or between firms? 
 
Research Aim: To explore and examine the role of a firm’s alliance portfolio in the 
development of dynamic capabilities of innovation and commercialisation.  
 
Research Objectives: 
i. To examine the nature of the relationship between securing alliance partners that 
excel in the capabilities of innovation and/or commercialisation and the 
associated impact and transference to the hub/focal-firm (i.e. resource 
cognition); 
ii. To examine managers’ perspectives of engagement within the alliance portfolio 
and the resulting benefits, costs and contributions of such involvement;  
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iii. To explore the overall impact, and effectiveness of such alliance portfolios in 
building/providing/establishing the capabilities of innovation and 
commercialisation within the hub/focal-firm; 
iv. To explore if and how the complement of alliance portfolio partners change over 
time to support the vision/strategy of innovation and commercialisation within 
the hub/focal-firm.  
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CHAPTER 8 - RESEARCH SETTING 
 
The Michener Institute for Applied Health Sciences (Michener) is a post-secondary 
educational institution dedicated to the advancement of the applied-health science 
professions, such as nuclear medicine, radiation-therapy, radiological-technology, 
medical laboratory science, advanced imaging (e.g. CT/MRI/Ultrasound, etc.) and 
genetics technology. Established in 1958, Michener has fulfilled its mission within a 
not-for profit funding model, receiving approximately two-thirds (2/3) of annual 
revenues from the Ministry of Health & Long-Term Care, the government agency 
responsible for health-services within the Province of Ontario. Increasingly, non-
governmental revenue sources, including those resulting from commercialisation 
efforts, have become a critical priority in securing Michener’s financial and strategic 
outlook. As government funding sources become constrained to the rate of inflation, the 
commercialisation of organisational assets such as intellectual property and the spare 
capacity of Michener’s physical space provide an opportunity to offset expenditures 
outside the base-operating costs required to fulfil academic needs. Core strategic 
activities such as innovation, applied research, curriculum redesign and advancement 
are traditionally outside of this base-operating budget, and thus require contributions 
from non-traditional (non-governmental) funding sources.  
 
In addition to the above operating resource challenges, the disciplines of the applied 
health sciences tend to be an extremely “capital-intensive”. More specifically, in order 
to provide students an authentic learning environment, clinical capital assets such as 
fully functional CT-scanners, liner-accelerators, gamma-cameras, and digital platforms 
are employed. With these assets costing anywhere from $0.5-$5.5 million per platform, 
this represents a further (capital) resource gap, insofar as Michener does not have a 
dedicated capital asset replacement commitment fund.  The gap between current 
operating-revenue sources/contributions, combined with the evolving state of 
Michener’s capital assets necessitate the advancement of commercialisation efforts as a 
means to accomplish these mega-end objectives, so long as such activities are related to 
Michener’s core business (education within the applied health sciences), as not to 
jeopardise Michener’s non-profit status.  
 
Michener has cultivated a distinct, multi-industrial alliance portfolio including alliances 
with approximately 155 clinical organisations, approximately 30 private vendor 
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relationships, and approximately 3 academic affiliation agreements. The intent of the 
collaborative network is to cultivate, support and encourage the development of 
successful, relevant healthcare practitioners (graduates), supported through the insights, 
resources, and opportunities provided through the network environment. From a 
network boundary perspective, each of the 155 clinical partners has completed a formal 
clinical affiliation agreement with Michener; similarly each academic partner has 
completed either a formal alliance or affiliation agreement specifying the relevant terms 
and conditions. The private-vendor alliances generally advance in an alternative formal 
agreement process. From the initial point of interest, Michener and the private-vendor 
traditionally produce a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA), and/or a Memorandum of 
Understanding/Agreement (MOU/MOA), with the intent to outline confidentiality and 
confirm the areas of potential collaboration, respectively.  If, after this review period, a 
formal alliance is desired, typically a formal agreement (whether it be an “Alliance 
Agreement”, “Purchase and License Agreement”, or some other deliverable) will be 
developed and signed by both parties.  These documents not only offer a rich source of 
information and insight as to the initial scope, goals and intentions of these alliance 
relationships from the embryonic stage, but they also provide an establishment of 
confidentiality and support for the research program aims and objectives to be pursued.   
 
As the Vice President, Operations (VP-O) of the Michener Institute, I have been directly 
involved in the establishment of the majority of the private-vendor alliances. In my 
current capacity as VP-O, I am the leader of the Business Development Team, charged 
with product/service innovations and commercialisation efforts. Given this capacity, I 
have access to a wealth of historical/contextual documents, agreements and 
deliverables, as well as personal relationships with the key interview stakeholders. 
Given the state of the literature, combined with the opportunity to complete a very deep 
case study (Yin, 2009) of Michener’s associated alliance portfolio (that extends into 
immediate network participants) lends this research design to be particularly attractive. 
 
While my previous and current roles act as an enabler in accessing critical documents 
and resources, the issue of researcher bias is recognised as a potential issue, especially 
in regards to completing any required follow-up interviews (see below for proposed 
methodologies). While recognising this risk, the researcher believes the scope and 
degree of information received from respondents will be representative of respondent’s 
true perspectives, given the tenure and maturity of the selected alliance portfolio 
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partners. Ultimately, the private-vendor partners within Michener’s alliance portfolio 
have been chosen precisely because of their direct involvement in collaborative 
innovation and commercialisation with Michener. The success of these relationships 
resides on open, honest and authentic communication, of which this research program is 
an extension thereof. To contribute towards this goal of authenticity, the researcher will 
open each interview session with a verbal acknowledgement of the potential bias, and 
recognition of the intent of the interview, and confirmation of the state of trust within 
the relationship, and of overall/absolute standard of confidentiality. The triangulation of 
multiple methodological approaches and data collection methods also contributes 
towards the overall validity and general corroboration of data findings and insights. 
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CHAPTER 9 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION  
In assessing an appropriate research methodology approach, reference to the research 
question and aim are critical in determining an appropriate choice/application. Given the 
state of the literature pertaining to the development of dynamic capabilities within 
alliance portfolios is in early development, and considering the exploratory nature of the 
research question itself, a phenomenological (qualitative), rather than positivist 
(quantitative) approach is most appropriate.  Further, given the emphasis of dynamic 
capability development, manager’s perceptions, and the inter-related concepts of 
change, decision-making, and the unique nature of the cases, an inductive exploratory 
case study approach will be employed.  
 
9.2 GROUNDED THEORY METHODOLOGY 
The methodology applied within this research program is a grounded theory approach 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Suddaby, 2006), leveraging the specific methods of archival 
analysis, participant observation/participation, and qualitative interviews within a case 
study context (Yin, 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989). In describing grounded theory, and as a 
means of aligning the triangulated data methods outlined above, Suddaby (2006) states 
“scientific truth results both from the act of observation and the emerging consensus 
within a community of observers as they make sense of what they have observed (p. 
633).” Further, Suddaby (2006) convincingly posits what grounded theory is not, 
including (summarised from pp. 634-640): 
 
i) An excuse to ignore the literature; 
ii) Presentation of raw data; 
iii) Theory testing, content analysis, or word counts; 
iv) Simply a routine application of formulaic techniques to data; 
v) Perfect;  
vi) Easy; or 
vii) An excuse for the absence of methodology.  
   
These insights (Suddaby, 2006), in alignment with Corbin and Strauss (2008) and 
Eisenhardt (1989) inform the grounded theory methodology as applied within this 
research program. The next section will outline the specific methods of analysis 
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including archival analysis, participant observation/involvement, and un/semi-structured 
interviews within a case study approach.     
 
9.3 CASE STUDY APPROACH & OTHER SPECIFIC METHODS 
The choice in case study approach in exploring the development of dynamic capabilities 
is well established (Teece, 2012; Danneels, 2011), specifically within the context of 
alliance portfolios (van Raak et. al 2001; Araujo 1998; Provan 1995; Eisenhardt 1989).  
The methodological approach is further justified in considering the maturation stage of 
the literature pertaining to dynamic capabilities. More specifically, Kraatz and Zajac 
(2001) suggest that “while the concept of dynamic capabilities is appealing, it is a rather 
vague and elusive one which has thus far proven largely resistant to observation and 
measurement.” As such, Barreto (2010) suggests that given the multi-dimensional 
approach in defining dynamic capabilities, the case study approach is most appropriate 
(p. 653).  
 
In justifying the case study approach Yin (2009) explains, “A case study is an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (p. 18).” This context as 
explained and illustrated by Yin (2009) accurately reflects the current context, reality 
and focus of this specific research program. Yin (2009) further proposes that the case 
study approach is most appropriate in research environments where:  
 
i) “how” and/or “why questions are considered;  
ii) the researcher has little to no control over events; and,  
iii) the focus of the research program is on contemporary examination within an 
applied (“real-life”) context (p. 2).  
 
Broadly, Yin (2009) explains the case study approach is appropriate when trying to 
understand and explain “complex social phenomenon (p. 4).” Stake (1995) provides 
further support for a qualitative, case-based approach stating that “in qualitative studies, 
research questions typically orient to cases or phenomena, seeking patterns of 
unanticipated as well as expected relationships (p. 41)”, which again, reflects the 
context, intent and focus of this research program.  The utilisation/application of the 
case study approach is established in researching the development of dynamic 
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capabilities of commercialisation and innovation in high-velocity environments 
(Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg, 2009; Danneels, 2011; Snow, Fjeldstad, Lettl and 
Miles, 2011). Eisenhardt (1989) explains that case studies can be descriptive, testing or 
generative in their intent. While these intents are not necessarily mutually exclusive 
(insofar as the generation of a theory rests on the descriptive nature of the case study), 
the aim of this research program is on the generation of an applied theory leading to the 
development of a conceptual framework.  These insights capture the core challenge of 
this research program. The effectiveness of establishing dynamic capabilities such as 
innovation and commercialisation cannot be separated from the role and experiential 
involvement and impact of participating within an alliance portfolio. Eisenhardt (1989) 
provides a definitive process of defining the research question; selecting case studies 
based on theoretical basis; leveraging multiple data collection methods; the integration 
of grounded theory techniques to collect, analyse and drive the subsequent findings. 
Within this definitive process lies the integration of other methods (namely those of 
Corbin and Strauss, 2008; including archival analysis, participant 
observation/involvement, and un/semi-structured interviews), outlined within the 
proceeding chapters titled “Chapter 11 - Sample Design” and “Chapter 12 - Data 
Collection & Analysis – Case Study Protocol.”  
 
9.4 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
The clarification of levels in examining and exploring dynamic capabilities is critical 
from a theoretical development and applied research perspective (Kay, 2010). House, 
Rousseau and Thomas-Hunt (1995) posit the incorporation of both micro and macro 
perspectives, into a ‘meso’ research approach, where ‘meso’ is defined as “synthesising 
micro and macro organisational processes (p. 73).” Rousseau and Hunt (1994) state that 
“the micro and macro distinction is an oversimplification, suited to an era where 
organisations were assumed to be relatively static and persons relatively homogenous 
(p. 15).” Rather than developing theory and research that strictly micro or macro in 
approach, House et. al. (1995) posit a ‘meso’ approach appropriate where, in the context 
of this research program, “one or more levels concern organisational processes or 
variables (p. 73).”  
 
While the unit of analysis (the examination and exploration of the establishment of 
dynamic capability of innovation and commercialisation within inter-organisational 
relationships) will remain consistent throughout the research program, the research 
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program will include multiple levels of analysis (Rousseau et. al., 1994). As a means to 
examine and explore the role of the alliance portfolio in establishing dynamic 
capabilities between and within firms, multiple levels of analysis will be pursued, 
including the perceptions of individual managers (micro-level); as well as the 
examination in establishing dynamic capabilities within dyadic alliance relationships as 
represented within Michener’s alliance portfolio (micro-level).  This micro-level of 
analysis (of Michener’s alliance relationships with both “Org A” and “Org B”) is 
critical to the exploration and examination of specific factors (resulting relationships, 
and interdependencies therein) as related to the establishment of dynamic capabilities 
between and amongst firms. These experiences, as reflected and identified as 
representative alliance relationships within Michener’s alliance portfolio, ultimately led 
to ‘Emerging Themes’ #1, #2 and #3 as developed in Chapter 16 – Results: Initial 
Analysis. 
 
In order to incorporate a macro-level perspective, the level of analysis transitioned from 
individual alliance relationships within Michener’s alliance portfolio (e.g. “Org A” and 
“Org B”), to that of the alliance portfolio itself (Rousseau et. al., 1994). While the unit 
of analysis remains consistent as the exploration and examination of establishing 
dynamic capability, the shift in level of analysis from individual alliance relationships 
represented within Michener’s alliance portfolio, to that of the alliance portfolio itself, 
enabled the candidate to explore portfolio-specific insights. More specifically, at the 
macro-level of analysis of the alliance portfolio, the candidate was able to explore 
insights related to the management, evolution, costs and benefits of the alliance 
portfolio (in establishing dynamic capability) (Wassmer, 2010). Respondents were 
informed of the transition of levels within interviews, and reference to the diagrammatic 
illustration of Michener’s alliance portfolio (see Figure 13) leveraged to ensure 
consistency of reference and intent. The results of this macro-level research perspective 
are summarised in ‘Emerging Theme #4’ within Chapter 16 – Results: Initial Analysis.    
 
In referencing the incorporation of both “micro” and “macro” levels of analysis, House 
et. al. (1995) posit that the employment of “meso perspectives is capable of generating 
unique insights and knowledge about organisational behaviour, over and above that 
contributed by micro and macro level research and theory (p. 85).” While developed 
independently as either ‘micro-level’ or ‘macro-level’ themes within Chapter 16 – 
Results: Initial Analysis, a ‘meso-level’ perspective is reflected in proceeding chapters, 
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including Chapter 17 – Conclusions; Chapter 18 – Contributions; and Chapter 19 – 
Generalisations (Rousseau et. al., 1994).  
 
Further clarification of specific and synthesised levels of analysis will be provided 
(where applied) in proceeding chapters (e.g. Chapter 16 – Results: Initial Analysis).  
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CHAPTER 10 - SELECTION OF CASE STUDIES 
 
The selection of case studies are as follows:   
 
Case Selection 
Case #1 –Michener & Organisation “A” (“Org A”) 
 
The selection of this interorganisational relationship was made based on the following 
factors/context: 
 Michener and Organisation “A” sought to create an alliance that would result in 
the development of a dedicated simulation centre within the applied health 
sciences, with resulting dynamic capabilities being established in the i) 
innovation/commercialisation of curricular assets/material within the applied 
health science disciplines; and ii) commercialisation of a 25,000 sq. foot 
healthcare simulation centre 
 This is a long-standing case study which has operated over ~3.5-years; is rich in 
both records (contracts; emails; etc.) and institutional experience (involvement 
of many organisational leaders) 
 
Case #2 - Michener & Organisation “B” (Org “B”) 
 
The selection of this interorganisational relationship was made based on the following 
factors/context: 
 Michener and Organisation “B” sought to create an alliance that would result in 
the innovative development of two unique (never before designed/developed) 
linear accelerator units which would require distinct hardware/software and 
workflow engines to reflect an academic (as apposed to a clinical) environment  
 The design/development process, completed over ~1-year period, involved 
extensive meetings with Michener’s subject matter experts (faculty; executives; 
staff) and Organisation “B” complement of engineers and support staff to 
innovate important solutions surrounding hardware (e.g. KV beam; installation 
procedures; etc.) and software (e.g. emulation of treatment process) 
 This is a long-standing case study which has operated over ~3.5-years; is rich in 
both records (contracts; emails; etc.) and institutional experience (involvement 
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of many organisational leaders) and artefacts (e.g. linac units themselves; 
research posters; etc.) 
 
The anticipated interviewee list corresponding to each case and the resulting ethics 
review process will be detailed in proceeding sections.  
 
The unit of analysis is at the pursuit/instance of establishing dynamic capabilities in 
commercialisation/innovation itself, as contextualised and represented through the 
interorganisational relationship between an external firm and Michener, representing a 
theoretical sample of Michener’s alliance portfolio complement.  
 
Cross-Case Analysis 
While the employment of the exploratory case study approach has been justified above, 
the application requires further specificity in regards to the form, type and structure. 
With the unit of analysis representing specific instance of commercialisation/innovation 
within the context of Michener’s egocentric alliance portfolio (Baum et. al., 2000), the 
author intends to select an in-depth case study that represents a “successful instance in 
developing dynamic capability of innovation and commercialisation”, and a subsequent 
in-depth case study that explores an “unsuccessful instance in developing dynamic 
capability of innovation and commercialisation”, representing a cross-case, multi-case 
study comparative approach. Yin (2009) summarises the benefits of a multi-case design 
stating: 
 
“the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the 
overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust (Herriott & Firestone, 
1983, as cited by Yin, 2009) (p. 53).” 
 
The process of comparing cases with similar dependent variables and 
exploring/explaining independent variables is referred to as the comparative-case study 
approach (Yin, 2009; Dion, 1998; Lijphart, 1975).  There is an established practice in 
utilising a cross case comparison approach within high velocity environments (which 
are characterised by the need to successfully innovate and commercialise) with the goal 
of examining critical concepts/themes (including management decision 
making)(Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988). Eisenhardt (1989) further supports the cross 
case approach and ability to explore cross case patterns/themes, stating: 
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 “Overall, the idea behind these cross-case searching tactics is to force 
investigators to go beyond initial impressions, especially through the use of 
structured and diverse lenses on the data…cross-case searching tactics enhance 
the probability that the investigators will capture the novel findings which may 
exist in the data (p. 541).”  
 
Yin (2009) further outlines the case study exploration process, where once the cases 
have been selected based on a theoretical sample (as determined by the dependent 
variable), the individual case examination is completed and a summary case report is 
completed. The two-cases representing differing dependent variables are then analysed 
“cross-case” to identify common/differing themes (independent variables), providing 
critical insights and conclusions (Yin, 2009; Lijphart, 1975). From an outcome 
perspective, one potential end deliverable is a conclusion report for the “successful 
instances/pursuit”, and a separate conclusion report for “unsuccessful instances/pursuit” 
(representing alternative dependent variables).  
 
The second and final analysis process involves comparing the conclusion reports, 
ultimately developing a cross-case comparison amongst independent variables based on 
the dependent variables (outcomes). The intent of this final cross-case comparison 
analysis is to explore critical concepts/themes (initially through content analysis but 
ultimately teasing out the core concepts and themes within the context of the theoretical 
propositions as represented/reflected by the research question and objectives) (Yin, 
2009; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). While outside the scope of this research program, future 
research should focus on this methodological approach in looking to explain (rather than 
explore) the phenomenon between and among alliance portfolios (Yin, 2009).  
 
The cross-comparative case approach has experienced criticism, generally surrounding 
the issues of i) finding truly comparable cases (Lijphart, 1975) and ii) case selection 
bias (Dion, 1998). In regards to comparable cases, Lijphart (1975) recommends that 
finding multiple cases that have the same dependent variable and hold constant many 
non-essential (outside research scope) independent variables allow the research the best 
opportunity for in-depth assessment of the relevant variables. In response to this 
criticism, the central benefit of choosing all cases from Michener’s egocentric alliance 
portfolio (Baum et. al., 2000) allows the candidate to hold constant many independent 
variables such as management team involved in each case; general organisational 
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resources available to each case; Michener’s culture; technological infrastructure, etc. 
Finally, in response to the claim of case selection bias, Dion (1998) posits that the issue 
of selection bias is mitigated through the framing of the dependent-independent variable 
relationship as a necessary, not sufficient condition. In the context of this research 
program, the intent is to explore the necessary conditions that lead to a successful and 
unsuccessful (dependent variable) outcome, and thereby analyse the common and 
differing conditions (independent variables) between and amongst the cases.          
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CHAPTER 11 - SAMPLE DESIGN 
 
11.1 SELECTION & APPLICATION OF A THEORETICAL SAMPLE 
 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) define theoretical sampling as “a method of data collection 
based on concepts/themes derived from the data”, with the purpose of collecting “data 
from places, people, and events that will maximise opportunities to develop concepts in 
terms of their properties and dimensions, uncover variations, and identify relationships 
between concepts (p.143).” As identified in the preceding section, using a theoretical 
sample based on differing dependent variables with the unit of analysis is at the 
establishment of dynamic capabilities in commercialisation/innovation within inter-
organisational relationships will enable an iterative cross-case comparison approach to 
be employed.  
 
From a relationship management perspective, many alliance/partner agreements require 
regular (e.g. quarterly) formal/informal reports, assessments and/or updates, to ensure 
the ongoing effectiveness and desired results of the relationship. Within the context of 
the terms and conditions outlined within the ethics section below, the candidate intends 
to leverage these reviews not only as a historical data source, but also as an opportunity 
to conduct and complete the aims and objectives of this research program. The focus of 
network and alliance effectiveness integrates well into existing agreements and overall 
intent, goals and objectives of these collaborative relationships. All partners share (to a 
significant degree) the collective intent of advancing collaborative innovation and 
commercialisation objectives within the healthcare industry. In alignment with a 
grounded theory approach, these participants (and resulting theoretical sample) have 
been chosen based on their respective ability to comment on the theoretical aims and 
objectives of this research program, as apposed to a random sample, which would be 
appropriate with a positivist approach. Within the context and in support of the aims and 
objectives of this research proposal, Corbin and Strauss (2008) support a theoretical 
sample approach in suggesting it is “especially important when studying new or 
unchartered areas because it allows for discovery” (p. 145).  Additionally, Barreto 
(2010) states “future studies should use not only the focal firm’s managers as 
respondents but also third parties (e.g., financial analysts) to mitigate potential bias in 
the responses from the former group.”  
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CHAPTER 12 - DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS:  
CASE STUDY PROTOCOL 
 
12.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Given the explorative, iterative nature of the case study approach within this research 
program, and given the unit of analysis is at the pursuit/instance of establishing dynamic 
capabilities of commercialisation/innovation via the alliance portfolio, a grounded 
theory approach is appropriate.  
 
The implications to this approach as it relates to the data collection and analysis 
processes are significant. First, the interplay between the data collection and the data 
analysis phases are tightly integrated, whereby the analysis of data begins at the 
conclusion of the very first (unstructured) interview. The key discoveries of this first 
interview, described by Corbin and Strauss (2008) as “concepts and themes”, result in 
“concepts derived from the data during analysis and questions about those concepts 
drive the next round of data collection (p. 144).” Thus, the data collection and data 
analysis processes build, inform and compound on each other until the core concepts 
and themes of the research program have been (largely) represented.  Corbin and 
Strauss (2008) refer to this end-point as “saturation (p. 148).” To assist in the 
development of this rich, evolving interplay between data collection and analysis, the 
development of “memos” are recommended as a means to “chew, digest and feel” the 
core concepts and themes emerging from the data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
Eisenhardt (1989) supports this precise approach through the creation of “field notes”, 
which are described as “an ongoing stream-of-consciousness commentary about what is 
happening in the research, involving both observation and analysis – preferably 
separated from one another (p. 539).” The evolution of the concepts, themes combined 
with the interpretation of these insights by the research candidate result in the 
“grounding” of the descriptive theory.  
 
In regards to the methods identified within the relevant literature base, un/semi-
structured interviews and/or focus groups (Araujo 1998; Morrissey et al. 1985, 1994, 
1997; Fried et al. 1998; Provan et al. 1995; van Raak 2001; Eisenhardt, 1989) were 
employed as the predominant data collection method. These methods assessed both the 
organisational/participant and alliance portfolio units of analysis (Provan and Milward, 
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2002). In following the intent of the grounded theory approach, the candidate leveraged 
core concepts/themes from the existing literature base to clarify the initial set of terms to 
be discussed and developed throughout the initial set of un/semi-structured interviews. 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) identify this as an appropriate approach, insofar as the initial 
theory constructs are modified and/or discarded as discovered/advanced throughout the 
interview process. 
 
Additional methods as supported by Yin (2009) and Stake (1995), such as document 
review, historical/archival analysis, participant-observation/engagement, were 
employed, albeit secondarily to the interview method. Resulting from the 
concepts/themes emanating from the independent interviews and focus groups, 
additional interviews/focus groups were employed to provide additional clarity of the 
concepts/themes in relation to the research objectives.  
 
The candidate experienced a rich, fluid interplay between data collection, data analysis, 
the development of (interpretive, directive, reflective) memos, and the constant 
development/formation of different visual interpretations of the conceptual (theoretical) 
framework, of which is the core, applied goal of the research program (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008; Danneels, 2011). Miles and Huberman (1994) support this approach, in 
proposing, “Conceptual frameworks are best done graphically, rather than in the text. 
Having to get the entire framework on a single page obliges you to specify the bins that 
hold the discrete phenomena, to map likely relationships, to divide the variables that are 
conceptually or functionally distinct, and to work with all of the information at once (p. 
22)”. Finally, the issue of obtaining valid and reliable information and responses on 
sensitive topics remains a challenge for many research fields. Einarsen and Valand 
(2010) suggest that in order to mitigate the risks as perceived by the respondent in 
providing sensitive information, an assessment of each situation and a designed 
approach is ultimately required. More specifically, Einarsen and Valand (2010) 
recommend a rich interplay of collection methods such as interviews; participant 
observations and/or participation as a means to detect, identify and confirm sensitive 
topics. The overall research strategy and resulting methodology as described above 
clearly support a process whereby sensitive topics and insights can and will be explored.   
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The candidate utilised a series of open-ended questions within the un/semi-structured 
interview, ultimately related to the objectives of the research program and the major 
themes and findings outlined within the existing literature.  
All respondents included within the individual (solo) and focus groups interviews were 
required to complete/sign the Informed Consent Form (included in Appendix A) as part 
of the formal ethics review submission/process. The purpose of each form is to clearly 
articulate the aim of the research program, the rights of each individual participant, and 
to confirm confidentiality. Given the complexity and degree of contemplation required 
to assess the objectives related to the development of dynamic capability, the researcher 
also provided respondents an opportunity to reflect on these core issues as well as an 
indication to the scope of questions well before the interview session itself.  
 
To corroborate the central concepts and themes resulting from the analysis phase, the 
candidate employed two techniques. First, the candidate used the reporting functionality 
included within data analysis software program to compare/contrast the objective 
terms/phrases/themes with the central phrases/themes developed through the candidates’ 
reflection memos. Secondly, at the conclusion of the interviews, the candidate randomly 
selected a respondent to review a series of random (anonymous) interview responses 
with a checklist of themes, with an equal amount aligned with the candidates developed 
themes, and an equal amount unrelated. The respondent was requested to read the 
random anonymous interview response and “check-off” those themes they deemed most 
relevant/appropriate.    
 
 
12.2 CASE STUDY PROTOCOL 
 
This section is dedicated to clarifying the specific mechanics involved in the data 
collection and analysis phases within the case study approach. The following chapter 
represents the structural intent (Case Study Protocol) of the case study approach as 
envisioned before the start of the data collection/analysis process.  
 
In reviewing the Case Study Protocol, the notion of independent and dependent 
variables may seem out of place in the context of a grounded theory approach. The 
candidate recognises this balance in methodological approach, insofar as the case study 
protocol and the resulting (anticipated) interview lists and (anticipated) questions 
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provided an initial framework to envision, and ultimately start the data collection and 
analysis phases (through the first set of interviews). As the interview process became 
more established, the candidate transitioned into a much more fluid interplay of data 
collection and analysis, including the pursuit/clarification of concepts, themes, and the 
associated relationships within the interviews themselves, reflecting a more traditional 
grounded theory approach.       
 
Step #1 – Establishing Clarity of Terms & Exploring the Instance, Development of 
Dynamic Capability  
 
Aim – The aim of this stage was to confirm with all respondents the key terms/concepts 
involved in the discussion (e.g. alliance portfolio; innovation; commercialisation) and to 
achieve a common recognition of the identification and existence of dynamic 
capabilities within each case. 
 
Methods – In advance of the interview, email solo/focus group participants were 
provided a general description of the intent of the interview and provided definitions of 
key terms/phrases/concepts (e.g. innovation; commercialisation; alliance portfolio; 
dynamic capability – Please see Appendix D). Providing a common set of definitions 
allowed participants the opportunity to clarify the intent of these terms/phrases/concepts 
and advance the discussion to recognise an instance where the development of a 
dynamic capability has/has not potentially occurred. The list of definitions also provided 
a useful and consistent resource during the interview process as a means to clarify the 
definition/intent of key terms.   
 
Proposed Participants – The establishment of clarity of key terms was essential to the 
essence/pursuit of the research aim of this research program. As such, the interview 
questions were applied to all internal/external respondents in both cases before 
proceeding to later stage inquiry.  
 
Anticipated Interviewee List for Case #1 – Michener & Organisation “A” 
 President & CEO – Michener – Solo 
 Vice-President, Academic – Michener – Solo 
 Group of Sr. Michener Leaders – Focus Group 
o Director, Finance 
Page 56 
o Sr. Director, Communications, Public Relations & Advancement 
o Manager, Human Resources 
o Academic Program Chair(s) 
 Group of Leaders from “Organisation A” – Focus Group 
o Sr. Project Manager (for this initiative) 
o Sr. Director, Global Sales & Marketing 
 
Anticipated Interviewee List for Case #2 – Michener & Organisation “B” 
 President & CEO – Michener – Solo 
 Vice-President, Academic – Michener – Solo 
 Group of Michener Leaders/Faculty – Focus Group 
o Sr. Director, Communications, Public Relations & Advancement 
o Academic Program Chair(s) 
o Sr. Project Lead 
o Former Chair, Radiation Therapy 
o Lead Faculty (2) involved in installation/implementation 
 Group of Leaders from “Organisation B” – Focus Group 
o Vice-President & General Manager 
o Director, Business Development 
o Director, Professional Services 
o Relevant Engineering Staff 
 
Potential Interview Questions:   
 
 Based on the pre-circulated set of definitions of key 
terms/concepts, how well understood to you feel these definitions 
are within your respective organisation? Explain.  
 How would you define/describe the core business of your 
organisation? 
 Would you consider your organisation residing within a 
knowledge-intensive industry? If so, based on your experience, 
has your organisation remained current/competitive within this 
environment?  Have alliance partners contributed towards this 
end? 
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 Generally, how do you perceive your organisations engagement 
with alliance partners contributing towards its core business and 
resulting developments (e.g. curriculum; applied research; 
instructional capital development; etc.)? Based on your above 
reflections, were these collaborative ventures a positive or 
negative contribution towards your organisations core business? 
 
The intent of the four questions above was to establish an understanding of critical 
terms/concepts that are relevant to this research program. These questions also aim 
to confirm the high-velocity environment in which the respective organisations 
operate, and where the engagement of an alliance portfolio occurs and for what 
purpose.  
 
 What would you perceive as your organisations most valuable 
resource(s)? What resources, abilities, experiences and/or 
reputation does your organisation offer potential alliance 
partners? How has this changed over time (e.g. past 2-3 years)? 
Would you also describe these resources as rare and/or critical to 
our organisational success? Could these resources be easily 
copied by other organisations?  
 Within the experience of this case, has this alliance resulted in the 
development of your organisations respective ability to innovate 
differently? Explain.  
 Within the experience of this case, has this alliance resulted in the 
development of your organisations respective ability to 
commercialise differently? Explain. 
 
The intent of the three questions above was to establish what a dynamic capability 
is, where it may exist and if the participant believes it has occurred (developed) 
within the specific case.  
  
Triangulation of Data – There were several other sources of data to explore the 
understanding/application of these terms including: 
 
 Minutes from alliance meetings dealing with strategic/operational issues 
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 Formal contracts complete with objectives reflecting specific capabilities 
 Participant (candidate) involvement/observation of past/current events relating 
to both cases 
The overall intent of Step 1 within the Case Study Protocol was to inductively advance 
the research question/aim by establishing/comparing responses in the context of a 
successful/unsuccessful case related to the first two research objectives: 
 
i. To determine the nature of the relationship between securing alliance partners 
that excel in the capabilities of innovation and/or commercialisation and the 
associated impact and transference to the hub/focal-firm (i.e. resource 
cognition); 
ii. To examine managers’ perspectives of engagement within the alliance portfolio 
and the resulting benefits, costs and contributions of such involvement;  
 
 
Step #2 – Explore, Compare & Contrast the Variables – Internal Perspective  
 
Aim – While certainly not mutually exclusive, Step #2 aimed to build from the 
responses of Step #1 to further advance the research aim/question in comparing 
responses in the context of each case related to the final two objectives: 
 
iii) To examine the overall impact, and effectiveness of such alliance portfolios in 
building/providing/establishing the capabilities of innovation and 
commercialisation within the hub/focal-firm; 
iv) To determine if and how the complement of alliance partners change over time 
to support the vision/strategy of innovation and commercialisation within the 
hub/focal-firm, and specifically how past experience with alliance partners affect 
future partner selection (i.e. building of alliance competency and partner 
selection).  
 
Methods– Same as described in Step #1.  
 
Proposed Participants – Will be limited to the Michener interviewee schedule (from 
both cases) identified in Step #1.  
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Potential Interview Questions: 
 How would you describe the effectiveness of Michener in 
seeking out alliance partners that support/advance its ability to 
innovate and/or diversify revenue sources (commercialisation)? 
 What, if any, have been the central benefits in Michener’s 
engagement with external alliance partners? 
 Are there costs associated with Michener engaging in external 
alliances? Please explain.  
 How would you describe Michener’s ability to succeed in 
alliances? How has this changed over time (e.g. past 2-3 years)? 
 If possible, tell a story/anecdote of a particular alliance/set of 
alliances that you would consider a success. What made it 
successful? 
 If possible, tell a story/ anecdote of a particular alliance/set of 
alliances that you would consider unsuccessful. What made it 
unsuccessful? What contributed towards it being unsuccessful? 
 Based on the reflections above, what type of alliance partners 
should Michener seek out in the future? What are the specific 
qualities/capabilities? Why? 
 Based on your experience, what has Michener learned to do 
differently through its past and current portfolio of alliances? 
Based on your answer, does the ability to do these new things 
reside with Michener, or does it require the other alliance 
partner(s) to facilitate? 
 
The intent of these questions was to explore the internal respondent perceptions of 
Michener’s involvement to-date with its respective alliance portfolio in the context 
to the terms/concepts identified/developed in Step #1.  
 
 With the context of this case, how would you describe the process 
by which both organisations came together to develop an 
ability/capability to innovate/commercialise? Would you describe 
this process as a success or failure? If deemed to be successful, 
was one firm responsible for the ability/capability to 
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innovate/commercialise or were both firms required (necessary) 
for this capability to exist? 
 In the context of the current case, what do you believe made 
Organisation “A”/”B” an attractive alliance partner? What skills, 
resources, relationships and/or abilities were especially attractive 
in our decision to partner with this organisation?  
 What do you believe the end strategic goal was/is in partnering 
with Organisation “A”/”B”? Could you describe within the 
context of what was to be designed/developed and 
commercialised? 
 How would you describe the relationship at the genesis point? 
Describe the maturation process.  
 Would you describe the results of this alliance relationship as 
successful or unsuccessful? Why? 
 Do you believe the originating alliance objectives were clear? 
Were they achieved? If so, what evidence would you offer that 
these results have been achieved? 
 
The intent of the Step #2 questions was to explore, through a variety of focused and 
open-ended questions the independent variables experienced in each case. While the 
outlining of the above questions suggests a mechanical approach, it is worth noting that 
the candidate recognises the importance of identifying key concepts and emerging 
themes (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) and the intent of the grounded theory approach brings 
which is to further explore such concepts/themes in proceeding interviews/focus groups. 
Secondly, from a cross-case comparison standpoint, the respondent’s perspectives 
began influencing Level 3 questions, which Yin (2009) describes as “questions asked of 
the pattern of findings across multiple cases (p. 87).” Step #2 and #3 are indented to 
explore these patterns further.  
 
Triangulation of Data - There were several other sources of data outside of the intended 
interviews/focus groups to explore the understanding/application of these 
concepts/themes including: 
 
 Minutes from alliance meetings dealing with strategic/operational issues 
 Formal contracts complete with objectives reflecting specific capabilities 
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 Participant (candidate) involvement/observation of past/current events relating 
to both cases 
 Artefacts (installed capital infrastructure; conference posters; etc.)  
Step #3 – Explore, Compare & Contrast the Specific Independent Variables – External 
Perspective 
 
Aim: Similar to Step #2, Step #3 aimed to engage the external participants to explore 
the independent variables experienced within each case. As reflected in the literature, 
from a research design perspective in examining interorganisational networks, it is 
critical that the external partners are afforded an opportunity to provide their respective 
perspectives (Yin, 2009).  
 
Methods: Same as described in Step #1, #2 above.  
 
Proposed Participants – Was limited to the external respondents (form both 
Organisation “A” & “B”) identified in Step #1.  
 
Potential Interview Questions: 
 
 What was your end strategic goal in partnering with Michener? Could you 
describe within the context of what was to be designed/developed and 
commercialised? 
 What made Michener an attractive alliance partner? What skills, 
resources, relationships and/or abilities were especially attractive to your 
decision to partner with Michener? How did you anticipate these factors 
contributing towards your end goal? 
 How would you describe the relationship at the genesis point? Describe 
the maturation process.  
 Has your organisation created new abilities/capabilities as a result of this 
relationship? Explain. If so, have these new abilities/capabilities 
contributed towards your core business/objectives? Describe.  
 Would you describe the results of this alliance relationship as successful 
or unsuccessful? Why? 
 Do you believe the originating alliance objectives were clear? Were they       
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achieved? If so, what evidence would you offer that these results have 
been achieved? 
 
Triangulation of Data - There were several other sources of data outside of the intended 
interviews/focus groups to explore the understanding/application of these 
concepts/themes including: 
 
 Minutes from alliance meetings dealing with strategic/operational issues 
 Formal contracts complete with objectives reflecting specific capabilities 
 Participant (candidate) involvement/observation of past/current events relating 
to both cases 
 Artefacts (installed linac units; conference posters; etc.)  
 
12.3 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS  
As this is not a clinical research project, safety considerations have been 
included/reflected within the “Ethics” section below.  
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CHAPTER 13 - ETHICAL REVIEW & CONSIDERATIONS 
 
As a post-secondary educational institution specialising in the applied health sciences, 
The Michener Institute has established a formal and robust Research Ethics Board 
(REB). As an employee of this organisation, it has been established that this research 
program was required to complete the formal ethics review process before proceeding to 
the data collection process with human subjects and organisational data.  
 
“The Research Ethics Board (REB) is a subgroup of the Institutional Research Review 
Committee (IRRC) responsible for assuring that all research carried out or in 
collaboration with the Michener Institute meets current scientific, regulatory and ethical 
standards for the protection of human research participants.  The Michener REB has two 
main functions: 
 
1. Review proposed study submissions for science and ethics; 
2. Promote education pertaining to research ethics 
 
The REB ensures that all researchers must follow the stipulations outlined in the Tri-
Council Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans, 1998 
(with 2000, 2002 updates). All research candidates must also (and subsequently did) 
complete the Canadian Research Ethics Course – TCPS 2 CORE4.  
 
The Michener REB submission requirements include: 
 Completed application form 
 Current Research Protocol (modified version template of this research program 
methodology section)
5
 
 Investigator’s current Curriculum Vitae 
 Informed Consent Forms (ICF) on Michener letterhead 
 Approval from Chair/Head 
 Other (e.g. interview scripts) 
 Ethics 
 Budget”6 
                                                        
4 http://tcps2core.ca/welcome 
5 Template reference: www.who.int/rpc/research_ethics/format_rp/en/index.html 
6 http://my.michener.ca/about/res/academic_res.php 
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All respondents included within the individual (solo) and focus groups interviews were 
required to complete the Informed Consent Form, included as Appendix A within this 
research program. The purpose of each form is to clearly articulate the aim of the 
research program, the rights of each individual participant, and to assure confidentiality. 
Given the complexity and degree of contemplation required to assess the objectives 
related to the development of dynamic capability, the researcher also provided the 
respondents an opportunity to reflect on these core issues as well as an indication to the 
scope of questions well before the interview session itself. Additionally, included within 
the Ethics Review Submission, the candidate received Letters of Support approving 
organisational support and participation in this research program from senior 
leaders/executives at “Org A”, “Org B”, and Michener (the specific letters will not be 
included as an appendix to this dissertation as a means to uphold the confidentiality in 
identity of both “Org A” and “Org B”).  
 
This research program was granted ethics approval in February 2012.  
 
While the majority of the recorded interviews transcription process was completed 
directly by the candidate, where additional transcription resources were utilised, 
individuals will be required to complete/sign a Confidentiality Agreement confirming 
that any related research data will be deleted from the computer post-transcription; that 
no copies of the information will be made; that no data shall be transferred to third 
parties; that the materials of the interviews are to be discussed solely with the research 
candidate; and that all materials included and related to this research program shall 
remain strictly confidential. Lastly, as the intent throughout this research program has 
been to maintain the confidential identity of both respective case study organisations 
(“Org A” and “Org B”), any/all inclusions of images related to the 
description/explanation/exploration of each case has been reviewed/confirmed by each 
organisation.  Where unique organisational identifiers and/or logos were included in the 
original images, image modification software was utilised to “blur-out” the affected area 
in order to maintain confidentiality.  
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CHAPTER 14 - DATA MANAGEMENT & STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS 
 
14.1 MECHANICS OF ANALYTICAL PROCESS: PRE-DATA COLLECTION 
PLAN  
 
Rather than leveraging a pre-determined set of concept/theme code keys, the candidate 
abided by the intent of the grounded theory approach and let the data (derived from the 
respondents) drive the relevant codes. Once the qualitative data had been collected the 
data was analysed using standard content analysis. The content analysis process, as 
described by Patton (2002) specifically explored emerging patterns and themes of the 
responses, with patterns representing specific themes representing collective categories. 
The candidate developed a relevant coding system throughout the fieldwork phase 
(participant observation; historical document review; un/semi-structured interviews; and 
focus groups if deemed necessary) of this research program.  
 
As an initial approach to operationalise the first phase of analysing the data (and thereby 
establish an appropriate data coding/tagging system) the candidate recognised the 
importance of “grounding” the theoretical terms such as dynamic capabilities, alliance 
portfolios to the existing definitions/insights as identified within the Glossary of Terms 
section of the literature review. This initial approach acted to identify and “ground” 
participant(s) responses to relevant data codes/tags and promote the advancement of 
emerging themes within the data, ultimately reflecting a grounded theory approach. Yin 
(2009) suggests that the coding/classification process is only the first step in the data 
analysis process; and that “developing a rich and full explanation or even good 
description of your case, in response to your initial “how” or “why” questions, will 
require much post-computer thinking and analysis on your part (p. 128).” In regards to 
analysing the case study data, the candidate utilised the specific techniques of cross-case 
synthesis and pattern matching to explore the critical concepts/themes.  
 
To assist in identifying the relevant data codes/tags and resulting themes, the candidate 
utilised the NVivo 9 software package. This software package supports the advanced 
application/exploration of various data sources including text sources from 
email/contracts, and sound recordings/memos from un/semi-structured interviews. 
While the software enabled the candidate to manually identify segments of data to a 
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specific theme, the software can also act as a powerful control for bias insofar as themes 
can also objectively derived from the platforms analysis/reporting functionally. The 
concepts/themes as identified by the candidate were compared/contrasted/corroborated 
by the NVivo analysis.    
 
A few points of clarification are required in regards to the sample frame and research 
objectives. The candidate anticipated to the best of his ability the most appropriate 
contacts/respondents to explore the engagement of an alliance portfolio as it relates to 
the development of dynamic capabilities of innovation and commercialisation. 
Regardless of the number and identity of all relevant participants, all subjects were 
treated to the same level of research ethics and personal confidentiality. Corbin and 
Strauss (2008) summarise the theoretical sampling approach in stating it “is not about 
sampling people, but concepts (p. 144).” Ultimately, in order to examine and explore 
the research objectives comprehensively, the candidate pursued the degree of interviews 
required to reach saturation of concepts (at the specific time of the research study).   
 
 
14.2 THE DATA COLLECTION PHASE – A POST-IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW  
 
In alignment to the methodology described in the literature and ethics review chapters 
above, the methodology followed a series of progressive stops and restarts within the 
processes of data collection and analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Following the 
integrated methodological approach of utilising a theoretical sample in a grounded 
theory approach, within the broader context of the case study methodology, the 
candidate has pursued a series of distinct (yet not completely separated) phases of the 
data collection/analysis process.  
 
14.2.1 Pre-Data Collection & Analysis 
As developed in the proceeding chapter, upon achieving ethical approval of the research 
study, the candidate accessed and reviewed a comprehensive set of archival documents 
related to the case study experience with both “Org A” and “Org B”. The intent of this 
process was to re-familiarise and gain new insight/clarity as to the original 
strategic/contractual aims and objectives of each alliance relationship. This clarity, in 
terms of intent and aims at different timelines, afforded the ability for the candidate to 
explore rich interdependences and variables with respondents in examining both 
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individual and the combined case study experiences. The additional intent was to 
provide a contextual background chapter for the reader, outlining the characteristics of 
each respective alliance case to bridge the methodology and results sections within the 
final dissertation. This data collection and analysis process commenced between mid-
February and early March, 2012.     
 
14.2.2 First Phase of Data Collection & Analysis 
The first phase, beginning March 5
th
 to March 22
nd
, included the completion of 4 
separate interviews with 5 unique respondents, including a Sr. Executive from 
Michener, 1 Former Project Manager from Case Study Organisation “A” (“Org A”); 
and 1 Sr. Executive and 2 Executive respondents from Case Study Organisation “B” 
(“Org B”).  Before beginning each interview, each respondent was assured of the 
confidentiality clause contained within the Informed Consent Form, and the general 
themes of the Form were reviewed. Respondents were asked if they had any questions 
in regards to the Form itself or the core definitions provided before each interview. 
Before proceeding, respondents were asked for consent to record the interview, and 
signed Informed Consent Forms were obtained.  
 
Interviews were recorded by two devices (standard mp3 recording device; and a 
technology called “Dropvox” which is an iPhone application that sends completed audio 
recordings to the candidates secure “Dropbox” cloud account). All files were converted 
from mp4a to mp3 files, and imported into the NVivo 9 platform. Once in NVivo 9, the 
audio files were transcribed into text format for coding. The candidate completed the 
majority of the transcription, with assistance in the transcription of a single interview.  
 
Initial interviews were coded and initial analysis completed to explore dominant themes 
and concepts. The first phase of data analysis confirmed that the majority of the data 
centred on the macro theme of the ‘alliance capability’ in the context of two 
organisations (Michener and “Org A”; Michener and “Org B”) attempting to build 
dynamic capabilities of innovation and commercialisation. The specific nature and 
placement/residence of these dynamic capabilities were also explored; so to was the 
concept of resource cognition amongst respondents.  This phase was critical in 
establishing the foundation by which i) a greater depth of analysis could be 
explored/completed on the above themes in subsequent interviews, and; ii) more 
advanced themes, such as the role of the alliance capability in establishing the capability 
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in an alliance portfolio, as well as the dominant themes of the alliance portfolio itself 
could be examined.  
 
14.2.3 Second Phase of Data Collection & Analysis 
The second phase operated from approximately from April 5
th
 to May 23
rd
, and resulted 
in 7 additional interviews, 7 respondents with 6 unique respondents being completed, 
resulting in a cumulative total (between Phase 1 & 2) of 11 total interviews (10 solo; 1 
focus group of 3 respondents), 13 total respondents, with 11 unique respondents.  
 
As with the previous phase, all audio files were converted to mp3 format, imported into 
NVivo 9, and manually transcribed into corresponding text files. The resulting interview 
transcripts, in alignment to the themes illustrated in the literature, formed the basis for 
the initial thematic categories used to code data within the software program NVivo 9.  
These initial thematic nodes included: 
 
 Enablers to DC Creation 
 Barriers to DC Creation 
 Costs of Alliance Portfolios 
 Evolution of Alliance Portfolio 
 High Velocity Markets 
 Bifurcation Zone 
 DC Commercialisation 
 DC Innovation 
 DC Business Models 
 Genesis of an Alliance Portfolio 
 Development of DC Between Firms 
 Curricular Impact via Alliances 
 Strategic Impact of Alliance Portfolio 
 Comp. Advantage Through Alliance Portfolios (Networks) 
 Networking/Alliance Capability 
 Alliance Portfolio Capability  
 Resource Cognition  
 Competitive Disadvantage 
 Competitive Advantage 
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Throughout this phase, the candidate reviewed the text-based transcripts and made 
extensive use of research memos (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) as a means to “chew on” 
the data and isolate emerging themes. The creation of memos and seeking clarity from 
past and future respondents to advance/clarify core themes was an extraordinary 
valuable tool/process.  This process, coupled with the application of the above nodes in 
coding the data, began to formalise some emerging theoretical frameworks. These 
diagrammatic frameworks were on occasion utilised within the interviews to quickly 
reference and illustrate sometimes complex, abstract concepts. To mitigate bias, key 
questions pertaining to the frameworks were asked before presenting the summarised 
diagrammatic concept.  Thereafter, respondents were asked to validate and reflect on 
emerging concept illustrations/diagrams, and to propose any gaps/oversights they 
perceived as a means not only to validate, but advance the concept 
illustrations/diagrams.  
 
This phase was critical to advancing the macro themes related to the alliance capability 
and the resulting pursuit of building dynamic capabilities of innovation and 
commercialisation amongst firms, and the development of initial conceptual 
frameworks integrating these key themes and concepts. This phase also established a 
firm relationship in the role of the alliance capability to establishing a capability in 
alliance portfolio management, and the central themes of alliance portfolio construct, 
evolution, alignment and impact. 
 
14.2.4 Third Phase of Data Collection and Analysis 
The third phase operated from approximately from May 23
rd
 to June 15
th
, 2012, and 
resulted in 3 additional interviews, 4 respondents with 3 unique respondents being 
completed, resulting in a cumulative total (between Phase 1, 2 & 3) of 14 total 
interviews (12 solo; 2 focus group of 5 respondents), 17 total respondents, with 14 
unique respondents.  
 
Throughout this phase, the focus of the respondents was largely directed to the research 
objectives pertaining to the alliance portfolio capability in the context of creating 
dynamic capabilities in innovation and commercialisation. With this focus, the nodes 
utilised within the coding process required adaptation and advancement, with the 
modified set of nodes including (changes in bold): 
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 Alliance Capability (promoted to distinct node) 
 Benefits to Alliance Portfolio Engagement (new node) 
 Transition of Alliance DC to Alliance Portfolio DC (new node) 
 Alliance DC Role in Establishing DCs of Innovation & Commercialisation 
(new node) 
 Alliance Portfolio DC Role in Establishing DCs of Innovation & 
Commercialisation (new node) 
o Melding of Multiple Alliance Portfolios Between Organisations (new 
sub-node) 
o Costs of Alliance Portfolio (new sub-node) 
 Evolution of Alliance Portfolio (new node) 
 Enablers to DC Creation in Alliances (clarified node) 
 Barriers to DC Creation in Alliances (clarified node) 
 Costs of Alliance Portfolios 
 Evolution of Alliance Portfolio 
 High Velocity Markets 
o Bifurcation Zone (consolidated to sub-node) 
 DC Commercialisation 
o DC Business Models (consolidated to sub-node) 
 DC Innovation 
 Genesis of an Alliance Portfolio 
 Development of DC Between Firms 
 Curricular Impact via Alliances 
 Comp. Advantage Through Alliance Portfolios (Networks) 
o Strategic Impact of Alliance Portfolio (consolidated to sub-node) 
o Competitive Advantage (consolidated to sub-node) 
o Competitive Disadvantage (consolidated sub-node) 
o Networking Capability (consolidated to sub-node) 
 Alliance Portfolio Capability  
 Resource Cognition 
  
At the resolution of the third phase, the candidate had identified through thematic 
analysis of the data and the literature base, 19 nodes, and 8 sub-nodes in which to code 
the transcribed data.  
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14.2.5 Forth Phase of Data Collection and Analysis 
From June 16
th
 to August 10
th
, 2012, the candidate conducted another analysis of the 
data resulting in a final set of 25 data codes. The finalised codes are based on the focus 
and intent of the data from respondents; totalling 88 pages of coded data, 30,318 words 
categorised within the following codes:  
 
 Lofty Expectations 
 Involvement/Engagement Process As a Means to Securing Desired Outcomes   
 Personal Relationships Subservient to Business Relationship 
 Resource Application 
 Lack/Loss of Strategic Focus 
 Fuzzy Decision Making Process7 
 Difference in Corporate Cultures 
 Value & Sustainability of the Alliance 
 Organisational Learning 
 Transference of Dynamic Capabilities Between Industries 
 Disappointment & Disillusionment 
 Faith/Confidence in Alliance Future/Direction 
 Trust 
 Strategic Fit of Resources/Vision 
 Development of Dynamic Capabilities Between Firms 
 Transition from Alliance Capability to Alliance Portfolio Capability 
 Alliance Capability 
 Dynamic Capability – Innovation 
 Genesis of An Alliance (Org “A” & “B” representative subset of overall 
Portfolio) 
 Benefits of Alliance Portfolio Engagement 
 Resource Cognition 
 Curricular  Impact via Alliances 
 Alliance Portfolio Capability 
 Evolution of Alliance Portfolio 
 Management of the Alliance Portfolio 
 
                                                        
7
 Please note, the term “fuzzy” is defined in the context of an unclear, convoluted 
decision making process.  
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This phase of the data collection and analysis process was the most rich and complex. 
Respondent data was analysed several times to ensure consistency in coding and 
subsequent classification. Upon reaching saturation in this process, the candidate 
proceeded to identify the central literature gaps and opportunities, through re-
examination and redevelopment of the literature review and to identify the specific 
contributions and theory development derived from the results. Beyond establishing the 
first round of codes, the candidate developed the final set of codes outside the NVivo 9 
platform (manually). The NVivo 9 platform was critical in acting as a central repository 
for all documents, audio recordings, transcripts and quick coding. The application was 
also extremely helpful in objectively assessing the choice in codes, through quick and 
efficient content analysis tools and suggestions. The application was also extremely 
helpful in enabling the transcription of audio files, through the ability to reduce the 
speed of audio by up to 50%. Once all the interviews had been transcribed and the 
initial data set coded with the initial codes, all subsequent code developments, including 
the final set of codes were completed manually by the candidate into the final document 
(88-page matrix; containing 30,318 words of rich, illustrative data).  
 
 
14.3 DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
As outlined above, as a means to triangulate data sources and inform the interview 
process, the candidate first collected and analysed a series of observations (participant 
observation); and archival documents (e.g. formal contracts; emails; alliance 
agreements; project plans; meeting minutes; etc.) related to each of the case studies 
(“Org A” and “Org B”). The analysis of this data formed the basis to establish the first 
set of questions (outlined in the preceding Case Study Profile chapter) and provided a 
grounded, objective reference for both foreseeable and unforeseeable points of enquiry 
throughout the interview process. These documents also provided a rich, objective 
“anchor” by-which the intent, aim(s) and objectives of each alliance relationship were 
specified and confirmed, which was critical in the pursuit in accomplishing the research 
aim. From a data collection and analysis perspective, the examination of each case study 
provided the ability to compare/contrast (common and distinct) variables 
between/amongst the cases; the specific cases also acted as a reference experience for 
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respondents in exploring the transition to, and specific characteristics of Michener’s 
alliance portfolio. 
 
The second major method involved in data collection and analysis was the completion 
of a series of unstructured interviews defined within a theoretical (or intentional) sample 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Within this research approach, Corbin and Strauss (2008) refer to 
this process stating “research is a continuous process of data collection, followed by 
analysis, and memo writing, leading to questions, that lead to more data collection, and 
so on (p. 197).” Specifically, in regards to the analysis of data, Corbin and Strauss 
(2008) posit “that data collection and analysis go hand in hand (p. 145), and that “the 
doing of analysis is fluid and generative (p. 160).” This is especially critical in the 
research methodology utilised in this particular research study given the focus of case 
study analysis, and the resulting Case Study Protocol. Corbin and Strauss (2008) posit, 
“A researcher cannot possibly know all the questions to ask when beginning a study. It 
is only through the interaction with the data that relevant questions emerge (p. 216).” It 
is this fluid, rich, evolving process between data collection, reflection, analysis, 
formation of developed questions, further data collection that the candidate 
implemented to the point of thematic saturation (in the context of the research scope).  
 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) confirm that (within this specific research scope and 
theoretical sample) the data analysis process begins at the conclusion of the first 
interview, and that “the idea behind the first reading is to enter vicariously into the life 
of participants, feel what they are experiencing and listen to what they are telling us (p. 
163).” As such, throughout the first and subsequent series of interviews, the candidate 
listened to what the participants were explaining, requested clarification of terms, 
phrases, concepts, themes to understand fully the context and experience being 
described. Within each interview, once key experiences related to alliances, dynamic 
capabilities, innovation, commercialisation, and alliance portfolios were identified, the 
candidate probed further to understand the relationship, direction, and integration 
between critical concepts to understand these themes more comprehensively. During the 
first set of interviews, the candidate utilised the NVivo coding function to designate 
certain responses to multiple potential data code themes, which reflected the 
“brainstorming” process recommended by Corbin and Strauss (2008), as a means to 
investigate the data and decipher concepts/themes. As further interviews were 
completed and the candidate had an opportunity to draw on and reflect on specific 
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memos between interviews, the respondent data was coded to a single identifiable 
theme, either through the specific language/concepts/themes identified in the actual 
response, the context, or in the meaning of the data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The 
memos represented a variety of forms, including notes, stream of thought/reflection, and 
draft diagrams proposing concept/theme interactions and relationships. As Corbin and 
Strauss (2008) specify, the establishment of such memos in the data analysis process 
contribute to the candidate “asking questions, making comparisons, throwing out ideas, 
and brainstorming (p. 170).” The analysis of the data between interviews supported the 
deepening of understanding of core concepts/themes through clarification and the 
opportunity to challenge meanings and relationships amongst the data (as demonstrated 
in the evolution of the coding system illustrated in the above sections 14.2.1 – 14.2.5).     
 
As described in previous sections, and as illustrated in the evolution of the coding 
structure above, the “doing of analysis is fluid and generative (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008).” Ultimately, the data codes and the resulting relationships, as articulated by 
respondents, were summarised in diagrammatic frameworks, illustrated via Figures 11 
and 12 in proceeding chapters. As Corbin and Strauss (2008) confirm, “This entire data 
collection and analysis process will go on until I am satisfied that I have acquired 
sufficient data to describe each category/theme fully in terms of its properties and 
dimensions, and until I have accounted for variation (conceptual saturation), and most 
of all until I can put together a coherent explanatory story (p. 197).” This process, of 
developing themes derived from the data concepts themselves, resulted in the final set 
of data codes illustrated above. With the aim of the research program to make a 
contribution beyond an explanatory story into theoretical development (as summarised 
in Chapter 18 - Contributions), from a data analysis and validation perspective, in later 
interviews incorporated the diagrammatic conceptual frameworks (e.g. Figure 11 and 12 
illustrated in Chapter 16 – Results: Initial Analysis, as well as other draft frameworks 
that were not included in the final dissertation but referenced throughout the proceeding 
Results chapter)  and sought insight, clarification and contribution from respondents. 
The integration of memos, and the validation/grounding of draft frameworks throughout 
multiple respondent interviews that results in a final (diagrammatic) theoretical 
framework contribution is an established practice within this research design (Corbin 
and Strauss, 2008). The theoretical frameworks (e.g. Figures 11 and 12) were adapted, 
evolved and re-developed over a series of interviews to close various gaps to the point 
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where saturation was achieved and subsequent respondents did not provide any new 
insights/contributions to the models.     
 
As a means to effectively manage the data throughout the collection and analysis 
process, the NVivo platform was an excellent tool in assisting first in the general 
categorisation of early concepts from the first set of interviews. As the process of data 
collection and analysis continued throughout the research program, the specificity of the 
data concepts and resulting data coding themes increased. The NVivo platform provided 
an additional content analysis tool insofar as basic functions such as word frequency 
diagrams illustrated (without bias from the candidate) frequent concepts and topics that 
may have been overlooked or not given appropriate attention by the candidate. 
Additionally, the data tree diagrams offered through the NVivo platform (while linear in 
presentation) offered the candidate some initial insights to the directional aspects of the 
data codes (e.g. trust as a concept was usually discussed before, and as an enabler to the 
development of a dynamic capability in innovation). These tools assisted in the early 
analysis of data concepts/themes in the context of establishing “axial coding” 
relationships as illustrated in “Figure 11 – Finalised Data Codes & Directional 
Relationship of Data”.  
 
The NVivo platform also assisted in the transcription of interviews in reducing the 
audio playback speed by up to 50%; all recorded interviews were transcribed into the 
NVivo platform. While the NVivo platform was an excellent tool for the management, 
reference and general inquiry (through the reporting and data analysis tools referenced 
above) the platform itself did not supersede the requirement for the candidate to conduct 
an exhaustive and continuous analysis of the data. As described above, the degree of 
analysis throughout the completion of interviews requires the candidate to examine, 
articulate, challenge and question (in subsequent interviews) the meaning, relationship 
and synthesis of data into a series of conceptual (diagrammatic) frameworks. While 
NVivo is an excellent data management platform (inclusive of data analysis scripts and 
tools), the degree of data analysis required to advance this research strategy ultimately 
resides with the research candidate.       
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14.4 DATA ANALYSIS – EXAMINATION AND EXPLORATION OF CASE 
STUDIES IN DEVELOPING THEORETICAL INSIGHTS  
 
While the process in which specific data concepts, themes and resulting codes were 
established above, the candidate also employed a cross-case analysis approach to 
analyse the data and the resulting data codes between the two case studies (“Org A” and 
“Org B”). This process, as described by Eisenhardt (1989), is a natural extension of 
analysing “within” case studies to that of “cross-case patterns” (p. 540). In establishing 
data codes (representing categories/themes in the data, both within and between the two 
case studies), the candidate was able to create a cross-comparison matrix (88-page 
matrix; containing 30,318 words of rich, illustrative data), organised by data codes by 
category/theme (row) and specific case study “Org A” and “Org B” (column). As 
Eisenhardt (1989) describes, “This tactic forces researchers to look for the subtle 
similarities and differences between cases (pp. 540-541).”  An illustrative example of 
this coding process has been provided in “APPENDIX E – Data Analysis: Example of 
Cross-Case Coding” which illustrates the cross-coding of data and establishment of the 
specific data codes of  “Development of Dynamic Capabilities Between Firms” and 
“Trust” (please note, to ensure confidentiality all personal identifiers and names have 
been generalised in the data examples; the illustrated data provide a representative 
sample, rather than an exhaustive list of quotes for each of the two data codes/themes).    
 
This process enabled the examination/exploration of the specific case studies and build 
potential case explanations (Yin, 2009). The establishment of data codes 
(categories/themes) enabled the candidate to explore where and why specific data codes 
where present in a single case study (e.g. fuzzy decision making), or referenced in 
responses in both case studies (e.g. trust). In pursuing explanations and theoretical 
insights, the candidate was able to question and challenge respondents through 
subsequent interviews to better understand why specific data codes (categories/themes) 
were reflected in one case, and not the other; and where the data code category/theme 
was present in both, such as the theme of trust (Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin and Strauss, 
2008).    
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14.5 TEST FOR DATA CODE (CATEGORY/THEME) BIAS 
 
At the conclusion of the interviews and subsequent data analysis, the candidate 
randomly selected an interview respondent and requested their participation in 
completing a data-code bias-test (via the methodological approach outlined within 
Chapter 12 - Data Collection & Analysis: Case Study Protocol). Upon reviewing the 
data code bias-control process with the respondent (and upon the completion of an 
additional Informed Consent Form and Confidentiality Agreement) the randomly 
selected respondent reviewed ~11 pages of randomly selected responses, consistently 
selecting the same data codes as applied as the candidate.   
 
 
14.6 THE CODING PROCESS - AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
 
As an illustrative example, the candidate will demonstrate the development of the 
research concept of a dynamic capability of innovation involving Michener and “Org 
B.” Beginning at the first interview, the candidate questioned respondents on the nature 
of the innovation, and specifically what (if any) of the specific developments resulting 
form the alliance could be considered at all innovative. After specifying the definition of 
innovation (pre-circulated, please see APPENDIX D - Supplemental Glossary of Terms: 
Specific to Research Interviews) respondents were requested to list the specific 
evidence of the innovation developed within the context of the Michener-“Org B” 
alliance relationship. Respondents identified several points of evidence of innovation, 
such as establishing new part numbers; design/building of new specific (cooling) parts 
and approaches; the installation of the linac units on a 9
th
-story floor, and the creation of 
the emulation software that simulated the full scope functionality of a MV-linac with a 
unique KV-linac design. Once it was established that these innovations had in fact 
occurred (by referencing the specific points and artefacts of evidence), respondents were 
requested to describe the context (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) in which these specific 
innovations occurred. For example, how did the teams work together; what were the 
unique characteristics of the discussions; how did the multiple teams contribute to these 
respective innovations; what were the variables that were present between team, what 
variables were developed over time; how did these specific innovations integrate with 
the broader alliance relationship between Michener and “Org B”; was one firm more 
dominant in providing the specific innovative capability or was the innovative 
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capability/capacity developed between firms; and how did these outcomes 
impact/influence other capabilities, such as commercialisation. Whilst the process of 
data collection and analysis occurs simultaneously during individual and/or focus group 
interviews (in order to clarify, examine, explore core concepts, themes and categories), 
the candidate also employed the use of memos to “chew” on the data and identify core 
concepts (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Following the example of “chasing” the concept of 
the development of a dynamic capability of innovation between Michener and “Org B”, 
on March 5
th
, 2012 the candidate completed the first interview with Michener-Executive 
I, who offered the following in reference to why alliance relationships were required 
and specifically within the radiation-therapy program: 
 
“But that was at that point I think we were then at a mindset because of the 
move towards strategic alliances as a vehicle to address what had never been 
provided by our government funding relationship. That right from the get go it 
wasn’t really interested in getting another proxy simulator as we had originally. 
You know wanted to do something that was going to certainly approximate the 
department the students would be working at when they were practicing as a 
radiation therapist. That meant getting a contemporary linear accelerator. That 
was there. Yes these are large, yes these are complex pieces of equipment but 
that I thought was what we needed to move forward.” 
 
Several concepts emerge from the response above, including “strategic alliances as a 
vehicle”; “government funding”; “approximate the department the students would be 
working”; “contemporary linear accelerator (linac)”; “what we needed”.   
 
Resulting from the same interview, the candidate sought evidence of innovation 
between the respective firms after visiting “Org B’s” UK factory:  
 
“And the guy kind of laughed and he says yeah we had to give them product 
numbers so we had to put them in our catalogue and if we ever need to sell them 
again we know what to list them as a purchase order. He said we couldn’t even 
list them. This didn’t fit our purchasing system. That to me became one of those 
watershed moments in terms of what this (alliance) relationship meant.” 
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From a data analysis perspective, the above response provided some form of evidence 
that an innovation took place well before installation. Secondly, the degree (no way of 
referencing the new parts through product numbers) and specific types of innovations 
(hardware/software) became clarified. The term ‘watershed moment’ became a 
particularly important phrase that the candidate wrote a memo towards, indicating a 
realisation to the degree of success of innovation within the (alliance) relationship.  
 
The above analysis, conducted after the interview on March 5
th
 2012, enabled the 
candidate to conduct an informed interview with the Sr. Executive Management Team 
of “Org B” two-days later on March 7th, 2012. Within this focus group interview 
involving three (3) respondents, the candidate was able to establish and probe these 
specific concepts further and seek clarification, evidence, and understanding from their 
unique perspective. The degree of innovation was confirmed, and additional examples 
of innovation were explored (e.g. the emulation module which enables the KV-linac to 
function as a MV-linac). Representative comments such as the following enabled 
confirmation of existing and identification of new concepts: 
 
“The emulation software innovation was the hardest innovation.”  
 
“Yes, it was a new baby, and the one thing “Org B” is really good at is making 
new babies. If you look at our history of innovation and breakthroughs, digital 
accelerators, VMAT, IGRT.” 
 
“It's unique, it’s a notch in the gun belt.  No one else in...Its personal capital for 
him.  He is the guy who did this...no one else in North America has done this for 
any company. It was actually not thought possible. Which gave him more 
motivation.  Everyone says no, his personality doesn’t accept that. He doesn't 
take no as the answer. He's a farmer. It's like a kid, you tell them no, and they'll 
fight you to the death. So its good we had him.  He made a big impact.”  
 
The data analysis process enabled the synthesising these interview responses and 
specific concepts such as “unique”, “emulation software innovation was the hardest 
innovation”, “notch in the gun belt”, “new baby”, “couldn’t even list them”, “product 
numbers”, “watershed moment”, etc. These identification, pursuit, and development of 
these concepts with (multiple respondent interviews thereafter) enabled the candidate to 
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clarify and explore the context and variables involved in establishing a dynamic 
capability in innovation, or “DC-Innovation” above. Subsequently, other concepts, such 
as “watershed moment” of visiting the UK plant were cross-referenced with 
executives/manager and installers from “Org B” to determine if the same 
experience/meaning was attributed to this concept as described by the Michener 
Executive I. The cross-referencing of data concepts within multiple interviews enabled 
key insights and discoveries. For example, in referencing the “watershed moment” 
concept with another representative from “Org B” on May 23rd, the respondent 
indicated that from “Org B’s” perspective, the visit was also a “watershed moment”, as 
before the visit “the project was hanging from a thread.” It was explained that the shared 
experience (meeting of alliance partners at the UK factory where the development of 
several innovations were underway) acted as a catalyst and confirmation “that what we 
were doing was special, unique.”  
 
The above example illustrates the process of identifying, clarifying, examining and 
grounding a specific data concept/theme/code with and amongst respondents. Core data 
concepts are triangulated and validated with each subsequent interview, resulting in the 
development of the specific theoretical frameworks and results outlined in Chapter 15 - 
Results- Archival Review & Analysis, and Chapter 16 - Results: Initial Analysis.    
 
 
14.7 DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS OF LITERATURE 
 
At the conclusion of the data collection and analysis phase, the candidate reviewed the 
existing literature review submitted to Edinburgh Business School in the Fall of 2011.  
This had the dual purpose of suggesting initial areas in which the collected data would 
provide a contribution to the development of existing theory; and suggested that other, 
more complex fields of research and subsequent interconnectivity to existing literature 
themes be explored and captured as part of the updated literature review within the 
proceeding data results chapter. This major secondary phase of data analysis and 
categorisation was crucial in identifying the specific distinct research contributions of 
this dissertation.   
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CHAPTER 15 - RESULTS: ARCHIVAL REVIEW & ANALYSIS 
 
15.1 INTRODUCTION & ALIGNMENT TO LITERATURE REVIEW & RESEARCH 
SCOPE 
 
Helfat and Winter (2011) identify alliances and new product development as examples 
of specific dynamic capabilities.  The focus and scope of this research thesis is to 
examine/explore the development of dynamic capabilities between firms, within a 
limited time frame to establish a new product/service innovation (to support Michener’s 
core business of graduate healthcare education in the applied health sciences) through 
alliance relationships (“Org A” and “Org B”) as a means to develop/secure relevant 
resources (Barney, 1991). Through this experience, this research thesis will explore the 
extrapolation of a dynamic capability in alliance management to that of Michener’s 
alliance portfolio (Wassmer, 2010).  
 
As described by Helfat and Winter (2011), the process of establishing a defined line 
between dynamic and operational capabilities can be extraordinarily difficult, given 
time frames and units of analysis.  In defining dynamic capabilities, other researchers 
(Wang and Ahmed, 2007) have posited that the presence of rapidly changing and/or 
highly volatile markets presents the environmental context to whether firms create new 
capabilities to support the continued operations of their respective core business. Helfat 
and Winter (2011) illustrate several examples (related to semiconductor chips; outlet 
proliferation; and oil and gas exploration) where seemingly operational activities, when 
considered over a long-term perspective, are in fact dynamic in their design/application.  
This is of particular importance to Michener. As described above, whilst focusing on the 
development of dynamic capabilities between firms (“Org A” and “Org B”), the 
establishment of these respective dynamic capabilities (specifically, the dynamic 
capabilities of alliance management, innovation and commercialisation between firms) 
have an impact on Michener’s macro-dynamic capability related to its pedagogical 
approach and resulting effectiveness. Given the capital intensity and role of simulation 
in Michener’s educational disciplines, each time a major technological/pedagogical 
advancement occurs in the macro-environment, Michener must “decide whether to 
participate in this next phase of the industry” (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002), and if so, 
evolve its overall pedagogical/resource approach. An example is the discipline of 
radiation-therapy, where technology innovations have seen major technological 
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developments related to standard radiation treatment for oncology, to the development 
of IMRT, IGRT and VMAT; similarly, within the nuclear medicine discipline, the 
introduction of single-head cameras, to dual-head cameras, to SPEC/CT units and 
currently multi-modality (hybrid) models. While Michener continues to educate within 
these respective disciplines (macro-dynamic capability), the complement of resources, 
equipment, educational approach, alliance partners and resulting capabilities must adapt 
to remain an effective and valuable educational experience (Helfat and Lieberman, 
2002). This integrated relationship between layers of capabilities is effectively stated by 
Teece (2012):    
 
“Dynamic capabilities are ‘strategic’ and distinct from ordinary capabilities. 
Firms can maintain and extend competitive advantage by layering dynamic 
capabilities on top of ordinary capabilities (p. 1396).”  
 
Kay (2010) provides further context to Teece (2012), in regards to the levels of 
capabilities, positing, “In short, both operating and dynamic capabilities are best defined 
not in terms of what they are, but in terms of what they do, and what they do depends on 
context (p. 1211).” 
 
Helfat et. al. (2007) posit “since dynamic capabilities create, modify, or extend the 
resource base of an organisation and since dynamic capabilities also comprise part of 
this resource base, this implies that dynamic capabilities can modify or extend dynamic 
capabilities (p. 4).” Thus, in synthesising these perspectives of dynamic capabilities, the 
examination/exploration of the dynamic capabilities (specifically, the dynamic 
capabilities of alliance management, innovation and commercialisation between firms) 
involved in case studies “Org A” and “Org B” over the time frame of two to three-years 
allow the candidate to ground and recognise (contextually) to Michener’s 57-year 
macro-dynamic capability related to the evolution of its pedagogical approach and 
educational experience.   
 
 
15.2 INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY ORGANISATIONS (“A” & “B”)  
Before proceeding to the specific results from the respondent data, the candidate (as a 
means to provide relevant context to the interview questions and anticipated discussion) 
leveraged the comprehensive archives involved with each respective case study. This is 
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an essential data analysis process insofar as the documents, including contracts, 
agreements, working papers, press releases and implementation plans provide a rich, 
objective “snap-shot” of the original intents, focus and vision of each case at different 
time-points. The subsequent data sources were referenced, where required throughout 
the interviews with respondents internal and external Michener (e.g. limited to 
respondents within “Org A” and “Org B” respectively, as to comply with existing 
confidentiality agreements and/or the terms and conditions outlined in the organisational 
letters of support). The following case summaries provide a contextual history and 
illustration of each respective alliance case study with “Org A” and “Org B.”   
 
15.2.1 Case Study #1 - Michener & Organisation “A” (“Org A”) 
Note: Methodology & Citation Clarification - Please note that all references/citations to 
“the agreement” between The Michener Institute for Applied Health Sciences and 
Organisation “A” are extracted from the document archives originating from the 
exploration of the alliance, formal agreement (completed in August 2008) and the 
process and development of the alliance to January 2012 (representing the archival 
analysis process). The data presented throughout this section also reflects the 
perspective of the candidate (participant observation/involvement), as he was involved 
in the negotiations and development of the originating contract and evolving 
relationship. The proceeding Results chapters will reflect the third methodological 
approach, that of the responses from the semi/unstructured interviews.  These specific 
methods (archival analysis; participant observation/involvement; and semi/unstructured 
interviews) are applied and presented within a case study approach.  
 
The identity of the organisation has been changed to Organisation “A” (referred to as 
“Org A”) to maintain confidentiality assured and referenced throughout the literature 
and ethics review submissions.   
 
The Genesis & Development of a Proposed Alliance with Organisation “A” 
As referred to in preceding sections, The Michener Institute for Applied Health 
Sciences (hereby referred to as “Michener”) specialises in the education of healthcare 
professions within the applied health sciences (e.g. radiation therapists; radiologists; 
respiratory therapists; etc.). Organisation “A” is a world-leading organisation (in terms 
of revenue and market share), that specialises (amongst other business lines) in 
simulation education in piloting of commercial/military aircraft. In 2008 Organisation 
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“A” aimed to diversify its strategic business units and capabilities from aviation 
simulation skills and techniques into healthcare simulation, creating a new business unit 
called Organisation “A” - Healthcare. Organisation “A” has over several decades 
developed significant and valuable capabilities in the development of aviation 
simulation curriculum; the development of aviation simulators (hardware); as well as 
the operationalisation of the simulation Centres themselves.   
 
The document titled “value proposition” provides an excellent insight to the alliance 
establishment process and approach. On March 24, 2008 Michener visited the 
headquarters of Organisation “A” to meet the then Vice President, New Products & 
Services and Managing Director, Healthcare. While a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) was signed previous to these meetings, the intent of the MOU was to establish 
the process for further explorative discussions within a confidential environment. The 
“value proposition” document summarises the initial focus of these explorative 
discussions. The document is segmented into 3 main sections, including: 
 
 Section 1 – Michener/Organisation “A” Strategic Alliance – which outlines the 
intended mutual benefits   
 Section 2 – Overview of Michener – provides an overview of academic business 
strategy and accomplishments 
 Section 3 – Capital Development Project – illustrated the intent and plans for the 
simulation floors (described in proceeding section, OSCE & simulation Suites) 
 
Importantly, the goals of the proposed alliance are referenced and clarified, including: 
 
1. International Standard for Healthcare Simulation Delivery, defined to include: 
 Optimisation of healthcare simulation centre activity and throughput 
 Resource integration (within and between Centres) 
 Commercialisation 
 
This specific (intended) goal of the alliance is significant for several reasons. First, it 
confirms the desire to collaboratively create a dynamic capability of commercialisation 
within the context of the simulation centre; an important focus for Michener at this time 
given the perceived need to develop/acquire this capability. Secondly, the resource 
integration “within and between Centres” is a reference to the fact that the original 
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vision was that this alliance would be part of several other alliances that Organisation 
“A” would be establishing with other healthcare simulation centres. Within the 
perspective of Michener, this broader network would act as an important complement to 
Michener’s alliance portfolio for sharing expertise, capabilities, curriculum, curricular 
media assets; etc.  
 
2. Centre of Learning in Healthcare Simulation, defined to include: 
 Train the Trainer Modules 
 Valid and reliable evaluation and assessment methodologies/practices 
 Conducting Research in Healthcare Simulation 
 
This goal confirms the desire to establish the alliance as a contributor to “thought 
leadership” within the healthcare simulation industry through research, and the 
establishment/application of innovative teaching/assessment methodologies, as well as 
the central outcome of the design/development of innovative curriculum.  
 
3. Innovation & Leadership in Healthcare Simulation, defined to include: 
 New product development (including but not exclusive to the area of 
advanced imaging) and/or current product (software) enhancements in 
healthcare simulation 
 Impact/efficacy of healthcare simulation for the end-user or healthcare 
provider 
 
This specific goal confirms the original desire to co-develop a dynamic capability in 
innovation within healthcare simulation, specifically within new product/service 
development and simulated curricular assets/experiences for the healthcare provider.   
 
The document contains further perspective to the alliance, including the supporting 
rationale and scope of the alliance. The founding rationale in proceeding with this 
alliance and the subsequent alliance portfolio (Michener-centric) or network 
(Organisation “A”-centric) was to address: 
 impeding and imminent health human resource shortages 
 the need for increasing numbers of learners in the system when the capacity of 
healthcare institutions is least able to accommodate increased clinical 
placements 
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 pressures to decrease the length of educational programs 
 concerns about patient safety statistics 
 accountability mandates to focus on the quality of healthcare workers and their 
practice  
These rationales were critical in referencing specific themes and developments within 
the data collection process (and specific interviews and subsequent theme 
development). The document further confirms Michener’s recognition of the 
Organisation “A”’ dynamic capabilities in innovation and commercialisation within its 
established industry of aviation simulation education.  
  
Confirmation a Formal Agreement 
 In August 2008, Michener confirmed an agreement with Organisation “A” (titled 
“Organisational A Agreement With The Michener Institute for Applied Health Sciences 
– For the collaboration, management and various services related to the establishment of 
a pre-eminent jointly-led Healthcare Simulation Centre.”) which sought to create an 
alliance that would result in the development of dynamic capabilities in the i) 
innovation/commercialisation of curricular assets within the applied health sciences; 
and ii) commercialisation of a ~20,000 sq. foot healthcare simulation centre. This 
relationship was critical to the approval and development of the simulation centre 
insofar as the total project cost to complete the construction of these two-floors was 
~$11.5 million, with ~$8.2 million being directed from the Ontario Ministry of Health 
and Long-Term Care, with the remaining ~$3.0 million being directed from 
Organisation “A”. Thus, the formal agreement included interests in the capital 
development and funding, as well as the operational responsibilities within the 
simulation centre post-construction.  The original innovation objective related to the 
construction of the Centre itself, illustrated below through the resulting floors plans: 
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Figure 5: 3
rd
 Floor OSCE Rooms, courtesy of The Michener Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: 4
th
 Floor Simulation Suites, courtesy of The Michener Institute 
 
 
Figure 5 above represents 24 individual clinical examination rooms (approximately 
10’x10’), which support the competency evaluation/assessment of individuals and teams 
in a variety of healthcare simulations.  OSCE is defined as “observed structured clinical 
evaluation” (Harden, 1988) and is an internationally recognised methodology for 
assessing/examining healthcare professionals. Figure 6 represents the 4
th
 Floor, which is 
dedicated to healthcare simulation suites, where large and custom simulation 
experiences can be scheduled/organised involving several healthcare professions (e.g. 
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home care setting; ICU; critical care; etc.).  The intent of the simulation Centre was “to 
become a self-funding venture” (p. 8 of 27).  
 
The overarching intent of this alliance (with Michener and Organisational “A”) was the 
transference of simulation capabilities from the aviation simulation industry to the co-
development of dynamic capabilities (innovation; commercialisation) within the 
emerging healthcare simulation industry (in all respects, including the capabilities 
associated with the design/development of simulation curriculum and experiences and 
resulting courses; the development of healthcare simulation hardware; and the 
operationalisation of dedicated healthcare simulation Centres throughout Canada). 
Michener recognised the dynamic capabilities of Organisation “A”, specifically of 
innovation (of curricular assets, experiences) and commercialisation (through the 
operationalisation of this curriculum and simulation hardware with dedicated simulation 
centres).  The agreement (page 3 of 27) confirms appreciation in stating: 
 
“Organisation ‘A’ is prepared to contribute to the development of this 
Simulation Centre its vast expertise, including, amongst others, the provision of 
consulting and project management services for the construction of the 
Simulation Centre, consulting services related to implementing a continuous 
improvement process, courseware development and, most importantly, the 
management of the Simulation Centre, in return for a fee and share of the profits 
to be generated from the commercialisation of Spare Time and Capacity…”. 
 
Given Michener’s needs of the simulation Centre were not expected to exceed 50% 
capacity (Monday-Friday, 0800-1800), Michener agreed to authorise Organisation “A” 
the use of this additional capacity for the commercialisation efforts and internal 
(training) purposes (reflecting the definition/intent of “commercialisation of spare time” 
(p. 15 of 27)).  Similarly, where there was additional capacity within Michener’s 
building (outside of the simulation centre) Michener would authorise Organisation “A” 
to pursue commercialisation of this space (representing the intent/definition of 
“commercialisation of spare capacity” (p. 16 of 27)).  
 
The agreement also contains a comprehensive business case and cash flow statement for 
a 10-year period, with net profits from the commercialisation of courseware, spare time 
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and spare capacity beginning at ~$0.7 million in year-one, escalating to ~$2.4 million in 
year-ten.   
 
Operationalising the Agreement – Launch of a Simulation Centre & Alliance  
Given the scope, degree of innovation, and complexities of the agreement, several 
change management meetings; articles and brand awareness publications were created 
to maximise the intent and likelihood of success.  
 
Fall 2008 – Contract Implementation  
In early September, 2008 several meetings were held with senior staff in both respective 
organisations to discuss process outlined within the document titled “Organisation ‘A’-
Michener – Contract Implementation.  The document outlines the central issues of the 
alliance to be developed, including the collaborative vision, mission, strategic business 
objectives, Alliance Charter (and related components) and a comprehensive change 
management plan. With the candidate participating in these discussions, the majority of 
the conversation was dedicated to establishing the vision and mission of the alliance and 
thereby the simulation Centre. The aim of the Charter was to establish the central 
components, including the “vision, mission, strategic business objectives, purpose, 
project scope, goals and objectives, milestones, roles and responsibilities of the team 
and a resolution framework (slide 11 of 75). Given time constraints, discussion and 
development of these factors beyond the vision and mission did not progress beyond a 
preliminary overview, with agreement to develop outside the formal meetings, and 
during an upcoming retreat at Organisation “A” headquarters. Given the literature base 
focus on the contributors and difficulty of alliance success (Kale et. al., 2002), two 
elements within this presentation are important to note; that of the Business 
Management Council (BMC) and the anticipated change management process. The 
BMC was intended to act as the “only approved vehicle to make key business 
decisions” (slide 14 of 75) within the alliance, and was to review “outstanding issues 
that can have material impact on the Organisation “A”-Michener partnership” (slide 15 
of 75). The BMC was anticipated to contain several tiered groups, including the (slide 
16 of 75): 
 
 Working Group – focus on day to day business, with meetings more frequent 
during the alliance start-up, to interface and leadership through Business 
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Process Owners (BPOs, designated functional/cluster leaders within each 
institution) 
 
 Core Process Group – Group designated to resolving impasses at Working 
Group level; lead by Core Process Owners 
 
 Steering Group – Highest tier; has authority to veto decision taken by 
Working Group or Core Process Group; decisions of this group are strategic 
in nature, consisting of executive management (respective executive 
management, VPs and CEOs of each organisation.  
 
This structure suggests a comprehensive attempt to establish a framework whereby 
communication, operational and strategic discussion making could be supported and 
sustained within the alliance.  
 
The second major focus of the document pertains to the comprehensive change 
management strategy. The presentation slides focus on core (generic) change 
management concepts such as the definition of change; reactions to change; perception 
of change; tools to combat resistance to change; key success factors; etc. The concepts 
are presented as means to not only illustrate the concepts to be considered and defined, 
but also as a framework to initialise the development of specific deliverables, including 
a formal communications plan and project impact and stakeholder assessment (slide 35 
of 75).  
 
Finally, great attention of this document is focused on the theme and process of 
implementation, largely through the concept of business process management (slide 38 
of 75). The objective was to establish a formal process methodology for each customer 
focused process experienced within the simulation Centre, including: 
 client acquisition, including key sub-processes of market analysis, business 
development, marketing activity, sales activity, contract execution and client 
registration (slide 45 of 75);  
 training operations, including key sub-processes of scheduling, client reception, 
training delivery and service documentation (slide 46 of 75);  
 technical services, including  key sub-processes of preventative/corrective 
maintenance (slide 47 of 75); 
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 employee fulfilment including key sub-processes of talent acquisition, talent and 
succession development, engagement and transfer (slide 48 of 75); and 
 client administration, including key sub-processes of invoicing, accounts 
receivable and collections (slide 49 of 75). 
 
This collective of processes represent the business process structure required to 
operationalise the simulation Centre, and by extension the alliance relationship. It 
represents an appreciation for the complexities and requirements in operating a joint-
innovative environment such as the simulation Centre.  The remainder of the document 
is focused on the methodology associated with improvement projects and the training 
and education requirements to be launched at the completion of the construction phase 
(e.g. staff education related to simulation phantoms; quality assurance sign-off process 
for construction phase; etc.). 
 
It is important to note that the document is highly conceptual and procedural, indicative 
of the early phase of this alliance. The document is clearly an attempt to establish clarity 
of direction and purpose (vision, mission); key terms and processes; and a thematic 
illustration of what was anticipated to be complete for the launch of the simulation 
centre, and the processes related to innovation and commercialisation.  These themes 
conversations above were continued at a joint half-day session on November 20
th
, 2008.  
 
Subsequent to the above Agreement and resulting process methodology, the majority of 
Michener’s administrative and operational leadership team visited the headquarters of 
“Org A” to build awareness of the nature/intent of the agreement, to discuss the process 
methodology process, and to clarify the specific operational resources to be applied by 
each organisation to each respective process. This focus and events of this two-day 
session were captured in a document called “The Spirit of the Alliance.” This document, 
and the central themes and intents in which it represents, will be explored in greater 
detail in the proceeding Chapter 16 - Results: Initial Analysis.  
 
The aim of these archives was to establish enough relevant reference and context to 
examine and explore the process and experience in the pursuit of establishing dynamic 
capabilities of innovation and commercialisation within the alliance environment. The 
referenced documents above provide a rich source of data in which to establish time-
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specific insights, intents and context, which was leveraged in the unstructured 
interviews with participants from both respective organisations. 
 
15.2.2 Case Study #2: Michener & Organisation “B” – (“Org B”) 
The Genesis & Development of a Proposed Alliance with Organisation “B” 
In the context of exploring the relationship between Michener and Organisation “B”, it 
is important to reference the fact that while this case study represents the first agreement 
and pursuit of innovation and commercialisation with Organisation “B”, Michener did 
have alliance relationships with two subsidiaries of Organisation “B”. The first 
subsidiary engagement, which began in the summer 2006 focused on a software 
installation required to operate hardware (linear accelerator) within the radiation therapy 
program. The second engagement began in 2008 with a third party company 
specialising in treatment planning platforms, which enable dosimetrists to build custom 
treatment plans for oncology patients. Michener was in the final stages of negotiations 
to procure this platform with this firm when they were acquired by Organisation “B”.  
 
In 2008, having upgraded the software and platforms for both the e-charting and 
treatment planning within radiation-therapy, Michener began to explore the opportunity 
of replacing two linear accelerators to complete this complement of lab equipment 
within this program through an alliance with Organisation “B”. It is important to state 
this clarification as a means to acknowledge that some “carry-over” of relationship 
knowledge and goodwill from the earlier relationships perhaps transferred to the 
explorative discussions with Organisation “B”. It is also important to note that the key 
contacts for each alliance were different, so while some “carry-over” could have 
occurred, with different people involved in each of the three alliances with Organisation 
“B”, this may be a limited impact. From a research scope perspective, while the 
candidate will explore this connection with interview respondents, the candidate will not 
be conducting a comprehensive archival review/analysis of the two preceding alliances 
to the alliance with Organisation “B”.   
 
The alliance intent with “Org B” was significant for several reasons, including the 
design/development of unique instructional assets within the radiation therapy program, 
as well as to contribute to Michener’s evolving alliance portfolio through the 
establishment of dynamic capabilities in innovation and commercialisation. In securing 
a formal alliance with the parent company Organisation “B”, Michener was efficiently 
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integrating three (3) formal alliances through a single relationship (Organisation “B” 
and its two (2) subsidiaries). This was an intended goal, not just for the sake of 
operational efficiency, but also from a corporate impact standpoint, specifically to 
enabling new possibilities within innovation and commercialisation.  
 
This is captured in a Michener Board of Governors Monitoring Report (submitted for 
the September 2008 Meeting). The monitoring report of interest provides a unique 
snapshot in time of Michener’s evolving alliance portfolio. Titled “II-61, Focus on 
Business and Other (non-academic) Strategic Alliances” while not completely 
exhaustive, the report outlines several specific alliances that were created and/or had 
advanced since the previous reporting period (specific reporting period of this report 
was January 2008 – September 2008). The report confirms existing relationships with 
the two (2) subsidiaries of Organisation “B”; an alliance with a regional technology firm 
exploring support technologies for digital microscopy; an alliance with a global 
cardiovascular perfusion company resulting in the investment of a heart-lung machine; a 
bi-party alliance between a subsidiary and parent company dedicated to digital 
microscopy; the alliance with Organisation “A”; and an alliance with a chiropody 
company which excelled in the electronic measurement/treatment assessment platform. 
It is within this alliance portfolio context and specific Board Meeting that the alliance 
with Organisation “B” was presented/discussed. The themes of the intent of the alliance 
portfolio, the alliance within the alliance portfolio, the management and evolution of the 
alliance portfolio, and the focus on dynamic capability development within innovation 
and commercialisation was a central theme at this time, and is to be explored in greater 
detail with the interview respondent data results in proceeding chapters.  
 
Confirmation of a Formal Agreement with Organisation “B” 
While the alliance between Michener and Organisation “B” was proposed to the 
Michener Board in the Fall 2008, final project approval was dependent on joint project 
capital funding through Michener’s primary funder, The Ministry of Health & Long-
Term Care. With this funding approved in the summer months of 2009, approximately 
3-months of effort were confirmed in a formal agreement in October 2009 titled 
“Purchase & License Agreement”. The candidate was the designated lead representative 
from Michener to complete this draft agreement.   
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The agreement was representative of the pursuit of a dynamic capability in innovation 
in several ways. First, in weighing at 25,000-40,000 pounds each combined with the 
issue of radiation-safety, linear accelerators are almost exclusively installed in 
hospital/clinic basements, traditionally called “bunkers. “ These bunkers have the 
capacity to hold the weight and provide a segmented (lead-lined) room for radiation 
safety. As a learning organisation, Michener’s goal was to install 2 liner accelerators on 
the 9
th
 Floor (of a total 15 floors) as this floor also includes offices for faculty members 
and the other related radiation therapy labs (treatment planning lab; VERT Lab; 
breakout rooms; etc.). This would require an innovative capability from a structural 
engineering perspective; an installation perspective and development of the actual linac 
devices.  
 
 
Figure 7: Design Plans for Linear Accelerator Installation, courtesy of “Org B”  
 
 
Page 95 
Secondly, as an educational institution, from a student safety perspective, Michener 
required the building a completely new linac device, one that operated, looked and 
functioned as a “real” linac, but one where the strength of the treatment beam was 
dramatically reduced. In clinical terms this is referred to as the difference between 
“MV” and “KV” beam, with KV beam being significantly mitigated in terms of 
strength/power. While this was an innovation onto itself, Michener also requested that 
the finalised product integrate with the software/workflow platform, to effectively 
simulate a radiation therapy treatment process, complete with beam and resulting 
images post-treatment, but without a fully functional linac unit. This not only required a 
significant ability to innovate a new linac hardware model, but also to innovate a unique 
“emulation” software platform that would simulate the fully functional linac operating 
experience without a fully functional linac capital unit. The engineering of such a linac 
unit and related emulation software would represent a significant (and to-date not 
established) innovative commitment.  
 
 
 
Figure 8:
8
 Custom Linear Accelerator Installed at Michener Campus, courtesy of The 
Michener Institute 
 
 
Fall of 2009 – Contract (P&L) Implementation 
The implementation of this project is distinct in several respects. First, given the 
complexity and degree of innovation required of this agreement/project, several 
implementation teams were created, joined and disbanded at different times throughout 
                                                        
8 A special thanks to Alex D. for his assistance in enhancing this image.  
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the implementation process. Almost immediately after the confirmation of the 
agreement between Michener and Organisation “B”, and internal implementation team 
was created to begin exploring the fundamental issues and actions required to advance 
the agreement. The final signature on the agreement between Michener and 
Organisation “B” was obtained on October 26th, 2009. The creation of the first draft 
“Project Charter” for this agreement was completed on November 26th, 2009, with a 
first team meeting organised on December 7
th
, 2009. What was also unique in this 
implementation plan was the degree of engagement with respect to the faculty. Faculty 
members within radiation-therapy were invited to participate in all meetings including 
the agreement implementation, engineering assessment (structural; electrical; etc.), and 
design-build discussions with the construction management firm, throughout the life of 
the implementation process (estimated at time of signature to be approximately one-year 
long). 
 
Implementation Teams involved in Alliance between Michener & “Org B”: 
 Michener Directed – Holistic Agreement (Project) Implementation Team, 
complete with Michener management, faculty, staff based in Toronto, Canada; 
 Organisation “B”– Installation Team, complete with executive team and Sr. 
Engineers from Toronto, Canada & USA; 
 Organisation “B” – Engineering Development Team in UK; and 
 Construction Management – Project Implementation Team dedicated to 
Design/Build. 
 
The intent of the Project Charter, first established on November 26
th
, 2009 and updated 
for the length of the implementation process, was to provide clarity to the 
implementation goals, stakeholders, deliverables; and the assumptions, budget, risks, 
constraints and issues resulting from this process. With this clarification, the 
coordination and efforts of the various implementation teams could be maximised. 
 
The Charter states that the vision was: 
 
“To enhance Michener student educational experience and create teaching 
opportunities for the Michener faculty by providing state-of-the-art equipment 
and software.”  
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This is an important reference as the vision is focused on the impact to the academic 
environment and maximising the student experience (in a sense, the pursuit of 
innovation in relation to our core business of educating students). In the context of the 
relationship described in the above section with Organisation “A” and the intent/pursuit 
of “commercialisation of spare time”, the implementation of this agreement and 
resulting linac units was intended to contribute to net new revenue generation 
opportunities. This also represents an important illustration of how Michener envisioned 
the synergies of its alliance portfolio, insofar as the success and result from one alliance 
(installation of innovative technology through unique linac units with Organisation “B”) 
could enable the goal and intent of another alliance (commercialisation of spare time in 
alliance with Organisation “A”). Similarly, once the capability of innovation was 
established with “Org B”, the application of the dynamic capability in innovation post-
installation to new developments would also contribute towards the cultivation of the 
intended dynamic capability in commercialisation with “Org A.” 
 
With the Charter the goals of success are articulated: 
 
 “All equipment, hardware and software delivered, installed, tested and ready to 
be used for student instruction by September 1, 2010”; and 
 
“Program personnel trained and ready to operate new equipment, hardware and 
software for student instruction by September 1, 2010.” 
 
The operationalisation of these goals was outlined in the proceeding sections of the 
Project Charter. From a resource application, coordination and engagement perspective, 
the relevant stakeholders were identified as the faculty of radiation therapy and medical 
laboratory sciences; the students of each program; Michener Executive Sponsor; 
Michener Project Sponsor; Michener Radiation Therapy Program Chair; Michener 
Medical Laboratory Sciences Chair; Michener Facilities & Operations Contact/Lead; 
Michener Health & Safety Manager; Construction Team Manager; Engineering 
Support; Base Preparation Contact; Michener Project Manager; Michener Project 
Coordinator; and “Org B” Project Manager.  
 
Given the list of stakeholders and resources above, in hindsight the project seemed to be 
well resourced; resourced by function and action, with a recognition of stakeholder 
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engagement. As a note of clarity, while this relationship and resulting project was 
focused on radiation therapy, with the installation of the heavy linac units on the 9
th
 
floor, supplemental weight bearing construction would ultimately be required below 
these 9
th
 floor labs on the 8
th
 floor. The space on the 8
th
 floor was related to a major lab 
within the Medical Laboratory Sciences program, hence the recognition as a major 
stakeholder group to be engaged and included on all major discussions/consultations.  
 
With the intent of agreement established through the Project Charter, the period 
between January 2010 and July 2010 focused on: 
 Identifying the core issues to implementing the agreement 
 Completing a formal Request for Proposal process (January 2010-April 2010) to 
select a design-build firm for the installation of the 2 linac units 
 Series of meetings between Michener staff and Organisation “B” engineering 
staff to innovation process (design/create/build) related to unique linac 
specifications 
 Series of meetings between Michener staff and “Organisation “B” software 
engineers to innovate (design/create/build) software emulation platform 
 Manage the various internal/external implementation teams for final 
implementation in September, 2010 
   
From an archival analysis perspective, an additional source of reference is the intranet 
website
9
 created for the Michener community (faculty, staff, students, management, 
Board of Governors, etc.) titled “Organisation “B” Project.” The intranet site acted as a 
single point of contact to obtain relevant information on the state of the alliance and the 
related implementation of the linac units. The intranet site included three major sections, 
including: 
 
i) Main – outlined quick one-line status updates by date 
ii) Timeline – production of images illustrating the timeline of construction 
development and related alliance activity 
iii) Documents – collection of implementation updates and a presentation to the 
Michener community 
 
                                                        
9 Modified URL can be found: http://my.michener.ca/nv/organisationb/index.php 
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Posted on this intranet site is a presentation to the Michener community delivered June 
16
th
, 2010. The presentation acts as a general update to the mission, goals and expected 
timelines of completion. Of interest is the slide titled “Project Goals”, identified as: 
 To perform removal, construction and installation activities in the most effective 
way and with the minimal disruptions to the educational process. 
 Engage all stakeholders, ensure transparency and openness of the project 
 
These goals appear to be in alignment with the preceding sections and discussions 
related to mission, goals and community engagement.  
 
In summary, to be effective in the design, development and installation of two distinct 
linac units, Michener, together with “Org B”, would require the co-development of a 
dynamic capability in innovation to achieve the goals and aim of the alliance. The 
outcome to be achieved was distinct insofar as the capital equipment was a completely 
new design; the software/simulation modules were non-existent; and the installation of 
one, much less two linac units on a floor other than the basement “bunker” environment 
would require an innovative engineering approach. If successful and once established, 
Michener would look to continue cultivating the dynamic capability of innovation with 
“Org B” as new developments and solutions were designed/incorporated into the 
installed units. Beyond the dynamic capability of innovation, the intent was to leverage 
these assets in the pursuit of a dynamic capability in commercialisation with “Org A”, 
but also in tandem with “Org B”, where appropriate fit existed for both organisations.   
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Evidence & Artefacts to Support the Establishment of Dynamic Capability in Innovation 
between Michener & “Org B” 
 
 
Figure 9: Michener Site Visit to “Org B” UK Production Facility (Picture taken 
August 12
th
, 2010, courtesy of “Org B”)  
 
The archive picture above is significant for several reasons. Taken from the intranet 
site focused on the developments pertaining to the alliance with Michener and “Org 
B”, the image provides evidence to the development of a dynamic capability in 
innovation. The image on the right is that of Michener’s President & CEO, who 
visited the manufacturing facility of Organisation “B” in the UK, standing next to 
the main mechanical drum of the unique liner accelerator that was built to 
Michener’s unique specifications, through exhaustive consultations between 
Michener faculty and staff and the engineering team of Organisation “B”. This 
picture, taken before shipment to North America, provides evidence that the intent 
of the alliance, P&L Agreement, and operationalisation and implementation plan 
and conversations had culminated into the development of a uniquely designed and 
developed liner accelerator unit. To get to this point required the development of a 
new method to create or innovate this unit, demonstrated through the many 
collaborative design/development discussions.   
 
The picture on the left is that of Michener’s President & CEO speaking with one of 
the software engineers responsible for designing/developing the integrative 
emulation workflow engine which would simulate the treatment of a patient with a 
modified liner accelerator unit. It is important to note that while a solution had been 
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found to create the unique liner accelerator unit (hardware), at this point in time 
(August 12
th
, 2010) a solution to the development of the emulation software had not 
yet been resolved.  
 
 
Figure 10: Mechanical Backroom for Linear Accelerator, courtesy of The Michener 
Institute 
 
The process by-which these two-organisations came together in pursuit of 
establishing a dynamic capability in innovation and commercialisation will be 
explored in greater detail and specificity in the proceeding chapter titled ‘Chapter 16 
– Results: Initial Analysis.’    
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CHAPTER 16 - RESULTS: INITIAL ANALYSIS 
 
16.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Where the previous chapter illustrated the nature of “Org A”, “Org B”, and the 
respective context/intent of each alliance relationship with Michener, this chapter will 
illustrate the results of this research program as informed by the vivid data provided by 
respondents from “Org A”, “Org B”, and Michener. For ease of illustration, the 
candidate has categorised the major results in thematic categories, according to both the 
nature of the data and the literature base in which it applies. Structurally, the candidate 
has attempted to provide a brief summary of the literature as it pertains to core 
challenges, gaps, and areas for contribution, before outlining the core findings through 
the illustration of core respondent data. Thereafter, the candidate has attempted to 
illustrate and clarify the theoretical relevance, value and overall contribution.    
 
In the preceding Chapter 14 - Data Management & Statistical Analysis, within sub-
section 14.2.5 - Forth Phase of Data Collection & Analysis, the candidate illustrated the 
final set of data codes utilised throughout the results section of this research program.  
In reviewing the content, sequence and interdependencies of these data codes, the 
candidate summarised the resulting relationships between data codes in the following 
diagram: 
 
 
Figure 11: Finalised Data Codes & Directional Relationship of Data 
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As outlined in the case study protocol within Chapter 12 - Data Collection & Analysis: 
Case Study Protocol, the initial set of questions directed to each respondent aimed to 
establish the core definitions of the research program, and introduce the foundational 
concepts of (manager) resource cognition of each specific firm, as well as the genesis of 
the alliance as experienced by each respondent. Once examined, the more advanced 
concepts and variables pertaining to each alliance experience; the transition to the 
alliance portfolio; and the alliance portfolio were explored sequentially thereafter. The 
above diagram provides the reader a “clear line of sight” between the core data codes 
and the resulting concepts and development of applied theory in the proceeding 
sections.  
 
Before proceeding to the description of the emerging themes, it is important to specify 
both the unit of analysis and levels of analysis as applied throughout this chapter. The 
unit of analysis remains consistent, which is the examination and exploration of the 
establishment of dynamic capability of innovation and commercialisation within inter-
organisational relationships (including alliance relationships as part of the alliance 
portfolio, and the alliance portfolio itself). As developed in Chapter 9 – Research 
Methodology, the establishment of dynamic capability can be viewed from multiple 
perspectives, including micro, macro, and meso-perspectives (Rousseau and House, 
1994; House, Rousseau, and Thomas-Hunt, 1995). This includes the perceptions of 
specific managers, executive and staff respondents (micro-level; Emerging Theme #1 & 
#2); the dyadic alliance relationship as part of the alliance portfolio (mico-level; 
Emerging Theme #3); and that of the alliance portfolio itself (macro-level; Emerging 
Theme #4).  
 
The relationships between these levels of analysis will be leveraged in the development 
of the proceeding emerging themes, and combined into a meso-level perspective in the 
proceeding chapters, including Chapter 17 – Conclusions, and Chapter 18 – 
Contributions. Additionally, Figure 11 also represents a meso-level perspective (and 
theoretical outcome) insofar as both micro and macro perspectives are reflected in this 
model, resulting in a comprehensive, applicable framework.        
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16.2 EMERGING THEME #1 – BROADENING THE ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT 
TOOLKIT - THE DEDICATED ALLIANCE FUNCTION WITHIN ALLIANCES 
BETWEEN PUBLIC & PRIVATE FIRMS 
 
16.2.1 Introduction 
Arndt (2008) describes the role of the organisational alliance capability as “the basis for 
alliance success (p. 38).” Arndt leverages the organisational learning theory in 
suggesting that:  
“Basically, organisational capabilities, such as the alliance capability, are 
developed by the integration of knowledge. This knowledge integration accounts 
for subdivisions of the capability as well as the abstract and aggregated levels. 
Existing links from alliances establish routines, the transfer of the experience 
however – respectively the knowledge transfer – reflects the capability (p. 39).” 
 
 In referencing the high tendency for alliance relationships to end in failure, Kale et. al. 
(2002) identified that “Thus, while alliances can create economic value, they are also 
fraught with risk (p. 747).” Kale et. al. (2002) identified the lack of experience as a 
significant potential driver in alliance failure. However, the results of Kale et. al. (2002) 
suggested that “We find that a firm’s investment in a dedicated alliance function is a 
more significant predicator of the firm’s overall alliance success than a firm’s alliance 
experience (p. 762).” 
 
The above literature synopsis in critical in understanding the relationship between 
potential alliance success, the past experience of the firm with alliance relationships, 
and the establishment of a formal, dedicated alliance function. Before examining the 
complexities and interdependencies of these factors in the following section, the 
candidate aimed to examine underlying manager perceptions of the alliance agreement. 
The intent in examining these underlying perceptions and expectations of mangers from 
each respective organisation (“Org A”; “Org B”; Michener) is to illustrate the base 
foundation and context in which current and future alliance relationships reside. If there 
are profound differences amongst leaders within the same organisation, or between 
leaders of different organisations about the intent, value and purpose of a potential 
alliance, then the pursuit of establishing dynamic capabilities of innovation and 
commercialisation may be compromised from the very beginning, with the full impact 
and contribution to the alliance portfolio never being realised and/or maximised.    
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16.2.2. Results - Respondents Perspectives (from the data) 
To explore the foundations in which the alliance function is based, managers from “Org 
A”, Org B” and Michener were requested to provide their perspectives on what an 
organisation in the alternative sector (private or public) would be need to know in order 
to be successful with a firm in their respective industry. Respondents from the public 
environment (Michener) suggested that in order for a private firm to be successful in an 
alliance with a public firm, private firms “must understand that the bottom-line 
shouldn’t be the focus in the short-term; that the public alliance partner is not and 
should not be treated as a customer, they are a partner; that resources invested may only 
yield benefits within the medium to long-term; that private business needs to be more 
flexible in working with public organisations; that the alliance relationship is not about 
making a sale; and that public industry is about service, and servant-leadership.” For 
example, the following comment by a Director at Michener summarises this theme: 
   
“That the bottom line doesn’t matter in this case. Yes, you are going to spend 
money and you may not get anything in return directly from us, but you have to 
look more at the future, that you're investing in a future product, and that while 
we have limited funds, that we would, the more that you can help us with 
procurement or purchases, the more free things you can give to us, the more we 
can help you innovate and give you better feedback. I think really trying to turn 
us into a customer just isn’t going to work (Director I, Michener – Part I).” 
 
Alternatively, respondents from “Org A” and “Org B” were asked the same questions 
and those respondents from private industry suggested that as a partner, “the public 
industry partner should match the commitment and resource contribution of the private 
partner; that private firms giving money to public firms does not represent a partnership; 
that investment of resources should lead to expected outcomes; that good partnerships 
illustrate transparency, good communication, intellectual horsepower, etc. from both 
partners; and that a donation is different than a partnership.” For example, a 
representative from “Org A” stated:  
   
“So I think a proper, a good forward moving partnership would say, right, we're 
going to bring academic minds together from this side, the scholastic side, and 
engineering minds from this side, and meet in the middle and say what does this 
now look like? If I'm going to supply you with products, If I'm going to supply 
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you with cardiac ultrasound simulators so you can train and do research with 
your folks to do cardiac ultrasound research and publish that research, I'm very 
interested in that as a partnership element if you will (Director I, “Org A”).” 
 
16.2.3 Synthesis of the Literature & Results, & Associated Contributions 
In the summary Figure 11 above, which represents the data codes and the associated 
relationship therein, Managers perceptions of their respective resources is critical in 
determining existing/deficient organisational abilities (Danneels, 2011), resources and 
capabilities. This in turn drives the genesis of an alliance agreement/relationship, the 
collection of which begins to establish a formal or informal alliance capability. Kale et. 
al. (2002) suggests that firms with a small number of alliance relationships may not 
require a dedicated alliance function, but as those alliance relationships increase, the 
value in creating a dedicated alliance function is significant. As a public organisation, 
Michener has a series of clinical, academic, government, community and private-
industry alliance partners. While the specific comments and insights described above 
may not necessarily be broadly representative in every alliance experience between 
public and private industry, the data and representative comments do suggest a 
difference in perception by each organisation of the purpose, resources, intents, attitudes 
and approach of the other partner. While this phenomenon may not be observed in every 
alliance experience between inter-industry organisations, it is perhaps exaggerated in 
those alliances involving partners from differentiated industries, where cultures, 
routines and expectations can be dramatically different. As experienced in Michener’s 
alliance relationship with “Org A”, where these perceptions are not effectively 
addressed, within the focus and findings of this research program, such a perception gap 
can contribute to the formation of lofty expectations; fuzzy decision making within the 
alliance; a loss of strategic fit and focus; and an inability to effectively transfer expertise 
and tacit knowledge and dynamic capabilities (innovation; commercialisation) from one 
industry to another. Over time, such experiences, if not resolved mitigate the essence of 
trust within the alliance relationship, ultimately leading to the inability to achieve the 
full scope of alliance benefits, including the development of dynamic capabilities 
between firms.  
 
It is recognised that the establishment of a formal, dedicated alliance function 
(capability) is critical to a firm’s overall alliance portfolio success (Kale et. al., 2002), 
and while there are many theoretical paradigms in which alliance relationships are 
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analysed, the organisational learning and dynamic capabilities perspectives provide 
particularly applicable insights (Arndt, 2008).  
 
Emanating from the alliance capability (dedicated alliance function) is a series of 
enabling, mitigating and strategic management factors that affect the success of an 
alliance relationship. Holistically, the collection of these alliance relationships 
represents the alliance portfolio (Wassmer, 2010). Thus, the result and outcomes of a 
specific alliance relationship reflect the overall organisational success and resulting 
value of the alliance portfolio. Kale et. al. (2002) found that “our findings also suggest 
that alliances do create significant increases in market value (wealth) for firms (p. 
762).” Thus, the ability to create successful alliances, consistently as represented via the 
cumulative alliance portfolio, has a direct impact to a firm’s ability to create wealth and 
value. Within the aim of creating this capability, Kale et. al. (2002) suggests the creation 
of specific toolkit to support the dedicated alliance function (displayed below, p. 763): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: From Kale, Dyer and Singh (2002) 
 
While Kale et. al. (2002) provide a comprehensive set of actions and processes to 
undertake to support this function, the focus and degree of participants within this 
model is focused completely internal to the hub-firm. Based on the respondents data 
above relating to the misperceptions in the alliance relationship between inter-industrial 
organisations, in order to maximise alliance success the procedural toolkit above could 
afford to be expanded to include a “myth-busting” process as a means to support the 
partner selection and alliance management phases identifies above. The “myth-busting” 
approach has been a very successful methodology used in healthcare to bring 
professionals from varying disciplines/professions together to dispel myths and improve 
inter-professional communication and perceptions, thus leading to increased patient 
safety and outcomes (Fleming et. al. 2010). Utilising such a process between and 
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amongst potential alliance partners from different industries and environments (e.g. 
public vs. private) could yield significant and valuable insights about cultural, 
procedural and resources valuations and biases before the design/confirmation of a 
formal alliance contract. Additionally, once engaged in an alliance relationship, such a 
myth-busting process could contribute to the identification of core issues/challenges 
more effectively, thus mitigating the false/negative perceptions and the resulting impact 
to trust within the relationship. A Director from Michener summarised the opportunity 
in stating:  
 
“So right off the get go what are the assumptions?  Put them on the table.  And 
that’s where I think the inter-professionalism would help in terms of the, I guess 
the knowledge building.  You know, learning with, from and about each other so 
that we’re dispelling…we’re myth busting.  And I think, you know, maybe 
that’s one of the ingredients.  It’s that you myth bust right off the bat to then 
come at some truths and then look at whether those truths are enough to move 
forward with conversations on.  Its one thing to have a eureka moment and say 
oh, okay, now I understand and I get it and it’s another thing to sort of say I can 
work with that (Sr. Director I, Michener).”   
 
The integration of a myth-busting process balances the internal host-organisations 
perspective, evaluation and bias of the other partner, thus leading to a more accurate 
understanding of the potential of the alliance, while also building trust and 
understanding of the strategic focus of the alliance, which mitigates fuzzy decision 
making and lofty expectations, ultimately contributing to the success of the alliance and 
establishment of dynamic capabilities.  
 
 
16.3 EMERGING THEME #2 – EXPANSION OF UNDERSTANDING IN THE 
ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT FUNCTION AS REFLECTED IN THE DEDICATED 
ALLIANCE FUNCTION 
 
16.3.1 Introduction 
A second potential contribution of this research program focuses on literature gap 
whereby Kale et. al. (2002) suggest that “While we know that alliance experience is 
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important, we still lack knowledge with regard to what is involved in developing an 
alliance capability (p. 748).” Further, Kale et. al. (2002) state that: 
 
“Even in the context of the same set of partners, some studies suggest that prior 
experience of allying with the same partner helps the partnering companies in 
future alliances. Presumably, prior experience of this kind increases the success 
of future alliances with the same partner for several reasons. One, the firm in 
question may have greater commitment to make the alliance work given the trust 
among partners and, two, prior experience helps the firms build partner-specific 
routines of coordinating resources and tasks successfully with the partner. 
Overall, although many of these studies suggest ‘prior experience matters,’ they 
are basically silent with regard to how prior experience translates into a 
capability (p. 749).” 
 
Lastly, Kale et. al. (2002) suggest “Our results show that although alliance experience is 
important, its impact seems to work through the creation of a dedicated structure to 
coordinate and leverage that experience more effectively (p. 762).” 
 
16.3.2 Results - Respondents Perspectives (from the data): 
In response to the suggestion that alliance experience matters, the impact to the alliance 
function itself was examined with respondents from “Org A”, “Org B” and Michener as 
a means to clarify the subsequent alliance development and cultivation process (alliance 
capability established through past alliance experience).  
 
The following framework illustrates the collective results of the data as it relates to how 
the alliance management process operates within the alliance function, as influenced by 
past alliance experience (there was a common agreement amongst the respondents from 
“Org A”, “Org B” and Michener) through the following conceptual framework:  
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Figure 12: Expansion of Understanding in the Alliance Management Function as Reflected 
in the Dedicated Alliance Function (Kale et. al., 2002) 
 
For the sake of clarity and intent, it is important for the candidate to reconfirm the focus 
of this research program, which is that rather than focusing on generic strategic 
alliances, and the contributions of success, the aim of this research program is to explore 
how organisations and managers can create the dynamic capabilities of innovation and 
commercialisation through the engagement of an alliance portfolio. Given the alliance 
portfolio is a collection of the egocentric alliances of the hub-firm (both within the past 
and current states) (Baum, 2000), the focus of two specific alliance case studies, 
identified as “Org A” and “Org B”, act as case examples to be examined by which the 
greater phenomenon of the alliance portfolio can be explored. Thus, this chapter should 
be viewed within the above context, and not of generic alliance 
characteristics/behaviour.   
 
Through a variety of questions, respondents were asked “how” each of their respective 
case examples either performed or failed to perform in building dynamic capabilities of 
innovation and/or commercialisation amongst firms within the alliance environment 
with Michener. Respondents were asked not only to reflect on the conditions and 
activities of success, but also to suggest “lessons learned” and “key takeaways.” 
Examining these insights is important, given that the benefits of creating an alliance 
function can contribute to an organisations ability to create wealth (Kale et. al., 2002), 
where the lack of a sophisticated, intentional approach typically results in a substantial 
rate of failure (Whipple and Frankel, 2000).  
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In reviewing the summary findings of the respondents comments via the alliance 
management conceptual framework above, the respondents from “Org A”, “Org B” and 
Michener strongly corroborate past findings of those characteristics of alliance success 
(Whipple et. al., 2000), including in the identification of clearly defined need/outcome 
(whether it be a product, service and/or a dynamic capability); which is contingent on 
the ability to achieve and sustain the elements of trust, transparency, shared values, 
strategic fit, clear expectations. An interesting insight was the inclusion and validation 
of the word “sacrifice.” An executive from Michener explained that:  
 
“I think a strategic alliance cannot work unless both parties are willing to 
sacrifice something.  At some point, in the relationship, somebody has to 
sacrifice something for the benefit of the other (Executive II, Michener).” 
 
This comment and resulting theme may align to the findings and insights related to the 
preceding section, which examined the perception gap between private and public 
organisations within alliance relationships that attempted to create dynamic capabilities 
in innovation and commercialisation, and represents the context of which the above 
conceptual framework (Figure 12) is to be interpreted.  
 
A second major insight of this conceptual framework (Figure 12) involves the degree of 
relationship building between partners, and the associated impact and development of 
the factors/contributors of alliance success (and thus promote the progression from the 
left-hand side of the model to the right-hand side of the model, representing a greater 
probability of success). While the role and support of Senior Management in alliance 
success is well understood (Whipple et. al., 2000), respondents within this research 
program felt that where the conditions of alliance success had been established, the 
nature and degree by-which those senior leaders (and by extension the alliance team) 
developed their respective relationships had a significant impact on the probability of 
success within the initial and potential future alliances.  
 
Respondents indicated that while a business relationship amongst alliance partners was 
sufficient to secure some probability of alliance success, that this probability increased 
as the leaders and alliance teams were able to transition from a strict business 
relationship to a personal relationship, and from a personal relationship to a personal 
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commitment/investment. For example, an executive at “Org B” illustrates this insight 
(as represented in the above framework): 
 
“My feelings are that personal relationships is that the business relationship is 
subservient to the personal relationship. That's how I personally feel. Right. And 
you know, the day I'm waiting for is when we have a real business opportunity 
collectively, cause we'll just come to the very top of our list and get pushed 
really hard. And that the day we're going to have a real party (Sr. Executive, 
“Org B”).”  
 
And; 
 
“There was mutual respect. And I think that successful partnerships have that 
charisma and cohesiveness as a team, and mutual respect. That's really what it’s 
about, people, team, commitment to one another. Sure it is, you could put 
whatever company behind us, and then the question becomes, can you actually 
pull the strings and make that happen, and there's ...if we were at our competitor, 
we wouldn't have our strategic relationship here, I don't believe. We would 
never, they would say (forget) that, take as much money as you can give you 
that much, that's it right? That's right. Versus thinking outside of the box, and 
maybe having a different set of values right, and commitment (Sr. Executive, 
Executive I & II, “Org B”).  
 
So I think that really successful partnerships are based on that. These are the 
guys we're going to war with, right. They made a personal choice to make that 
commitment. I think that's what makes the difference. And I think we have that, 
we have had that from day 1 (Sr. Executive, “Org B”).” 
 
This phenomenon was also validated through the interview process, whereby 
respondents, after asking to reflect on their respective experiences with each/both 
alliances, were presented a version of the framework above (Figure 12) and asked to 
qualify and/or adapt the model to best reflect their past experience and perceptions from 
“lessons learned.” In reflecting o the role of personal relationships and the established 
results of “Org B”, a Program Chair at Michener suggested: 
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“…so its also how people make you feel right, so how that is very how did you 
choose a personal leader, well this person made me feel this way, I felt 
empowered, I felt respected, wasn't so much sometimes an activity that the 
individual did, its how that person felt. So I can see the personal, it’s like, I 
believe in this project AND I feel that it will be a big success and rewarding and 
I'll be satisfied. I'll get some personal gratification out of it. I think it’s important 
to human beings mostly (Program Chair I, Michener).” 
 
The process line representing the transition between a business relationship to a 
personal commitment/investment is intentionally chaotic and non-linear (as 
demonstrated in the framework through a wavy line). A Sr. Director from Michener 
indicated that the relationship development process typically advances through “a series 
of tests (Sr. Director III, Michener)”, and that these tests and challenges confirm, 
support and advance the development and richness of the alliance relationship. An 
executive at “Org B” explains the experience of the challenges in the advancement of 
the relationships:  
 
“I think in terms of establishing the trust quickly is an understatement. I don’t 
think I've ever had a relationship of any kind, personal or professional that got to 
the wood that fast, to the point that you believed the BS right, it was like, ok, so 
these guys, it was 15 minutes and we said lets go to dinner. And I was, I had a 
fuse of about 8 minutes that night, and you guys were out of there, get lost. And 
it was synergistic and honest, and it just built because you...when we ask you to 
do a site visit or host somebody its 110%. And I think that when you stumble a 
little bit, the first thing we've done on both sides is that we apologise, and we get 
on the same side of the table and fix it right. I think culturally and value wise it’s 
the people that are core to the relationship, they actually personally value those 
things. So when you value that type of relationship, and those are the ones you 
want to be in, you see it right away (Sr. Executive, “Org B”).” 
 
The executive respondent from “Org B” illustrates a link between establishing a 
personal relationship and commitment, and the role in supporting and cultivating trust, 
which is a significant contributing factor to alliance success (Whipple et. al. 2000). The 
respondent also illustrates the role in the personal commitment, establishment of trust, 
and resulting focus on effort within the relationship, and conflict management within 
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the alliance (“stumble a little bit…we apologise). Finally, the respondent suggests that 
sourcing and finding partners with these factors and attributes are desirable, in stating 
“those (alliance relationships) are the ones you want to be in.” Final evidence to the 
critical importance of the role in establishing a personal commitment and the associated 
impact to those factors that contribute towards alliance success is a suggestion by an 
employee at “Org B” who suggested that “before (Michener’s President & CEO) visit to 
the factory in the UK, this project was hanging by a thread.” In the end, the fact that a 
dynamic capability of innovation was established and the end result achieved is valuable 
to contrast from a theory development perspective.     
 
The advancement of the alliance relationship is aligned to the development of dynamic 
capabilities between firms. Rothaermel and Hess (2007) suggest that the current 
literature fails to appreciate the integration and interdependency between the level of the 
individual, firm and network, and its relation to creating and sustaining heterogeneity at 
any/all of these respective levels. The interdependency between the individual, firm and 
alliance portfolio is illustrated through the contrast of the experience via “Org A” and 
“Org B”. For example, an executive at Michener explores this interdependency: 
 
“You know looking at those two cases and using those to kind of reflect. I think 
it’s hard to generalise because of the number of independent variables that occur 
in these relationships. And how difficult it would be able to replicate those 
independent variables with any degree of consistency. And I think the ultimate 
success of commercialisation has a higher degree of likelihood, this is in 
hindsight, has a higher degree of success with "ORG B" than it ever would have 
with "ORG A". "ORG A" we tried to conceptualise it too early. Whereas "ORG 
B" were only coming to commercialisation after we built a very strong as you 
said, creative, innovative working relationship. There is a lot of trust that’s here; 
there is a lot of honesty that’s here. Which I think allows us to talk about 
commercialisation (Executive I, Michener).” 
 
The respondents comment above suggests a necessary condition, in the advancement of 
the relationship, for the development of a dynamic capability in commercialisation 
between firms to occur.  
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In summary, the above framework (Figure 12) illustrates “how” alliance relationships 
are affected by past alliance experience, and the specific process in which alliance 
relationships progress or fail to progress within the alliance management process within 
the dedicated alliance function (Kale et. al., 2002).  
 
 
16.4 EMERGING THEME #3 – EXPLORATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES BETWEEN FIRMS THROUGH THE ENGAGEMENT 
OF THE ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO 
 
16.4.1 Introduction 
Whereas the preceding chapters outlined emerging themes in utilising myth-busting 
techniques within the alliance selection and management phases within alliances 
involving inter-industrial organisations (public and private); as well as a conceptual 
framework (Figure 12) illustrating the corroborated factors of alliance success, this 
chapter aims to explore the development of dynamic capabilities between firms (Wang 
et. al., 2007). Given the research design of this study, the candidate intends to leverage a 
“compare and contrast” approach in illustrating the fundamental differences in an 
alliance case study where the full scope of intended dynamic capabilities were achieved, 
and a case study where they were not (Yin, 2009). An important note of clarification is 
required before proceeding in regards to the compare and contrast style. Rather than 
drawing cause and effect assumptions between the case studies, which would involve a 
degree of inference by the candidate to the respondents insights (and thus potentially 
contributing towards a biased perspective) the candidate will alternatively analyse the 
coded responses and compare the themes through representative quotes.  
 
In exploring the catalyst for dynamic capability development, MacIntosh & MacLean 
(1999) explain that in order for organisations to “contemplate and learn how to do 
things differently”, dynamic capability development occurs within the “bifurcation 
zone.” The literature has an established lens in utilising alliances and networks as a 
means to establishing dynamic capabilities of innovation and commercialisation 
(Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg, 2007). In regards to building capabilities through 
alliance portfolios, Rothaermel & Hess (2007) state that: 
 
Page 116 
“Industries characterised by complex and rapidly expanding knowledge bases, 
the locus of innovation lies within a network of learning composed of incumbent 
firms, new entrants, and research institutions, rather than within the boundaries 
of individual firms. Thus, to build new capabilities within an emerging 
technological paradigm, incumbent firms frequently need to leverage their 
external networks to source new technology (p. 901).” 
 
Rothaermel & Hess (2007) also acknowledge the integration between the resource-
based perspective, dynamic capabilities and alliance portfolios: 
 
“Although the resource-based view tends to focus on the importance of the 
internal asset base of the firm, researchers have recently posited that network 
relationships may allow a firm to leverage unique resource combinations. Dyer 
and Singh (1998) highlight relation- specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, 
complementary resources and capabilities, as well as effective governance as 
antecedents to an interorganisational competitive advantage (p. 901).”  
 
The drive to establish new dynamic capabilities through the engagement of the alliance 
portfolio, as represented in the context of specific alliance experiences (e.g. “Org A”, 
“Org B”), is the focus of this chapter.  
 
 
16.4.2 Results - Respondents Perspectives (from the data): 
The necessity of resource cognition in establishing dynamic capabilities is well founded 
(Danneels, 2011). In exploring the development of dynamic capabilities (as outlined in 
Figure 11 above), it is essential that an organisation have an understanding of its current 
resource/capability base, resource/capability deficiencies, and desired end point (e.g. 
strategy). Barreto (2010) defines a dynamic capability as “…the firm’s potential to 
systematically solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and 
threats, to make timely and market-orientated decisions, and to change its resource base 
(p. 271).” Dynamic capabilities are developed in response to a dynamic or volatile 
industry (Wang and Ahmed, 2007). The alignment between the resulting dynamic 
capabilities and the firm’s strategy is critical, insofar as the resulting strategic focus 
leads to a distinct, value creating set of capabilities, which in turn, Wang and Ahmed 
(2007) propose, have an indirect impact on firm performance. As described in a 
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previous chapter, the overall objectives for the alliance with “Org A” were focused on 
building a dynamic capability in innovation which would result in the construction and 
utilisation of a state-of-the-art simulation centre, whereby the curricular assets (capital) 
and expertise (curriculum) would be innovated/commercialised, with the proportional 
proceeds re-invested to support Michener’s core academic business. Michener’s alliance 
with “Org B” was initially focused on building a dynamic capability in innovation 
between firms to design/build a distinct linear accelerator for the academic environment, 
with commercialisation opportunities to be explored thereafter. A Michener executive 
describes the underlying need and conditions for pursuing an alliance with “Org A”: 
 
“It all started when you know as a result of the curricular reform. Embedding the 
inter-professional collaboration (IPC) and the greater uses of simulation in 
curriculum, the recognition that the physical facility did not accommodate that 
curriculum in an optimal manner. And the fact that we needed to renovate the 
building and we specifically needed the opportunity to have flexible delivery 
space for simulation. That led to a master planning exercise, that led to a capital 
project submission to the MOLTHC and a whole series (Executive I, Michener - 
Part II).” 
 
And similarly, the underlying need and conditions for pursuing an alliance with “Org 
B”: 
“But that was at that point I think we were then at a mindset because of the 
move towards strategic alliances as a vehicle to address what had never been 
provided by our government funding relationship. That right from the get go it 
wasn’t really interested in getting another proxy simulator as we had originally. 
You know wanted to do something that was going to certainly approximate the 
department the students would be working at when they were practicing as a 
radiation therapist. That meant getting a contemporary linear accelerator. That 
was there. Yes these are large, yes these are complex pieces of equipment but 
that I thought was what we needed to move forward (Executive I, Michener - 
Part I).; and 
 
“We leveraged this purposely; we’ve leveraged this extraordinary successfully, 
to address one of the things that I was told from the clinical partners when I first 
got here. That was that our students had to train on contemporary equipment. 
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Training them on antiquated training, with operating protocols and safety 
protocols that were not in sync with what was being delivered in the field meant 
we were offloading a burden to the field which they could ill afford to provide 
any longer. So we needed to upgrade this stuff, and we had no money to do 
it…(Executive I, Michener - Part III)” 
 
 
The focus in pursuing the alliance with each organisation was to support the core 
academic business and strategy of the organisation; thus the pursuit in creating a 
dynamic capability in innovation was to secure capital, resources, and/or capabilities to 
support initial and long-term organisational needs/strategy.  
 
In terms of results, respondents indicated partial success in creating a dynamic 
capability of innovation and a failure to create a dynamic capability of 
commercialisation between Michener and “Org A.” Respondents suggested dynamic 
capability of innovation was created between Michener and “Org B”, with artefacts to 
suggest a dynamic capability of commercialisation is in the process of being cultivated.  
 
Within these two case studies, in order to examine the conditions that respondents 
believed contributed or mitigated success in creating dynamic capability between firms, 
the candidate will leverage the conceptual framework in Figure 11 to highlight and 
discuss the illustrative data, and the resulting theoretical implications.  
 
From a strategic management perspective, once Michener had established that an 
alliance agreement was needed/required in each case, and subsequent to the partner 
selection process as reflected in the alliance function (Kale et. al., 2002), the aspect of 
alliance management, and the role and impact such management has in creating 
dynamic capabilities between firms and cumulatively as an alliance portfolio, is central 
to understanding the factors that contribute towards achieving alliance objectives and an 
organisations overall strategy. Generally, in the case of Michener’s alliance with “Org 
A”, where respondents believed only partial success was achieved in evidence of the 
fact that the 20,000 sq/ft healthcare simulation centre was completed in part due to a 
financial contribution provided by “Org A.” The Simulation Centre was essentially the 
environment intended to cultivate the alliance in building new curricular assets for 
Michener’s academic programs and beyond. The capacity for this innovation and 
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resulting commercialisation would be supported through alliance teams in both 
organisations.  
 
16.4.3 Factors Experienced Predominantly with “Org A”  
Lofty Expectations 
From a data response perspective, the factors that mitigate the successful pursuit to 
create dynamic capabilities of innovation and commercialisation were predominantly 
collected in reference to the alliance experience with “Org A.” Within the coded data 
pertaining to ‘lofty expectations’, all 17 illustrative (coded) data examples were 
attributed to Michener’s alliance experience with “Org A.” During the finalisation of the 
alliance negotiation phase, and evolving into the alliance management phase (Kale et. 
al. 2002), respondents indicated the presence of lofty expectations within the alliance. A 
former manager with “Org A” stated: 
 
“I think, expectations that were setup right up front, rightly or wrongly, some 
expectations were quite lofty, and when those expectations started to show signs 
of erosion and we weren't going to meet them, it was inadequately mitigated, in 
other words, there wasn't an adequate amount of effort put to realise why it 
failed, and that then impacted the trust and then we figured it was an intentional 
failure because of the lack of something from either side, bilateral, I think 
Michener lost trust in “Org A” because we did not mitigate the situation when 
things were going south, and vice versa, “Org A” thought Michener should add 
more resources or put more commitment towards other mandates or projects we 
had, and didn’t, and so we lost trust in Michener’s ability to (support) the 
alliance up (Former Manager, “Org A”).” 
 
The examination of this representative response is insightful for several reasons. First, 
the respondent from “Org A” suggests that the expectations for success in the alliance 
were lofty from the origination of the alliance, which would suggest that the aim of 
transferring and/or building capabilities would be compromised from the very 
beginning. Secondly, the respondent suggests a directional link between lofty 
expectations from the genesis of the alliance, the perception and/or realisation of an 
inadequate response, and the subsequent impact (loss) of trust. While to be explored in a 
subsequent chapter, this research program corroborates past research (Whipple et. al., 
2000) in identifying the establishment and cultivation of trust as a major determinate in 
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alliance success (in this case the pursuit of establishing dynamic capabilities in 
innovation and commercialisation). Respondents indicated lofty expectations originated 
from a series of factors, including the fact that “Org A” was relatively new to entry 
within the healthcare industry; that unlike the alliance with “Org B”, the initial focus of 
innovation was on high-end conceptual developments pertaining to curriculum and 
pedagogy of simulation in healthcare, rather than on the design/development of a 
physical asset; competing strategic priorities; a lack of strategic fit between cultures 
(public vs. private); and inadequate decision making techniques. The compounding 
effect of these mitigating factors, regardless of the directional occurrence in which they 
are experienced, are likely to erode trust and pro-long challenges, and ultimately lead to 
disillusionment and disappointment, as illustrated in Figure 11.  
 
Difference in Corporate Cultures 
Respondents identified a difference in corporate culture as an additional factor that 
mitigated alliance and dynamic capability development success. Respondents noted the 
difference in the two organisations, identifying differences in size; purpose (corporate 
vs. educational; profit vs. non profit); business model approaches between firms; and 
results. Thematically, throughout the collection of coded data, respondents noted the 
impact of a profit driven, traded corporate focus and the associated challenge of 
functioning/operating within an academic, non-profit environment. Without debating 
the merits of this theme, its does seem from the data and the resulting impact with other 
key data codes, including the ultimate result of disillusionment/disappointment, that this 
perception (on short term shareholder return, EBITDA) had an impact to the outcome 
and perceived experience of this alliance. A Director from Michener characterises this 
theme in the representative comment: 
 
“You know, again, it comes down to the culture.  Their expectation was bottom 
line we need to see dollars.  We’re public sector.  It’s not about the bottom line 
for us, it’s about the quality.  So, how do you blend those two in a … through a 
thoughtful discussion and conversation where, you know, we’re coming in like 
this but we end up here.  So that everyone’s expectations on the revenue driving 
side is managed such that, okay, you know what, we’re not going to turn a 
profit.  Okay because we’ve got to figure out the quality piece.  And then here, 
we need to eventually drive a profit so we need to increase what we’re doing 
vis-à-vis the quality.  So, when you’ve got two organisations whose bottom line 
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focus is so, really polarised, it’s kind of … you have to work even harder at 
bringing it back and there has to be some patience and allowances for things not 
quite working (Sr. Director I, Michener).” 
 
While supporting the perspective of a non-cohesive culture, the above comment also 
illustrates the value in establishing a dedicated alliance function, whereby a 
comprehensive cultural fit analysis and review is completed as part of the due diligence 
process within the partner selection phase (Kale et. al., 2002). Failing that, this 
perceived cultural divide could also be effectively mitigated through a formal “myth-
busting” intentional conversation amongst alliance partners post-negotiations, as a 
means to challenge and clarify perceived gaps, biases and perceptions.     
 
As a means to foster a common culture, a Director from Michener suggested the 
following: 
 
“As you were saying that, the best way I could think of in my opinion would be 
to have employees from both organisations, A, and B, to create a third entity 
that becomes the innovative core, but they don’t directly report to A and B, 
something where you can take that context out, you there not so much of that 
(culture) clash, that you were for company A, you work for company B, but if 
we work together, we form a third party, we could build off on that, I think that 
model would be a lot more conducive, because we're not so much restricted by 
the rules and regulations of each others (Director I, Michener – Part I)....”  
 
Conceptually, the comment aligns to the findings of Rich (1994) in examining the 
concept of skunk works in supporting innovation. Rather than an internal entity 
separated from the main firm, the respondent in the following comments suggests the 
establishment of a “proxy-entity” between firms where a common culture of innovation 
and commercialisation can be established and cultivated (rather than a distinct entity 
such as a joint venture):   
 
“Exactly, its kind of like we're partnershiped (sic) on top, but then this was 
below, maybe reports to both sides, but it has to be more independent, which is 
the best method. If we try and collaborate work between two companies 
separately, there’s (sic) always barriers on both sides. So if there’s a way to 
Page 122 
eliminate those barriers, you know, policies procedures innovation moves 
quickly, you need to be able to make quick decisions, even basic things, 
purchase whatever, a laptop, hardware, whatever the heck it is, I don’t have to 
go through due process to do that (Director, Michener – Part II).” 
 
and  
 
“Well I think that would create a common culture, and that would maybe gel a 
little bit better. When I think they're separated, I think they're more politics 
involved, so that same thing, I want to make a basic decision about buying a 
laptop, who buys it, you have to argue, and its a stupid point to argue over and it 
slows everything down. If you become a separate entity, you say look, here’s 
your budget, here’s what you have, here’s what the end goal is, and just let it 
run, more independent (Director, Michener – Part II).”  
 
The respondent makes reference of having the ability to make a simple decision, such as 
procuring a laptop, and the impact such a culture has on mitigating barriers (such as 
fuzzy decision making) and resulting impacts (such as a loss of trust) in pursuit of 
establishing dynamic capabilities of innovation and commercialisation between 
organisations. Ultimately, respondents felt the creation of a common alliance culture 
would foster the development of dynamic capabilities in supporting the ability to make 
quick decisions; operate in a less political and independent fashion; be hands-off, 
autonomous; act as an effective resolution to bumps/challenges; and enhance/cultivate 
personal relationships, a key determinate for alliance success.  
 
Fuzzy Decision Making Process 
Compounding the role of different cultures and the mitigating factor of lofty 
expectations, respondents (who were all Michener respondents in this particular data 
code) indicated that the decision-making process and hierarchy was described by 
respondents as autocratic, convoluted and non-transparent. A Director at Michener 
summarises this factor in stating: 
 
“Exactly, it (lack of decision making capability between firms) slows 
everything down, it just hurts the relationship, the next time they want us to do 
something, maybe I won’t do it as quickly as I should, because you're dragging 
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your feet, basically, us thinking its them, as apposed to a third party, we're all in 
this together, from my experience with “Org A” that’s how it kind of came down 
(Director, Michener – Part II).”  
 
While lofty expectations and a fuzzy decision process collude together to mitigate 
success, the impact to trust is represented in the described limited performance based on 
perceived non-commitment between individuals from different organisations.   
 
As with the data collected within the “lofty expectations” data code, the data collected 
within the “fuzzy decision making process” exclusively reflected the alliance experience 
with “Org A”; as did the data codes of “different corporate cultures (factor)”; “lack/loss 
of strategic focus (factor)”; “fuzzy decision making process (factor) ”; “transference of 
capabilities between industries (factor)”; and “disappointment and disillusionment 
(result)”.  
 
To proclaim that such an alliance experience and outcome between Michener and “Org 
A” is a “failure” would be elementary and limited in both its perspective and assertion 
(Christensen, 2003). While the original goals of the alliance may have resulted in 
disappointment, critical learning about what business lines to engage in; what the 
strategic focus of the entity should be; and how the alliance function and portfolio 
should evolve were realised by both organisations.   
 
It is also important to note that the above inferences and deductions are not the result of 
the lack of ability, commitment or expertise of a single firm in the alliance, nor is the 
lack of intended success the result of what one firm did or did not accomplish. The 
mitigating factors of success work in systemic cycle. Where a difference in corporate 
cultures results in lofty expectations and a fuzzy decision making process, it can be 
deduced that within such an environment, the ability to achieve strategic clarity and 
focus; effective resource applications; establishment of trust; and alignment of visions 
would be significantly compromised. Each mitigating factor realised in an alliance 
relationship has profound implications to the success of the alliance relationship and the 
resulting value of the alliance portfolio to the hub-firm. For example, the existence of 
lofty expectations within an alliance containing two organisations acting in good faith 
can quickly result in resource requirements from one or both firms that neither had 
intended nor could provide to the alliance. This inability complicates the decision 
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making process, strategic fit, trust and ultimately the results of the alliance environment. 
While the candidate has employed a variety of conceptual frameworks and diagrams 
throughout this dissertation to encourage clarity, efficiency and effectiveness of 
research concepts, it is critical to re-enforce the degree of complexity in which a single 
alliance relationship often operates. This complexity, risk and subsequent opportunity 
are compounded in exponential ways when extrapolated to the alliance portfolio.   
 
16.4.4 Factors Experienced Predominantly with “Org B” 
As with the preceding section outlining factors that were identified exclusively with 
“Org A”, the data codes of “involvement/engagement process as a means to securing 
desired outcomes”; and “personal relationships subservient to business relationship” 
were experienced predominantly in reference to “Org B”. While the data code of 
“personal relationships subservient to business relationship” was developed in the 
preceding section in regards to identifying the role of establishing a personal 
commitment within an alliance, and the associated impacts to trust, conflict resolution 
and reputation as a valuable partner, the impact of this relationship to the development 
of dynamic capabilities will be examined and clarified.  
 
In regards to establishing a dynamic capability of innovation between Michener and 
“Org A”, a contributing factor was the establishment of a personal commitment 
amongst the respective teams and leaders. For example, an executive at “Org B” reflects 
this association: 
 
“So I think that really successful partnerships are based on that. These are the 
guys we're going to war with, right. They made a personal choice to make that 
commitment. I think that's what makes the difference. And I think we have that, 
we have had that from day 1 (Sr. Executive, “Org B”).”   
 
“I think personal relationships, and commitment, and the pretty much everyone 
who bought into this was intrinsically motivated to do something that hadn’t 
been done. So the fact that you’re going to tell people that we took the wall off a 
9th floor building and put these linacs in there....I've told that story so many 
times (Sr. Executive, “Org B”).” 
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Both comments reviewed together provide valuable insights and opportunity for 
theoretical development. The respondent suggests that the degree of commitment 
required was “a personal choice”, one supported by the innovative challenge and 
opportunity at hand, insofar as the goal was to create and install “something that hadn’t 
been done.” The respondent also indicates the belief that such a commitment was 
established at the very early stages of the relationship (“day 1”), and that the integration 
of the two alliance teams were “the guys we’re going to war with”, illustrating a high 
degree of personal commitment to the goal and establishment of a dynamic capability of 
innovation itself. In the final comment, the respondent seems to take pride and illustrate 
a sense of amazement about the end result of the dynamic capability, providing some 
evidence that the capability and intended outcome was achieved. 
 
The ability to transition the alliance relationship between leaders/teams from a business 
driven relationship to a personal commitment seems in this case study to be a critical 
factor for success. The way in-which such a personal commitment can be established 
(the “how”) seems to be encouraged by elements such as the degree of challenge; clear, 
open and transparent communications; and the establishment and cultivation of mutual 
respect. Within this specific alliance with “Org B”, the ability to establish such a 
personal commitment, coupled with the full stakeholder/community engagement, 
contributed towards effective resource application decisions, the establishment of trust 
within the alliance relationship, and an exceptional strategic fit between respective 
organisational resources (Barney, 1991) with the aim of creating a dynamic capability 
of innovation.  
 
16.4.5 Comparing & Contrasting the Alliance Experience of “Org A” and “Org B” in 
Pursuit of Establishing Dynamic Capabilities of Innovation & Commercialisation    
While factors that were exclusive to each case have been examined, this section will 
examine those factors that were represented in both case studies. Of those factors, the 
two most dominant factors illustrating the successful and/or unsuccessful development 
of dynamic capabilities between firms were trust and organisational learning.   
 
Organisational Learning 
The role of organisational learning within and amongst firms is well established as a 
core factor in the creation of dynamic capabilities, and has been traditionally viewed as 
a capability onto itself (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999; Wang and Ahmed, 2007; Arndt, 
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2008). While the candidate does not intend to include or develop a focus of the 
knowledge based theory (KBT), the role of organisations ability to absorb and capitalise 
on critical learning (Wang and Ahmed, 2007), and the role in developing dynamic 
capabilities between firms will be explored within the healthcare education 
environment.  Lorenzoni et. al. (1999) state that in the examination of establishing 
dynamic capabilities, it is:  
 
“important to investigate the mechanism by which firms accumulate and 
disseminate new skills and capabilities to reply promptly to changes in the 
competitive environment despite conditions of path dependencies and core 
rigidities in technological and organisational processes. The possession of 
dynamic capabilities leads to several fundamental features of strategic 
manoeuvring: high response capability, reduced time-to-market, innovative 
capability (p. 320).”  
 
Specific to investigating said mechanism, Lorenzoni et. al. (1999) suggest that 
“organisational learning capability is especially critical since idiosyncratic advantages 
naturally erode over time, and an intensive exchange of knowledge, deliberately 
delivered, may help reinforce strategic positioning (p. 320).”  Thus, the central role of 
organisational learning in establishing and re-generating dynamic capabilities is well 
established. Where the context of previous research studies has been in the 
manufacturing industry (Lorenzoni et. al. 1999) the aim of this chapter is to illustrate 
this role within the context of two-case studies within the healthcare education industry.  
 
In regards to Michener’s experience, the organisational learning process and associated 
impact is represented in an interview comment from an executive member: 
 
“It's (alliance capability role in establishing dynamic capabilities in 
innovation/commercialisation) absolutely important, I think its essential, that’s 
why I was pausing. And I think the link to essential is I don’t think we would be 
in the mindset of creativity and innovation that we are if it weren't for the 
alliance issues. I think going back to what are the key things necessary for the 
portfolio management, what we have now, we have a confidence in this 
approach and this rationale. And so we're willing to throw challenging 
problems at that conceptual approach to doing business that I don’t think you 
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would do if you didn’t have the confidence. And as I say, I'm sitting right now 
looking at our latest example, and if the wheels fall off this for one way or 
another, we're not just going to walk away from this. We almost have a plan C. 
We've got a confidence that we will find a solution to this...it may not be the 
preferred, it may not be as timely as we might have been able to pull if off we'd 
done if in the pure alliance sense, but we will get there. And, I don’t think this 
organisation had that degree of confidence 8-years ago. It was just like, please 
sir, no, oh shoot. What else can we do? It’s that kind of, I think that its that what 
else can we do issue (sic). If they don't pay for it, what else can we do? Well, we 
found out there are a lot of things we could do that’s there. We didn’t have that 
before (Executive I, Michener – Part III).”  
 
The respondent illustrates a series of important factors. First, the respondent seems to 
identify the necessity and significance of the alliance experience in creating an 
organisational capability in managing an alliance portfolio, for the purposes of 
establishing dynamic capabilities within innovation and commercialisation, itself an 
example of organisational learning. The respondent identifies the role of the alliances 
and resulting alliance portfolio in solving “challenging problems” at the organisational, 
or strategic-level. The respondent also suggests that this is a newly established ability 
and approach, achieved within the last 8-years, and that such a capability has had a 
direct impact to the organisations ability to solve core, strategic challenges (resources 
and capabilities) and new processes to accomplish such needs/requirements. Lastly, 
while the comment is in reflection and context of “Org A” and “Org B”, it should be 
noted that the respondent refers to this capability as a means to solve challenges and 
enhance overall strategic manoeuvring (Lorenzoni et. al. 1999) beyond of the focus of 
these two initial case studies. The establishment of an alliance capability, and in-turn an 
alliance portfolio capability, act as a source of fuel and nourishment for the 
development of dynamic capabilities within the current, and future-state. This is 
summarised by the following comment from an executive from Michener:  
 
“We wouldn’t be here if we hadn’t done the alliances. So you know the alliance 
exercises as we are manifesting them here are learning exercises for us. That’s 
what frustrates me when people think that they’re nothing more than a way to 
get a cheap price point on a piece of equipment. That’s actually not it at all. If 
they allow us to learn and they allow us to ultimately leverage the organisation 
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in a different direction, then it’s a win-win all the way down the issues 
(Executive I, Michener – Part I).” 
 
Organisations also learn from those alliances that were not successful in the full scope 
of the intended objectives. In describing the pursuit in establishing a dynamic capability 
with “Org A”, an executive at Michener categorised the outcome as “… the whole 
commercialisation issue was a failure right up.” That said, the same Michener executive 
indicated: 
 
“I think we’ve learned a lot. Both in the positive and negative sense about 
commercialisation. It wasn’t a functionality of the organisation 5-years ago to 
talk about commercialisation in any way shape or form. I think the alliances 
have given us the capability as well as a capital asset level you know that allows 
us to even consider capitalisation. There are a few factors going on here. So it’s 
been positive in that sense (Executive I, Michener – Part I).”  
 
The respondent, while acknowledging the unsuccessful attempt in establishing a 
commercialisation capability through an alliance with “Org A”, suggests and evolution 
to the learning, including the establishing organisational awareness of what constitutes a 
dynamic capability in innovation, and what the initial “factors” of such a capability 
might be. Perhaps in this context, in determining what factors were not successful in 
developing a dynamic capability in commercialisation, the outcome informs other 
potential factors to be explored.      
 
Interestingly the organisational learning process within an alliance can create new 
dynamic capabilities of innovation and commercialisation in the other partners in 
unforeseen ways. Having worked directly with Michener over the past ~5-years, 
learning about the educational approach and industry, “Org B” has expanded its 
application of educational solutions from an after-sales-support process to one of 
competitive value and potentially competitive advantage. An executive from “Org B” 
describes the decision to build a new educational centre: 
 
“Well certainly it (innovation/experience with Michener) impacted our 
behaviour. We're dumping $2.5 million in a training, education centre in Atlanta. 
Without a business plan. Because I brought 4 people to Toronto to have dinner 
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and said look, and we don’t make $2.5 million dollar investments without 
business plans (Sr. Executive, “Org B”).”  
 
The establishment of a dynamic capability in innovation with “Org B” has resulted in 
“Org B” pursuing new capabilities (e.g. organisational learning, and the role of 
education curriculum to the full-solution product offering) as demonstrated in the above 
“behaviour”/decision, and approaches to their core business in ways in-which may or 
may not directly involve Michener as an alliance partner. This innovation (creation of a 
dedicated educational centre) will enable “Org B” to create new capabilities related to 
innovation and commercialisation that may have a cyclical impact to the alliance with 
Michener, and thus to Michener’s alliance portfolio itself. The rich interplay between 
developing dynamic capabilities within a dyad alliance relationship (Michener and “Org 
B”), the utilisation of such a dynamic capabilities within and external to the alliance 
dyad (“Org B” in the competitive marketplace); the advancement to this capability 
within the external environment, and then full/partial re-incorporated into the alliance 
dyad (Michener and “Org B”), and thus alliance portfolio suggests a  non-linear, but 
ultimately valuable capability advancement process. This process also contributes 
towards the gap in the RBV literature pertaining to where such VRIN resources are 
acquired (Gulati, R., Nohria, N. and Zaheer, A., 2000). The above experience with 
Michener and “Org B” suggests an initial melding of resources (resource cognition) 
with the partner firm to acquire new resources to pursue new dynamic capability 
development.  These new capabilities, emanating from the dyad alliance relationship, 
are advanced and developed through application within and external to the dyad alliance 
relationship.     
 
Trust 
Trust has been identified as a significant, critical factor related to long-term alliance 
success within the food and healthcare industries (Whipple et. al. 2000). Gulati et. al. 
(2000) states that “The presence of inter-firm trust is an extraordinary lubricant for 
alliances that involve considerable inter- dependence and task coordination between 
partners, (and) firms with prior network connections are likely to have a greater 
awareness of the rules, routines, and procedures that each needs to follow (p. 210).” In 
examining the factors necessary for organisational learning in creating dynamic 
capabilities, Lorenzoni et. al. (1999) suggests that the shared alliance experience over 
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time supports the cultivation of trust, thus leading to lower transactional costs and 
bureaucratic administration.    
 
Based on interviews with respondents from “Org A”, “Org B”, and Michener, the 
development of trust proceeded on different paths for each respective alliance. A former 
manager from “Org A” identifies the concept of lofty expectations within the alliance: 
 
“I think, expectations that were setup right up front, rightly or wrongly, some 
expectations were quite lofty, and when those expectations started to show signs 
of erosion and we weren't going to meet them, it was inadequately mitigated, in 
other words, there wasn't an adequate amount of effort put to realise why it 
failed, and that then impacted the trust and then we figured it was an intentional 
failure because of the lack of something from either side, bilateral, I think 
Michener lost trust in “Org A” because we did not mitigate the situation when 
things were going south, and vice versa. “Org A” thought Michener should add 
more resources or put more commitment towards other mandates or projects we 
had, and didn’t, and so we lost trust in Michener’s ability to (support) the 
alliance up (Former Manager, “Org A”).” 
 
The respondent describes the process by which trust was eroded and challenged through 
the perspectives of both organisations. At some stage, regardless of the factual basis of 
these perceptions, the profound loss of trust results, and the objectives in building 
dynamic capabilities between firms significantly mitigated/compromised. In a preceding 
chapter the candidate suggests a ‘myth-busting’ approach, traditionally used within 
inter-professional healthcare teams as a means to improve patient outcomes and 
experience, as a means to support such conversations within the management of an 
alliance between inter-industrial/sector organisations. A respondent from “Org A” 
summarised the factor of trust in the alliance over time in stating “It (trust) didn't evolve 
at all...I think trust was probably at its highest at the fire side chat (point-in-time 
represented in the archival analysis chapter through the “Spirit of the Alliance 
document) …we went down exponentially after that (Former Manager, “Org A”).” 
 
In examining the role of personal relationships within the alliance within a proceeding 
section, an executive at “Org B” stated “in terms of establishing the trust quickly is an 
understatement. I don’t think I've ever had a relationship of any kind, personal or 
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professional that got to the wood that fast (Sr. Executive, “Org B”).” With trust 
established at an early phase, the cultivation of trust is supported in organisations 
achieving/producing what they have committed to within the alliance (Whipple et. al., 
2000). A key difference to note between Michener’s alliance relationships with “Org A” 
and “Org B” was that in the case “Org A” was pursuing the development of dynamic 
capabilities in a newly established industry (healthcare education; largely through the 
transference of capabilities from aviation simulation); alternatively, the pursuit of 
developing dynamic capability of innovation with “Org B” was in the respective core 
business industries of both respective partners. An executive from Michener 
summarises this insight: 
 
“I think we would need to do better to work with large, well-established players 
and whatever their particular area of specialty or niche may be. I think where 
we’ve been challenged is where, "ORG A" is a good example where a large 
established player trying to play a new game. "ORG B" is not trying to play a 
new game. They’re trying to play their existing game differently and have us 
play a role in that. I think we’ve been more successful there (Executive I, 
Michener – Part I).” 
 
From a theory development and contribution perspective, the comparative narrative and 
respondent comment above suggest a corroboration of contemporary strategic 
management theory, expanded to the development of dynamic capabilities between 
organisations, to ‘stick to the knitting’ (Peters and Waterman, 1982), whereby the 
development of dynamic capabilities are pursued within the existing core business 
industries of each respective alliance partner.  
 
The factor of trust also has the impact of lowering management/coordination costs 
within the alliance, and in some circumstances, mitigates the reliance and/or need for 
progressive contract documents/alterations, etc. (Lorenzoni et. al., 1999). In comparing 
the role of trust and the resulting impact to the resulting contractual approach for “Org 
A” and “Org B”, an executive at Michener reflected:  
 
“You notice one of the things with "ORG B" when we talk about 
commercialisation there’s no questions of NDAs (Non Disclosure Agreement). 
Or any of that trappings that’s going on. In "ORG A" we had to codify the 
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commercialisation and lock it down and we almost, negotiations, almost broke 
down. Because of certain comments the room had made about the 
commercialisation (Executive I, Michener – Part I).  
 
Again, from a theory building perspective, the respondent confirms that during the 
pursuit of commercialisation opportunities, which tend to include extremely sensitive 
organisational information (such as specific resource standings; existing partner 
relationships within the alliance portfolio; access to market; etc.) the requirement for an 
NDA with “Org B” has not been required, while the experience with “Org A” seemed to 
be rather laborious and complex. The respondent also illustrates a link between trust and 
the pursuit of developing a dynamic capability in commercialisation within both case 
studies.  
 
The factor of trust has been contrasted in each case study, illustrating the impact to the 
end result, either leading to disillusionment and disappointment, or the establishment of 
dynamic capabilities between firms. The comparison of case studies corroborates that in 
alliance relationships within healthcare education, amongst public and private partners, 
the early establishment and cultivation of trust is a critical factor in the development of 
dynamic capabilities, and alliance success.  
 
Outcomes Perspective – Disillusionment & Disappointment, and the Development of 
Dynamic Capability 
In the proceeding sections, factors that both contribute and mitigate the development of 
dynamic capabilities between firms have been examined. Ultimately, in the context and 
comparison of these 2-case studies, respondents indicated a partial accomplishment in 
the development of a dynamic capability in innovation and disappointment in 
establishing a dynamic capability commercialisation with “Org A”; whereas 
respondents in context to case study involving “Org B” indicate a development of a 
dynamic capability in innovation between the two organisations, with the evolution of a 
commercialisation capability in the early phases of development. As illustrated in the 
preceding chapters, while the aim and objectives of each case study are similar 
(development of dynamic capabilities of innovation and commercialisation), the context 
and variables in which each case unfolded were different. More specifically: 
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o “Org A” was a new entrant to the healthcare education industry and 
aimed to transfer existing dynamic capabilities of innovation and 
commercialisation from one industry to another; where “Org B” is an 
established firm within their core industry and was applying existing 
capabilities within their core business to a new challenge/opportunity; 
o The alliance with “Org A” was focused on the development of a physical 
asset (simulation centre within the applied health sciences) and once 
established, services (curriculum/product innovation and 
commercialisation); whereas the focus of the alliance with “Org B” was 
primarily on designing/developing a new adaptation of a product and 
complete innovation of an emulation module to interface with the 
product, with commercialisation efforts commencing a significant time 
thereafter (6-12 months); 
o The established relationship with “Org A” remained primarily a business 
relationship; whereas the established relationship with “Org B” quickly 
evolved to a personal commitment between executives/teams, and has 
maintained and grown since this initial project; 
o The factors of trust and organisational learning were strong themes in 
respondent’s comments pertaining primarily regarding “Org B”; whereas 
the themes of lofty expectations, cultural fit and fuzzy decision making 
process pertained primarily to “Org A”.  
 
These factors, experienced within the respective context, ultimately resulted in the 
development of dynamic capabilities between firms or in disappointment. Where the 
development of dynamic capability was successful, respondents indicated that they 
resided both within and between the respective firms. Respondents indicated that both 
parties were critical but not sufficient for the establishment of dynamic capabilities, and 
that the factors outlined above were critical in this pursuit. One executive summed the 
impact of establishing dynamic capabilities between firms in the context to Michener’s 
core business of healthcare education:  
 
“Which is the kids are now either depending on the discipline, being trained in a 
very contemporary way, or they're about to be, and that's what we should be 
concerned about as an educator. Is that they are, and those 3 things that I heard 
out there, they had to have all their basic skills when they got to clinical; they 
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had to be trained on the contemporary equipment, with knowledge of 
contemporary operating knowledge and safety protocols for that equipment; and 
they had to be trained as members of an interprofessional team, not as a single 
profession. Those are still the big drivers of what we're doing with the curricular 
reform, and we're way closer to having those 3 big things achieved, and I've 
never said, and I never would that's that’s end sum game of this whole issue, 
because there will be another 3 items that come out next, but its the next 
iteration, its the next go around for this organisation, and in another 5-8 years, 
because this will be the norm. They'll have their basic skills; they'll 
contemporary, and they'll come out there having the knowledge of being part of 
the team, so now someone else will come and say, yeah, but they need A, and 
they need B, and they need C, well that's fine. That's what education is all about, 
its never an end sum game, its never finished, but the alliances have been a key 
organisational response to allowing us to move those markers that were there, so 
yeah, I think we're imminently successful on multiple of levels (Executive I, 
Michener – Part III).” 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the respondent illustrates the three strategic drivers in 
building an innovative dynamic capability to support the newly established curriculum 
model, in the context of alliance relationships (Michener’s alliance portfolio). This 
insight aligns to the basic essence of dynamic capabilities, whereby new ways of doing 
things are required to succeed in new and volatile environments. Once established, this 
process continues to evolve, whereby new environmental developments require new 
ways of doing things yet again. The above response acknowledges this process in 
stating that “in another 5-8 years” there will be new strategic directions. From a 
theoretical perspective, the evolution of a firm’s capabilities over time are strongly 
supported through the engagement of an alliance portfolio, the focus of the proceeding 
chapter.   
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16.5 EMERGING THEME #4 – THE EXPLORATION OF THE ROLE OF THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ALLIANCE CAPABILITY AND THE ALLIANCE 
PORTFOLIO CAPABILITY, AND THE RESULTING MANAGEMENT & 
EVOLUTION OF THE ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO  
 
16.5.1 Introduction  
The role of the dedicated alliance function and the relationship and impact to the 
alliance portfolio is suggested by Kale et. al. (2002): 
 
“The dedicated alliance function offers a tool for leveraging experience across 
the alliance portfolio and becomes a stronger predicator for alliance success than 
alliance experience alone (p. 40).” 
 
While primarily focused on the theoretical lens of organisational learning, Arndt (2008) 
explores the relationship between the establishment and subsequent impact in 
establishing an organisational alliance capability in relation to the value and outcomes 
of the alliance portfolio. Kale et. al. (2002) examined the relationship of establishing the 
alliance portfolio and its relationship to firm performance (defined via both stock 
market return and manager perception). In examining the benefits of alliance portfolio 
participation, Arndt (2008) categorises private versus common benefits: 
 
“Private benefits are those (learning) spill-overs that only benefit the firm, 
excluding the focal alliance processes. Common benefits, however, are 
generated from the partnership for both sides. They equal the learning effects 
from the alliances for common activities (p. 36).” 
 
Wassmer (2010) illustrates the many theoretical lenses by-which alliance portfolios can 
be explored, including the dynamic capability lens of choice within this research 
program. Wassmer (2010) conducted a comprehensive review of the existing literature 
base pertaining to alliance portfolios, and categorises the current literature in three 
distinct areas, including the emergence, configuration and management of alliance 
portfolios; and provides a summary table of recommended future research opportunities, 
including the primary areas of contribution of this research program:     
o “Clarify how alliance capability on the single alliance level is different 
from alliance portfolio management capability (Wassmer 2010; p. 162).” 
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o “Examine the role of the dedicated alliance function in alliance portfolio 
management (Wassmer 2010; p. 162).” 
o “Understand the costs and benefits associated with different types of 
alliance portfolio configurations (Wassmer 2010; p. 162).”  
o Explore the evolution, management of the alliance portfolio (Wassmer 
2010). 
 
The following chapter will explore these research areas with the aim of contributing 
towards the overall theoretical understanding within the context of an alliance portfolio 
of a hub-firm in the healthcare education industry.   
 
16.5.2 Progression from Alliance Capability to Alliance Portfolio Capability 
While some researchers have explored the relationship between the establishment of a 
dedicated alliance function/capability and the alliance portfolio (Kale et. al., 2002; 
Arndt, 2008), the relationship as a research focus is at an embryonic phase. Wassmer 
(2010) states that “ Through their alliance portfolios, firms essentially gain two distinct 
types of alliance experience: (a) experience in how to manage single alliances and (b) 
experience in how to manage multiple simultaneous alliances with different partners (p. 
161).” The intent of this chapter is to explore the transition and relationship between 
these two types of experience and capabilities. As a means to explore the relationship 
between individual alliance relationships and the resulting alliance function; and the 
management, evolution and benefits of an alliance portfolio, the transition was explored 
primarily with respondents from Michener (as its Michener’s complement of alliances).  
The candidate is not aware of any related publications exploring this relationship within 
the healthcare education industry. 
 
An executive at Michener suggested a direction link between the organisational learning 
associated with the alliance capability and that of the establishment of the alliance 
portfolio: 
 
“I don’t think you'd have a portfolio capability if you didn't have the 
individual one, cause how are you going to build a portfolio, if you haven't got 
the corporate wherewithal, or the personal wherewithal to actually build the 
individual alliances, they won’t last. Cause they'll be built on a single deal that 
will be only as good as the deal last (Executive I, Michener – Part III).” 
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Thematically, the cumulative experience in individual alliances, through formalisation 
and organisational learning, promotes the establishment of an alliance portfolio, if only 
initially from a definitional perspective as “as a focal firm’s past as well as ongoing 
strategic alliances” (Wassmer, 2010). This is to say that while a firm may meet the 
definition of an alliance portfolio by establishing more than a single alliance 
relationship, the recognition of the alliance portfolio as a source for complex, 
interdependent development of dynamic capabilities for the pursuit of strategic 
objectives and/or a sustainable competitive advantage is a more sophisticated, 
developed approach, supported through long-term organisational learning and 
experience with multiple strategic alliances.      
 
An additional theoretical insight relates to the developmental direction of the alliance 
capability in regards to the alliance portfolio. While the long-term experience and 
organisational learning are critical to the establishment of a strategic alliance portfolio, 
interestingly the engagement of the alliance portfolio can also produce new individual 
alliance agreements. For example, an executive at Michener summarises this insight:     
 
“And just as I thought about that, the ancillary discovery, in this portfolio 
management approach to alliances which goes back to some of these additional… if 
we hadn't gone down this track, we would never had been introduced to 
organisations like B.I. who we also have an alliance with....(Executive I, Michener – 
Part III)” 
 
This insight corroborates past literature within different industrial contexts, insofar as 
the establishment of an alliance capability and related alliance portfolio capability act as 
a “proof of concept” and value-proposition and validation mechanism for future alliance 
partners (Kale et. al., 2002). Kale et. al. (2002) also suggest that the establishment of an 
alliance portfolio capability is aligned to the cumulative value of multiple alliances to 
the hub-firm, as well as the sheer number of alliances, insofar as there is a tipping point 
where the management of multiple alliance relationships becomes a necessity.   This 
experience is illustrated in exploring the relationship between the organisational alliance 
capability and the capability of the alliance portfolio, whereby an executive at Michener 
stated “I would argue we would not have been as successful at the collective level if we 
had not progressed as far as we did along the continuum in the individual level.” This 
comment suggests that the central themes of organisational learning, and the 
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incorporation of such learning and experience into a specific alliance capability have a 
direct impact and contribution to the establishment of an organisational capability 
related to the alliance portfolio.   
 
The respondent data illustrated above suggests that the relationship between the alliance 
capability and alliance portfolio capability is not unidirectional. While the experience, 
learning and capabilities from individual alliances help support the establishment, 
development and cultivation of the alliance portfolio capability, the evolving alliance 
portfolio capability impacts current and future dyadic alliance relationships through new 
management approaches and partner selection/opportunities, respectively. While the 
development of an alliance portfolio capability seems reliant on the development of an 
alliance capability, once established the relationship between the two capabilities seem 
to re-enforce and cultivate each other. This insight contributes and advances the 
understanding of the role of the alliance capability and the establishment of the alliance 
portfolio (Wassmer, 2010).    
 
16.5.3 The Alliance Portfolio – Benefits, Management & Evolution 
While there is a well-established literature base associated with specific alliance 
relationships, the exploration of alliance portfolios is embryonic in its development 
(Wassmer, 2010).The proceeding section will explore themes related to the alliance 
portfolio, including the benefits of engagement, management and evolution of such a 
phenomenon.  Before proceeding, it is important to specify the change in focus in the 
level of analysis (House et. al., 1995). In preceding chapters, the level of analysis has 
been identified as the alliance (dyadic) relationship, the firm, and/or specific 
capabilities. Unless otherwise specified, the level of analysis for this section is 
(Michener’s) alliance portfolio itself (as illustrated by Figure 13). Respondents were 
informed of this shift in levels of analysis, with specific questions designed accordingly 
(e.g. To establish dynamic capability, who should Michener attract to it’s alliance 
portfolio? How should Michener’s alliance portfolio evolve within the context of the 
healthcare community/industry? What have been the costs/benefits in engaging within 
this alliance portfolio?; etc.). The unit, or focus of analysis remains unchanged as the 
pursuit of establishing dynamic capabilities of innovation/commercialisation 
between/within inter-organisational relationships. The exploration in the role of an 
alliance capability to the alliance portfolio, and the associated evolution, management 
and benefits of such engagement will be explored, largely through the contributions 
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from respondents within Michener itself. The candidate is not aware of any related 
publications exploring this relationship within the healthcare or healthcare education 
industry. 
 
In a comprehensive review of the existing alliance portfolio literature base, Wassmer 
(2010) outlines three distinct themes of existing and future research, including the 
emergence, configuration and management of alliance portfolios. Given the necessary 
scope of this research program, the candidate does not intend to explore the emergence 
of the alliance portfolio in significant detail, if only to confirm that the original scope in 
the preceding chapters remains, insofar as the emergence of the alliance portfolio is in 
pursuit in the establishment and development of dynamic capabilities between firms, 
with the alliance portfolio acting as an expanded opportunity to pursue this aim. Rather, 
the focus of this section will explore the general themes of management and 
configuration of the alliance portfolio, with specific focus on the management, benefits 
and evolution of the alliance portfolio. From a contribution perspective, given the 
emerging state of the literature, the candidate intends to provide new insights to existing 
literature gaps, within the specific context of the healthcare educational industry, and 
within the dominant theoretical paradigm of dynamic capabilities. The application of 
these specific insights into a dominant theoretical model/framework would likely be 
premature and/or presumptuous.  
 
16.5.4 Michener’s Alliance Portfolio 
As discussed in preceding chapters, Michener has established a well-established alliance 
portfolio. Historically, Michener has simultaneously managed alliances in distinct 
categories, including clinical partners; academic partners; and private-industry partners. 
A Michener executive described the genesis of the clinical alliance portfolio in the 
following representative comment:  
 
“I think the other, on the basis of our model, since it is based on didactic and 
clinical, has required us to build a series of partnership in networks of education 
which currently at about 150 plus organisations predominately in Ontario but in 
literally every province of Canada. That allows us to have an outreach of 
networking capabilities that is quite unique in terms of post-secondary 
education institutes (Executive I, Michener – Part I).” 
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The respondent illustrates a series of insights related to the establishment of the clinical 
alliance portfolio. First, the respondent confirms that such a model was critical in 
supporting the core healthcare educational model operated at Michener, as a means to 
complement the didactic educational with clinical experience; thus, a support of 
Michener’s core business. Secondly, the respondent suggests that such a network not 
only supports Michener’s core organisational strategy, but also acts as a method of 
potential sustainable competitive advantage, insofar as the extent of the 
outreach/networking capability is “unique” (i.e. “VRIN”; Barney, 1991). In terms of 
exploring the genesis of an alliance portfolio, this is a critical insight, as this sub-
portfolio (clinical partners) represents the first generation of the alliance “portfolio”.  
Subsequent sub-portfolios, such as academic partners, private-industry partners, and 
international partners were established thereafter. The roots and alignment of all 
subsequent sub-portfolios, including the private-industry sub-portfolio (the focus of this 
specific research program), have been in alignment to the core academic core business 
of Michener.   
 
The diagram below illustrates Michener’s alliance portfolio (figure adapted from 
Roberts and Wallace, 2004)
10
: 
 
Figure 13: Michener’s Alliance Portfolio (figure adapted from Roberts and Wallace, 2004) 
 
                                                        
10 A special thanks to Shahid H. for his technical assistance with this image.   
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16.5.5 Alliance Portfolio Capability 
The proceeding sections have explored the specific role of the alliance capability in 
establishing an alliance portfolio capability; as well as the genesis of an alliance 
portfolio in support of the organisations core business and organisational strategy. The 
purpose of this chapter is to explore the specifics of the alliance portfolio capability at 
the organisational level, and specifically as a means to establish and cultivate dynamic 
capabilities in innovation and commercialisation. The intended scope of this research 
focus is aided by the current literature, which heavily leverages both the RBV (Barney, 
1991) and dynamic capabilities theoretical lens within alliance portfolios (Wassmer, 
2010).  
 
In exploring the cultivation process in establishing an alliance portfolio capability, and 
executive at Michener suggested: 
 
“I think it (alliance portfolio capability) has to be an integrated, integral part of 
the corporate response strategy. You can't do this, you might be successful on 
one as an example, but you can't do this as a one off. I think you have to build it 
into it, and figure out that it has priority, it has resources, it has support, as it 
goes forward. I think another key piece of this is because ultimately moving it 
from the individual to the portfolio, as we already discussed, means you have to 
have the individual way beyond the initial level, you have to be into a deep 
relationship level. You have to have the key people doing this. And they have to 
be here for a while. This isn't something that a two year tenure rotation, it 
wouldn’t work cause relationships are longer than that. I think part of the 
reasons that we've been successful, is that we have had the longevity of 
commitment to this by individuals (Executive I, Michener – Part III).” 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the above comment provides a series of valuable 
insights. The respondent suggests that the alliance portfolio capability is centrally 
focused to the core business of the organisation, and is not peripheral in its strategic 
contribution, design or intent. Secondly, the respondent confirms the role of personal 
relationships in achieving portfolio success, referencing the importance of leadership 
tenure and commitment required to succeed in this portfolio capability.  Additionally, to 
be successful in the long-term, the respondent suggests establishing a formalised, 
dedicated alliance capability function, resourced appropriately, with senior leaders who 
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have the appropriate authority and relationship with key portfolio members. This 
corroborates the findings of Kale et. al. (2002) which explored the fiscal and strategic 
benefits in establishing a dedicated alliance function within an organisation. From a 
theoretical development perspective, it is important to clarify the potential difference in 
establishing a dedicated alliance function/capability, and that of a dedicated alliance 
portfolio function/capability. While preceding chapters have described the effects and 
relationship between the two capabilities, the candidate asserts that they are in fact 
separate and distinct capabilities, with the establishment of one (alliance capability) not 
necessarily leading to the accomplishment in the other (alliance portfolio capability). 
Finally, there is a subtle yet important distinction in the interpretation of what an 
‘alliance portfolio capability’ entails. Existing research suggests that firms who 
simultaneously manage multiple alliances are engaging in this capability (Arndt, 2008; 
Wassmer, 2010). The response above however suggests a deeper application and 
definition of the alliance portfolio capability. In practice, as the respondent identifies in 
the above response, the capability goes beyond the traditional RBV and dynamic 
capability literature where a firm assesses the resources and capabilities within its 
alliance portfolio and deems appropriate action thereafter (whether that pursuit is the 
establishment of a new alliance relationship; the pursuit in developing/advancing a 
dynamic capability; or pursuit of a market opportunity; access of a specific external 
resource/capability). In identifying the alliance portfolio as a “corporate response 
strategy”, in practice, the alliance portfolio becomes a sophisticated means by which 
new market and learning opportunities (innovation, commercialisation) can be pursued 
that otherwise might not be feasible. Rather than engaging the alliance portfolio to 
achieve specific hub-firm benefits (through access/utilisation of knowledge, capabilities, 
resources, etc.), the alliance portfolio can be utilised to create clusters (Provan et. al., 
2007) via the portfolio to create market opportunities and innovations that disrupt and 
transform the current market environment (as it relates to all aspects of the established 
business model, transformations and advances in customer relationships; customer 
offerings; product/service offerings; distribution approach to products/services; etc.). In 
other words, the depth and resulting contribution from a specific dynamic capability 
developed via the alliance portfolio has the potential to enable the hub-firm (and 
associated partners), to pursue innovative shocks to the competitive environment, rather 
than simply aiming to compete more effectively/efficiently within the current 
competitive marketplace.  
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As an applied example, the case study of Michener’s alliance relationship with “Org B” 
provides some useful insights and clarifications to the above theoretical development 
and analysis. Michener and “Org B” have been involved in a formal alliance agreement 
for several years, pursuing many initiatives involving technological solutions within the 
radiation therapy industry. Michener and “Org B” share many “loose tie” relationships 
with a series of clinical research partners, industry partners, academic partners, etc. 
within each others respective alliance portfolios. Traditionally, the OEM (original 
equipment manufactures) industry (as experienced in a wide variety of health 
disciplines, such as ultrasound; radiation-therapy; radiation technology; nuclear 
medicine; advanced imaging; medical laboratory sciences; etc.) have focused on 
technological innovation and integration as proof of its capability for innovation and 
problem solving/contribution within healthcare. Education, as part of the value chain, 
has (largely, but not exclusively) been targeted to the pre-sales and early post-sales 
timeframes. This is a challenge for many clinical environments as the state of 
technological sophistication grows, and natural staff turnover is experienced. Adding to 
this challenge is the consistent innovation of technology and rapid technological 
advancement, which has led to a gap in the potential of the equipment and the capability 
of the healthcare professional to utilise the full extent of the solution, throughout the 
lifecycle of the platform. Within this alliance portfolio, the opportunity exists for “Org 
B”, in collaboration with Michener and other loose tie partners, to fundamentally 
redesign the value-chain of the OEM towards not only supporting the technological 
innovation of the capital solutions, but to also establish a “practitioner-integration” with 
the equipment, through the application of sophisticated, and consistent educational 
solutions throughout the life-cycle of the equipment. The current capability of 
innovation between Michener and “Org B” may adapt to this new marketplace (thus, 
representing a true dynamic capability in innovation), with the goal of maximising the 
utilisation of the existing equipment, with the purpose of maximising 
benefits/experience to the patient. New educational solutions (beyond the standard full-
time diploma and post-graduate continuing education courses) are being examined to 
support this collective value-chain, leveraging the core business of Michener 
(education) and that of “Org B” (design/development of healthcare treatment 
capital/solutions) to support domestic and international healthcare education needs. The 
above description illustrates the ability of the alliance portfolio to be used as a 
mechanism for strategic diagnosis and development, focused on contributing towards 
societies greatest challenges and needs (e.g. healthcare solutions), and demonstrating 
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the benefits of corporate shared value (CSV) as described by Porter et. al. (2011) (as 
represented through the collaboration of public-private firms).   
 
This theoretical contribution resides in the juncture of the theoretical lenses of RBV 
(Barney, 1991), dynamic capabilities (Wang et. al., 2007), networks (Provan et. al. 
2007), alliance portfolios (Arndt, 2008; Wassmer, 2010), industrial design (Porter, 
1980) and strategic nets (Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg, 2007) to illustrate the 
potential of alliance portfolios to act as a strategic response and design mechanism for 
firms operating within highly volatile and competitive environments. This represents a 
significant departure and advancement from the standard literature base, insofar as when 
the theoretical lens of RBV and dynamic capabilities are referenced/applied to the 
alliance portfolio literature, the focus of the analysis is typically to acknowledge the 
internal benefit/impact to the hub-firm (Kale et. al., 2002; Arndt, 2008). The leveraging 
of these theoretical perspectives together, with the empirical data collected within this 
research program suggest that the benefits of the alliance portfolio (and the resulting 
dynamic capabilities established therein) have the potential to provide both internal 
benefits/value to the hub-firm (and alliance participants), as well as external 
benefits/value to the industrial environment and society at large (Porter et. al., 2011).       
 
In respect to this application of the alliance portfolio, an executive respondent from 
Michener commented that in terms of the strategic response and deign perspective, as an 
organisation: 
 
“We're not 100% there, ok, cause I still think its (alliance portfolio) a learning 
curve that we're on, but we're a long way from initiation in this thing because we 
have, and I look back at as we have, trying to explain this, and what, the value 
chain you put together several years ago, about how we approached an alliance, 
and it was pretty much theoretical what was there, but in fact we now have a 
proven model that we have confidence in, and how to approach an alliance. Its 
not something we're afraid to do (Executive I, Michener – Part III)…” 
 
The respondent acknowledges the learning process and investiture required to succeed 
in the alliance portfolio capability, referencing intermediate steps (alliance partner 
selection through evaluation to organisational value chain) and long-term timeframe 
(several years). The respondent also illustrates the transition from a theoretical 
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application of the alliance portfolio capability to an established approach, and the 
inherent confidence in such an approach. Further to this response, in elaboration of the 
alliance portfolio as a powerful strategic design and diagnostic mechanism, an executive 
at Michener stated: 
 
“I'm not sure it’s at the point yet where it’s a diagnostic in that sense. I have a 
feeling that with the continued progression, it may become a diagnostic, I think 
it’s too early for that. I think right now it was this is an opportunistic response, 
and again, because of where we are with the personal relationship with “Org B”, 
its kind of like they're at the point oh shoot, we have a problem, maybe these 
guys can help us. As apposed to saying one of the benefits of our alliances is that 
we will routinely look at and diagnose whether there is an opportunity for these 
guys to help us, I don't think we're there yet. And again, I think it’s a piece of 
building (the) relationship where opportunistically they came, they had a 
problem, we came up with a response, and now we're moving, we've moved 
forward to deliver that. That's going to give them much greater confidence to 
probably come to us earlier in the diagnostic sequence and say, maybe in the 
future it becomes part of their bidding, that we have the capacity to bring in the 
curricular and educational where with all that we can do A,B,C,D (Executive I, 
Michener – Part III).”    
 
The respondent suggests that while the opportunity exists for the alliance portfolio to 
mature to this stage of potential contribution, the portfolio in its current state acts in the 
traditional RBV and dynamic capability sense, whereby problems are solved through 
the utilisation of alliance partners and related configurations.  
 
As demonstrated throughout this research program in exploring alliance function and 
alliance portfolio, the concept of strategic focus, and more specifically creating alliances 
with firms versed within the hub-firm’s core business industrial context is an important 
contributor to success both in general alliance relationships and in the specific pursuit of 
establishing dynamic capabilities. This theme is extended to the alliance portfolio unit 
of analysis, with an executive at Michener stating: 
 
“Most these companies (in the alliance portfolio) are healthcare based, so they 
know how the funding works, how things occur in hospitals and in education, 
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and the benefit it can offer, they have a much better grasp of this whereas I think 
companies like “Org A” who work mainly with commercial, they only not so 
much not for profits, they have a harder time with it. So I think these different 
dynamics come into play, like dealing with “Org B”, limited funds, but the 
benefit is there down the road (Executive I, Michener – Part III).”  
 
As identified in the above comment, the establishment of an alliance portfolio and the 
resulting portfolio capability should aim to support and advance the core business of the 
organisation, and ultimately provide benefit and value.  
 
16.5.6 Management of the Alliance Portfolio Capability 
Before proceeding to the next section, which explores the costs and benefits in 
establishing and engaging in an alliance portfolio, the management of such an alliance 
portfolio will first be explored. In regards to the management of the alliance function, 
Kale et. al. (2002) state that “Alliance knowledge that resides experientially with 
individual managers is likely to dissipate over time in the face of natural turnover 
among them. By codifying this know-how and by absorbing it, the alliance function 
plays an important role in retaining the knowledge that otherwise might be lost if 
managers that possess it were to leave the organisation (p. 751).” Within this lens, the 
candidate intended to explore whether this relationship would remain consistent when 
applied to the management of the alliance portfolio. The theme offered by Kale et. al. 
(2002) above was consistently re-enforced by respondents, with a Program Chair at 
Michener providing a representative comment: 
 
“I think it (management of the alliance portfolio) does need to be centrally 
managed, absolutely. Absolutely, because in order to meet that level on 
consistency so that you don't as people change and move, there has to be some 
envelop or body of knowledge, whether its individual or whether its a manual, 
whatever the mechanism is so that it if somebody new does come in or 
whatever, there’s something that can be picked up to say, oh, this is what, this is 
what we need, this is sort of what we've got, this is how it evolved, this is what 
the relationships are, this is what we need to do. And its a little bit different for 
this person or this group over here because its a bit of a different niche, or 
whatever, its so you need to know so, yeah (Program Chair I, Michener).” 
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The respondent identifies a series of core themes, including the requirement for the 
function to be “centrally managed”, which leads to “consistency” and sustainability of 
the portfolio should key personnel leave the organisation. The respondent also 
references a critical theme of the existing literature pertaining to the management of the 
individual alliance function, insofar as the benefit in doing so captures (at a minimum) 
the explicit and potentially some of the tacit knowledge related to the alliance portfolio 
(Kale et. al., 2002). In elaborating on the nature of such a centrally managed alliance 
portfolio function, respondents included requirements such as “transparent”; 
“accessible”; and “understanding”. In terms of a “distributed alliance portfolio 
function”, a director from Michener offered the following recommendation as a means 
to centrally manage but leverage full organisational awareness and participation as a 
means to effectively manage/cultivate the alliance portfolio: 
 
“And the how. The how, because if I understand how it goes, I think a lot of 
people understand why we have these alliances, cause they see the end product, 
but its the how, because if I know what’s involved, you don’t know, I might 
know the VP of somebody, right, then I can start in a casual conversation, oh, I 
never really thought of it this way, there’s an opportunity. Not that I have to do 
anything more of the work, because I understand it, I see more opportunities as a 
result of it. I can bring it to you then cause I already understand and know, that 
this may or may not work out, but I understand (Sr. Director III, Michener).”     
 
The respondent suggests an innovative approach to managing the alliance portfolio 
function. While the established literature suggests formalising an alliance function for 
individual alliances, including the establishment of alliance offices and/or roles (Arndt, 
2008; Kale et. al., 2002), the management of a large, loosely tied alliance portfolio may 
require more of a hybrid approach, whereby collective organisational awareness and 
knowledge of the alliance portfolio is aligned and integrated to the dedicated alliance 
portfolio function as a means to maximise portfolio management and value. This is an 
important distinction from the existing theoretical base, insofar as the application and 
approach has been adapted from the alliance function literature to new insights and 
understanding related to the alliance portfolio function.  
 
The engagement and accessing of knowledge and relationships (as described above in 
the two-proceeding respondent quotes) within an organisation as a means to develop 
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dynamic capability  through ‘transactive memory systems’, or “the knowledge of ‘who 
knows what’ (p. 1376)”  reflects the recent micro-foundations insights posited by 
Argote and Ren (2012).         
 
Wassmer (2010) identified that “although the extant of the literature has mainly focused 
on understanding single alliance management capability, research addressing the issue 
of alliance portfolio management capability has only recently started to accumulate (p. 
160).” The above theoretical development and subsequent contribution supports the 
theoretical understanding related to two central gaps within the existing literature, 
namely the role of the alliance function in the establishment of an alliance portfolio 
capability, and the potential impact of the alliance portfolio capability beyond the 
traditional understanding of the RBV and dynamic capability literature (e.g. alliance 
portfolio as a strategic diagnostic mechanism, leading to potential 
reconfiguration/transformation of dominant industrial business model).  
 
16.5.7 Benefits in Engaging in Alliance Portfolio  
As a future research opportunity, Wassmer (2010) identified that “future alliance 
portfolio configuration research should shed more light on the costs and benefits 
associated with different types of alliance portfolio configurations (p. 165)”; “through 
the exploration and assessment of the perceptions of senior managers, directors, and 
executives.” In contribution towards this focus, throughout the data collection process, 
through a series of unstructured interviews, respondents were requested to elaborate and 
clarify the core benefits associated with Michener’s alliance portfolio. The responses 
were varied, with core benefits including (in order of frequency): 
 
 Acquisition/installation of capital/equipment  
 Increased innovative capability  
 Increased educational/curricular experience for students  
 Increased knowledge base/organisational learning 
 Increased strategic options 
 Increased access to financing  
 Increased access to market knowledge/intelligence 
 Increased strategic awareness 
 Increased (applied) research opportunities 
 Innovative creative academic progression 
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The above insights reflect what Wassmer (2010) identified as central benefits of alliance 
portfolio engagement in other industries, stating that “looking at the role of alliance 
partners from a resource and capabilities perspective can reveal new insights on how 
variation in firm’s alliance partners affects the benefits they derive from their alliance 
portfolios (p. 154).”  The majority of private partner firms in Michener’s alliance 
portfolio are original equipment manufacturers (OEMs); who are responsible for the 
design and development of equipment used in a variety of applied health disciplines, or 
alternatively in the equipment utilised in the educational approach to those applied 
health science disciplines. An executive summarised the equipment complement 
acquired to-date through the engagement of this alliance portfolio: 
 
“The capital equipment, we have had, we have CT scanner, we've got 2 liner 
accelerators, we have a Vertual simulator, we have a heart and lung machine, … 
we have all kinds of physical capital equipment through these partnerships that 
we would have not have procured because we have no capital funding. So that's 
one that came out of it. Even with the “Org A”, we still have “Org A” simulators 
downstairs that are at our disposal if we wanted to use them, and there are 
capital equipment that came out of it including the (Audio Visual Solution) 
(Executive I, Michener – Part III).”   
 
The above comment confirms the specific capital acquired from the engagement of the 
alliance portfolio, valued within the several to tens of millions of dollars in asset 
replacement value, without a dedicated capital funding commitment. The respondent 
also references the alliance relationship with “Org A”, while disappointing in terms of 
establishing capabilities within innovation and commercialisation, has resulted in a 
“spill-over” benefit of innovative capital equipment remaining at Michener’s campus 
for potential future incorporation into the curriculum.  
 
Respondents also referenced the pursuit of establishing a dynamic capability of 
innovation both directly (increased innovative capacity/capability), and indirectly 
(Increased knowledge base/organisational learning; Increased strategic options; 
Increased access to financing; Increased access to market knowledge/intelligence; 
Increased strategic awareness; Increased (applied) research opportunities; Innovative 
creative academic progression) via engagement of the alliance portfolio. While the 
acquisition of equipment and establishment and cultivation of dynamic capabilities in 
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innovation are significant benefits, given the core business of Michener is the education 
of professions for the applied health sciences industry the collective benefit to the 
student learning experience and quality of curricular experiences is of highest 
importance.     
 
A senior Director at Michener summarised this theme in stating:  
 
“Educating students in the healthcare field. Gives us access to machines that we 
would not have access to, all these devices are extremely expensive, and keeping 
up with the latest technology is a very expensive endeavour, being able to make 
these partnerships with private companies such as “Org B”, BMD (bone mineral 
density) unit, these types of donations or collaboration gets access or grants 
access to students on the latest technology, so that when they do go into the 
hospital, they don't have to relearn everything, they've seen it before, and they've 
been exposed to tools which are the latest and greatest, which again could 
benefit the hospital as well, because then they may end up not have these latest 
tools, and they could say I was at Michener, we're able to do A,B and C…so its 
kind of beneficial for hospitals as well (Director I, Michener – Part II).”    
 
Of central importance is the reference to the impact to student learning, the quality of 
the academic experience, and the impact to the clinical environment, which was a 
central directive from Michener’s Clinical Partners and Board of Governors (clinical 
relevance and quality curricular experiences being the underlying motivation for this 
pursuit), ultimately leading to the pursuit of individual alliances. The above comment 
also illustrates the degree of innovation from a single alliance to the academic 
environment, and to the alliance portfolio. For example, as a means to provide an 
innovative curricular experience Michener establishes an alliance with “Org B” to 
pursue the design, development and installation of a unique linear accelerator. The 
establishment of a dynamic capability in innovation is established between the 
respective organisations leading to the completion and installation of a unique linear 
accelerator. The unique linear accelerator is integrated into the curriculum (both didactic 
and lab environments), whereby students and faculty have the opportunity to explore, 
learn and test the limits and applications of the equipment. This organisational and 
student learning is distributed both internally to Michener, and externally to Michener’s 
clinical partners through the students clinical rotation and post-graduation/certification 
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employment. The feedback of this learning continues, through clinical education 
engagement sessions, liaison officers, etc. This process of innovation is cyclical within 
the community, involving students, faculty, support staff, clinical partners, industry 
(“Org B”), representing the very definition of a dynamic capability of innovation.  
 
The majority of Michener’s respondents suggested that the continued engagement of its 
private partner alliance portfolio, and the full engagement of all its alliance portfolios is 
critical to the advancement of Michener’s long-term strategy, stewardship and linkage 
goals. From a theoretical perspective, success at the level of the alliance portfolio begets 
future success and cultivation of specific dynamic capabilities. It also illustrates the 
critical importance in achieving the factors that contribute towards alliance success 
(establishment of trust; strategic fit of resources; appropriate resource applications; 
personal commitment; community engagement process throughout implementation; 
dedicated alliance function {Kale et. al. 2002}); and to limit and reduce the mitigating 
factors of success (lofty expectations; fuzzy decision making; lack/loss of strategic 
focus; difference in corporate cultures; etc.). The above example illustrates that where 
an organisation has established an alliance portfolio, the outcome of individual alliances 
(development of new capabilities and acquisition of equipment; or alternatively, 
disappointment and disillusionment) has a significant affect on the current and future 
value, capabilities and opportunities of the alliance portfolio. As Arndt (2008) states, 
“Alliance portfolio benefits have the potential to be more valuable than the 
accumulation of the single alliances (p. 36).” While the above analysis corroborates this 
statement, the opposite is also relevant, insofar as the risks and costs of the alliance 
portfolio could also be greater than the accumulation of individual alliances.  
 
In regards to potential risks/costs associated with engaging in an alliance portfolio, 
respondents identified:  
 Potential loss of academic integrity 
 Organisational Autonomy 
 Balance of allocating best resources (people) to alliance portfolio capability to 
succeed in subsequent capabilities (innovation/commercialisation) 
 Relationship cost(s) 
 
From a theoretical application perspective, the establishment of a dedicated alliance 
function and subsequent alliance portfolio function, in the context of strong 
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organisational governance and professional behaviour/ethics policies would likely be 
appropriate in mitigating the first two risks. The third bullet, representing a strategic 
management capability, is essential for long-term success and has been developed at 
length in the preceding sections/chapters. The theme of the relationship costs represents 
the fact that in order to keep individual alliances and multiple alliance relationships 
within the alliance portfolio effective, it takes time, resources, effort and intentional 
focus, representing a direct resource costs and opportunity cost.   
 
16.5.8 Alliance Portfolio Configuration - Evolution 
Wassmer (2010) states “Little is still known on how alliance portfolio configurations 
change over time and what drives this evolution (p. 166).” Within the context of 
Michener’s alliance portfolio, respondents through unstructured interviews were 
requested to reflect on how the current alliance portfolio might evolve; as well as the 
types of alliance partners Michener may look to recruit within the medium to long-term. 
Respondents suggested a variety of factors that would drive the evolution, which 
generally relate to the current and evolving core business of Michener; and attracting 
new partners that: 
 
 share our vision, values; strategic direction (excellence in education of applied 
health science professionals); 
 support student learning and quality curriculum; 
 support, cultivate and grow clinical, academic, international, industry and 
government partners; 
 strengthen our performance in the marketplace; 
 provide access to new market opportunities (e.g. home healthcare models); 
 fill a gap, fill a need in our/their value chain; 
 meet joint needs amongst partners;  
 can co-develop new capabilities (e.g. distributive learning; extending longevity 
of capital equipment base); 
 provide long-term development (growth) opportunities; and 
 can influence in different capacities.  
 
 
A Director from Michener provides a summary response: 
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“I guess partners that share our vision of course, of supporting students and 
bringing in the best technology and the best curriculum, best experience, best 
education, that they can have at Michener, They would have to see that benefit 
as well, along with benefits to their own company, if there was a way we could 
collaborate more closely as opposed to their open to us saying helping 
developing a product, would they give us some beta version or some piece of 
medical equipment that could be tested here because we're not going to (harm) 
any patients. And if we're able to provide them with feedback, and if the 
students can see that aspect as well, and even just make them feel part of 
development of some kind of tools, so that when they go into the hospital 
environments, they look and say I've worked on this 6 months ago. Brings them 
ahead of the curve, cause at that point they're playing with technology that hasn't 
been sent out to the public just yet, not been made available.   So partners that 
look to us for information as well I think for collaboration would be beneficial 
(Director I, Michener – Part II).” 
 
The respondent suggests that future alliance partners should continue to support the core 
business of Michener, education within the applied health sciences, through providing 
students innovative technology and solutions. In turn, the continued focus on cultivating 
the organisational dynamic capability in innovation is referenced, through the 
recommendation that Michener continue to act as a beta (or alpha) site whereby new 
and emerging technological advances in healthcare are integrated into the healthcare 
education curriculum, to be experienced and leveraged within the clinical environment. 
Michener has a unique ability to act in this capacity insofar as no live patients are 
treated at Michener’s facilities; a variety of “phantoms” and patient simulators are 
leveraged to establish the required professional capabilities. The respondent also 
references the critical function of the alliance portfolio, which is to advance both the 
capabilities and value created by the hub-firm (Michener), and also to secure benefits 
for those partner firms. The cycling back of the application of new healthcare 
technology back to the OEMs, together with the capability development of healthcare 
professions for the clinical setting, offers benefits to both alliance partners and the 
healthcare system itself.  
 
Many of the themes above provided by managers/executives suggest a portfolio 
evolution driven by two major phenomena. The first is that the alliance portfolio must 
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initially support the core business of the hub-firm, and adapt/evolve in tandem as the 
vision, values and strategy of the hub-firm evolve in order to remain relevant and to 
cultivate the related dynamic capabilities of innovation and commercialisation. 
Secondly, the comments and themes illustrated above suggest the evolution of the 
structure of the alliance portfolio itself. Where historically Michener’s alliance portfolio 
has included formalised sub-portfolios of clinical, academic and industry alliance 
partners, it is likely that this evolution will increase the quantity of formalised sub-
portfolios to include those collective alliances in government, international 
development, community relations; etc. Lastly, beyond the incremental evolution of a 
firm’s strategy, as discussed in preceding chapters, the ability of the alliance portfolio to 
act as a strategic diagnosis and response mechanism to shifts/shocks in the competitive 
marketplace is a realisation that firms increasingly strive to capitalise on, as is illustrated 
in the case study involving Michener and “Org B.” 
 
Finally, in order to maximise the value of Michener’s alliance portfolio, part of the 
evolution must ensure reciprocity in the value received by all portfolio participants. A 
Michener executive summarised this theme in the following representative comment:  
 
“I think its (alliance portfolio) all those things (the value that drive that value, is it 
need, capital need, value chain, our capabilities, or lack thereof, access to markets), 
but I think interestingly enough, the future robustness of the portfolio, and the 
success and contribution of the portfolio, while that I would argue in this 
evolutionary phase, this development phase of building that portfolio, we have been 
the driver of this for our purposes, for our outcomes. I think for it to move to that 
next level, it may well be the leveraging of those alliance partners to fulfil the 
capacity of their equipment, of their issues (Executive I, Michener – Part III).” 
 
The theme identified above aligns to the results developed in the opening chapter 
examining the factors that contribute towards success at the individual alliance level. 
Within this context, an executive at Michener stated, “I think a strategic alliance cannot 
work unless both parties are willing to sacrifice something.  At some point, in the 
relationship, somebody has to sacrifice something for the benefit of the other (Executive 
II, Michener).” The above comment suggests from theory development perspective that 
the same relationship could also apply in the evolution of the alliance portfolio 
capability.  
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16.5.9 Summary 
In leveraging the unit of analysis of the alliance portfolio, the above chapter provides 
insights to the establishment, evolution and management of the alliance portfolio within 
the healthcare education industry, in the pursuit of establishing dynamic capabilities in 
innovation and commercialisation. Unlike the preceding chapters, this chapter is unique 
in its theoretical contributions, given the embryonic development phase of the literature, 
rather than providing new clarifications, adaptations and/or advancements to existing 
theoretical concepts and related literature gaps, the insights and results of this chapter 
contribute to the early development and evolution pertaining to alliance portfolios in 
general. 
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CHAPTER 17 - CONCLUSIONS 
 
17.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The focus of this research program stemmed from a detailed review of the strategic 
management literature. The emergence of dynamic capabilities as a means of explaining 
both strategic change and competitive advantage has been profound.  However, the 
detailed review presented earlier in this thesis suggests that there is a gap in our 
understanding of dynamic capabilities in the particular context of inter-organisational 
settings.  To effectively summarise the core contributions of this research program, the 
foundational Research Aim was “To explore and examine the role of a firm’s alliance 
portfolio in the development of dynamic capabilities of innovation and 
commercialisation.” To advance this Research Aim, the following Research Questions 
were identified:  
 
Research Questions:  
i) What role do alliance portfolios play in the development of dynamic capabilities 
within healthcare firms?  
ii) Do any resulting dynamic capabilities reside within and/or between firms? 
 
To specifically address the research questions, this chapter begins by providing an 
executive summary response of the major findings relating to these research questions 
(titled Summary Finding #1, #2, respectively). Then, based on these findings, the thesis 
offers specific contributions to the extant literature on dynamic capabilities and returns 
to the overall Research Objectives of the research program as outlined in Chapter 7 - 
Research Questions, Aims & Objectives.  
 
 
17.2 SUMMARY FINDING FOR RQ#1: RELATIONSHIPS AND TRANSFER 
 
In the case studies examined throughout this research program, an organisation’s 
engagement of its alliance portfolio enables the opportunity to significantly contribute 
towards the development of dynamic capabilities (of innovation and 
commercialisation). The way, in which this occurs, as demonstrated through Figure 11 
above, is indirect and systemic. It is indirect insofar as enabling and mitigating variables 
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impact the ability to create trust, effective resource allocations, and strategic fit within 
the alliance environment. An executive from “Org B” illustrates the cumulative impact 
of these factors in positing:  
 
“I think so, I mean I think at Michener I don’t think of the linacs anymore. I 
think of partnerships and innovation, coming hand in hand with you to enter 
emerging markets and help us with Ontario. So, I think we have a lot more 
growth we could do together. And its not about machines, its about people and 
experience education. The whole thing is linked to service contracts, and 
collaboratively working with others, a few other partners in Ontario. I think all 
the individuals are personally capital in this (Sr. Executive, “Org B”).” 
 
The ability of managers/executives/practitioners within alliances to limit the mitigating 
factors, and cultivate the enabling factors (as illustrated in Figure 11) form the basis 
whereby trust, resource allocation and strategic fit can be established. The resulting 
creation of new dynamic capabilities, which they attribute to the alliance rather than 
their own individual firm, enable new business models and growth opportunities that 
otherwise would not be possible within the confines of the firm’s egocentric 
resource/capability base/complement. This phenomenon, of the rich interplay by the 
manager of internal/external resources, abilities and growth opportunities is observed by 
Augier and Teece (2009, p. 418) stating: 
 
“The manager/entrepreneur can bargain, negotiate, and buy or sell or swap 
investments/assets, orchestrate internal assets (intrapreneurship), transact with 
the owners of external assets (entrepreneurship), and design and implement new 
“business models,” which define the architecture of new businesses (Chesbrough 
and Rosenbloom 2002, as cited by Augier and Teece). The astute performance 
of these functions will help achieve what Porter (1996, as cited by Augier and 
Teece) calls “strategic fit,” not just with internally controlled assets, but with the 
assets of alliance partners.” 
 
Further, within the context of this research program, this phenomenon is illustrated in 
the following description from a Michener executive: 
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“It's (alliance capability in establishing dynamic capabilities in 
innovation/commercialisation) absolutely important, I think its essential, that’s 
why I was pausing. And I think the link to essential is I don’t think we would be 
in the mindset of creativity and innovation that we are if it weren't for the 
alliance issues. I think going back to what are the key things necessary for the 
portfolio management, what we have now; we have a confidence in this 
approach and this rationale. And so we're willing to throw challenging problems 
at that conceptual approach to doing business that I don’t think you would do if 
you didn’t have the confidence (Executive I, Michener – Part III).” 
 
This ‘alliance experience’, as recognised by Arndt (2008), has an effect on the 
organisational learning capacity, and develops and cultivates a dedicated alliance 
function (Kale et. al., 2002). As demonstrated through this research program, the 
cumulative experience of the dedicated alliance function, and the resulting dynamic 
capabilities established therein, transition to the alliance portfolio. The alliance portfolio 
not only acts as an egocentric catchment of an organisations respective alliances (Baum, 
2000), but also acts as a cumulative set of dynamic capabilities, resources, and 
opportunities. The critical finding of this research program is that this model is re-
enforcing, insofar as the experience and development of an organisations dynamic 
capabilities through the engagement of the alliance portfolio has a direct role in 
supporting the firm’s internal alliance function (and thus dynamic capability 
development and cultivation). Additionally, through the research field of the 
development of dynamic capabilities through alliance portfolios (Arndt, 2008), through 
organisational learning, the candidate posits and illustrated as a core result the value of 
alliance experience from dyad relationships to the alliance portfolio need not necessarily 
be a successful outcome for it to be valuable. In other words, contribution in terms of 
learning and value (e.g. future capability development; new market entry decisions; 
market exit decisions; new partner selection within the alliance portfolio) may result 
from dyad alliance relationships that result not only in successful alliances, but also 
those in which resulted in (short-term) disappointment.    
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17.3 SUMMARY FINDING FOR RQ#2 
 
The direct response to this research question as articulated throughout this research 
program is data from these cases suggest dynamic capabilities developed in alliance 
situations reside both within and between firms. Although this finding is based on a 
limited sample in the healthcare sector, it nevertheless draws attention to other contexts 
by showing that it is at least possible to find dynamic capabilities which reside within 
individual partner firms and in the relationship between those firms.  While the specific 
nature (Micro-level perspective) of how dynamic capabilities are created amongst and 
between firms is outside the scope of this research program (this will be reflected in the 
future research recommendations section), as the alliance relationship progresses and 
matures, both in terms of time and relationship status, the established dynamic 
capabilities reside both within and between the respective organisations. Dynamic 
capabilities, if and once established, can be leveraged for the advancement of the 
current collaborative initiative, as well as future collaborative initiatives, both within the 
specific dyad alliance relationship, and outside the original dyad alliance relationship 
with alternative/future alliance partners (insofar as the alliance portfolio and the alliance 
function act as a centralised mechanism for dynamic capabilities).  
 
This research program has examined the specific factors and variables related to the 
establishment of dynamic capabilities amongst firms; how managers interact and 
perceive this development process; how dynamic capabilities are developed; and where 
the resulting capabilities reside. The candidate has also explored the relationship 
between individual alliance agreements, and the transition to an organisations respective 
alliance portfolio. Finally, the alliance portfolio itself was explored specifically in 
regards to the management, evolution and overall benefits of such an alliance portfolio. 
The development of dynamic capabilities via an organisations individual alliances and 
alliance portfolio core represents the central (applied) strategic management problem 
addressed in the advancement of these research objectives.  
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CHAPTER 18 - CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
From a theoretical development and contribution perspective, this research program has 
aimed to provide further clarification and understanding pertaining to: 
 
18.1 CONTRIBUTION #1 – BROADENING THE ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT 
TOOLKIT FOR THE DEDICATED ALLIANCE FUNCTION WITHIN ALLIANCES 
BETWEEN PUBLIC & PRIVATE FIRMS {IN REFERENCE AND ALIGNMENT TO 
SATISFY THE CONDITIONS OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVE I) & II)}  
 
Kale et. al. (2002) posit that the establishment of a dedicated alliance function has a 
significant association with overall alliance success and resulting financial return; and 
suggest a series of phases in which alliances progress and corresponding analysis 
applications.  Within this research program, the examination the perception differences 
between respondents in both public and private sector organisations of each other, and 
specific methodologies to mitigate such differing perceptions contribute towards the 
‘enabling factors’ (as illustrated in Figure 11) that contribute towards successful alliance 
relationships. The core insight that alliance partners may have fundamentally different 
expectations/perceptions of the alliance relationship has significant implications for all 
phases of the alliance relationship (including the alliance planning, partner selection, 
negotiation, management and termination phases as outlined by Kale et. al. (2002)). 
This insight, coupled with the theoretical development and incorporation of the “myth-
busting process/conversation”, as utilised within multi-disciplinary healthcare teams 
(Fleming et. al., 2010) as an effective tool to identify, challenge and clarify 
misperceptions and myths amongst alliance partners within and between the specific 
phases of the alliance relationship. This contribution enriches the existing components 
of the alliance function by suggesting a specific methodology in which inter-industrial 
organisations can apply to increase the likelihood of alliance success (defined in the 
context of this research program as the establishment of dynamic capabilities in 
innovation and commercialisation). 
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18.2 CONTRIBUTION #2 – EXPANSION OF UNDERSTANDING IN THE 
ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT FUNCTION AS REFLECTED IN THE DEDICATED 
ALLIANCE FUNCTION {IN REFERENCE AND ALIGNMENT TO SATISFY THE 
CONDITIONS OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVE I) & II)} 
 
In examining the factors of long-term alliance success, Whipple et. al. (2000) posit that 
buyer response; trust; senior management support; the ability to meet performance 
expectations; clear goals; and partner compatibility as critical. Within this research 
program, the factors most identified (through respondents from Michener; “Org A”; and 
“Org B”) as being critical to alliance success were trust, transparency, shared value, fit 
of values and core businesses between the organisations, and clarity of expectations and 
sacrifice, within the context of a clearly defined desired goal/outcome (defined in this 
case as the establishment of dynamic capabilities between the alliance partners), as 
illustrated via Figure 12 {Expansion of Understanding in the Alliance Management 
Function as Reflected in the Dedicated Alliance Function (Kale et. al., 2002)}. 
 
This conceptual framework (Figure 12) first corroborates the findings of Whipple et. al. 
(2000) insofar as several key factors of success within the Michener alliance experience 
(and different industrial context) is either directly illustrated or categorically related. 
Secondly, the conceptual model builds upon the initial findings of Whipple et. al. (2000) 
insofar as the model demonstrates the impact of establishing these alliance success 
factors on the foundation of differentiated relationship states. More specifically, the 
conceptual model posits that the factors that contribute towards long-term success do 
not operate within a void context, and the ability to build and transition from a business 
to a personal relationship, and finally to a personal commitment/investment has a 
significant impact to the degree of success ultimately achieved.   
 
While the results in this industrial context (healthcare education) corroborate past 
findings in alternative industries in terms of the factors that contribute toward the 
successful management/operation of alliances (Whipple et. al., 2000), the development 
of the above framework makes distinct contributions in:  
 Linking the framework to the alliance management process within the dedicated 
alliance management function (Kale et. al., 2002); 
 Suggesting new factors that may contribute towards alliance success in the long-
term (e.g. sacrifice); and 
Page 162 
 The integration and prominence of the personal commitment, and the subsequent 
advancement from a business relationship, to the overall probability of success 
within an alliance relationship.  
 
These insights build upon, extend and consolidate the contributing factors related to 
alliance success (Whipple et. al., 2000) as reflected in the management of alliances as 
embedded within the alliance function (Kale et. al. 2002).  
 
 
18.3 CONTRIBUTION #3 – EXPLORATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES BETWEEN FIRMS THROUGH THE ENGAGEMENT 
OF THE ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO {IN REFERENCE AND ALIGNMENT TO 
SATISFY THE CONDITIONS OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVE III)} 
 
The major focus of this chapter and resulting contribution is to explore the variables 
associated with the establishment of dynamic capabilities through the compare/contrast 
of two distinct case studies (Yin, 2009). Referred to as “Org A” and “Org B” this 
research program examined the general role, and specific factors of the alliance function 
in establishing dynamic capabilities (of innovation/commercialisation) between firms 
(Barney, 1991; Lorenzoni et. al., 1999; Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg, 2007). 
Ultimately, in the case study involving “Org A”, where respondents posited the partial 
success of innovation and failure to establish commercialisation capabilities, the 
variables (data codes), as represented by the content and intent of the specific and 
illustrative responses, included “lofty expectations”; “difference between corporate 
cultures”; “fuzzy decision making”; “lack/loss of strategic focus”; and “transference of 
capabilities between industries.” The identification of these variables (representative 
data codes) and the compounding and inter-connective relationship between them, 
extend the contribution of Whipple et. al. (2000), insofar as the case specific variables 
posit the specific factors that mitigate the ability to establish trust within an alliance 
relationship. From an applied strategic management perspective, trust, as referenced 
throughout this research program, is one if not the most dominant factor related to long-
term alliance success (Lorenzoni et. al., 1999; Whipple et. al., 2000).  
 
Similarly, in examining the case study with “Org B”, the distinct variables (enabling 
data codes) of “Personal Relationships Subservient to Business Relationship;” and 
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“Involvement/ Engagement Process As Means to Secure Desired Outcomes” were 
distinctly identified within the case study associated with “Org B.”  
 
The identification of these variables (both mitigating and enabling factors in 
establishing dynamic capabilities between/amongst firms within an alliance 
relationship) within the conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 11, provide a unique 
contribution insofar as the dominant strategic management theories of RBV (Barney, 
1991); dynamic capabilities (Wang and Ahmed, 2007) and alliances (Gulati,1998a) are 
compounded to posit a functional and diagnostic conceptual framework (Figure 11).  
 
This illustration (Figure 11) provides a contribution for future research insofar as the 
conceptual relationships and specific variables link together several related yet 
traditionally siloed concepts; additionally, for the management practitioner, the 
relationship of the mitigating and enabling variables to the ability to establish trust, 
appropriate resource allocations, and strategic fit within an alliance suggests the role 
and importance of strategic management. In being aware of these specific variables, 
management practitioners can aim to cultivate the enabling values, while working to 
contain and manage those variables that mitigate the establishment of trust, effective 
resource deployment, and strategic fit, in the aim of establishing dynamic capabilities. 
In short, as illustrated through this model, strategic management matters. The presence 
of one or more mitigating variables does not immediately conclude to complete 
disappointment and disillusionment (represented in this research program as the failure 
to create dynamic capabilities); rather, the relationship is indirect, insofar as where one 
or more of these variables are present, they represent a risk to establishing the critical 
factors of alliance success, such as trust (Whipple et. al., 2000), strategic focus and 
effective resource application, which themselves have a critical role in establishing 
dynamic capabilities. The clarity of the indirect, subtle, yet compounded relationship 
between these variables and theories within strategic management provides a unique 
contribution for future applied research and management practitioners.        
Page 164 
18.4 CONTRIBUTION #4 – THE EXPLORATION OF THE ROLE OF THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ALLIANCE CAPABILITY AND THE ALLIANCE 
PORTFOLIO CAPABILITY, AND THE RESULTING MANAGEMENT & 
EVOLUTION OF THE ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO {IN REFERENCE AND 
ALIGNMENT TO SATISFY THE CONDITIONS OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVE IV)} 
 
Inclusive within the comprehensive examination and summary of the literature base 
pertaining to alliance portfolios, Wassmer (2010) suggested several significant gaps in 
the current state of literature, including (but not limited to) the management; evolution; 
and specific costs and benefits of alliance portfolios.  This research program explored 
the distinct nature and specific factors of the alliance portfolio capability through the 
respondents of staff, managers, directors and executives; the role of the alliance 
capability in establishing an alliance portfolio capability; the transition process involved 
therein; and the systematic manner in which the alliance capability and alliance 
portfolio capability cultivate each other (Kale et. al. 2002; Arndt, 2008; Wassmer, 
2010). In doing so, the candidate has made a unique contribution in illustrating the 
specific variables associated with alliance success (defined as the establishment of 
dynamic capabilities in innovation/commercialisation) as related to the alliance function 
(Kale et. al., 2002); the role (and transference) of this subsequent alliance function to 
the alliance portfolio; and finally the management, evolution and benefits of such 
involvement. These relationships, as illustrated in Figure 11, provide a clear (if not 
unintended linear, mechanical), comprehensive relationship model of these often 
compartmentalised, and yet highly (inter)related concepts.  
 
While the role/relationship of the dedicated alliance function to the alliance portfolio 
capability has been identified by previous researchers (Kale et. al., 2002; Arndt, 2008), 
this research program has aimed to explore this transition more deeply, through the 
responses of management practitioners directly, as a means to extend existing views.  
 
Additionally, given the embryonic state of the alliance portfolio research literature 
itself, the candidate is not aware of any other related research publications within the 
healthcare education industry that specifically explore the themes of alliance portfolio 
management, evolution, and associated benefits as directly or specifically as this 
research program, thus representing a distinct and unique research contribution.     
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CHAPTER 19 - GENERALISATIONS 
 
19.1 IMPLICATIONS TO RESEARCH AGENDA & INDUSTRIAL PRACTICE   
As markets and industries become increasingly complex and volatile, the role of 
alliances, and specifically the alliance portfolio, provide organisations an effective 
mechanism to pursue competitive advantage and shared value (Porter et. al., 2011). The 
core findings involving the perception differences between inter-industrial alliance 
partners (Contribution #1) is significant insofar as it suggests a specific mechanism 
(myth-busting conversation model) whereby management practitioners from a variety of 
industries apply at various stages throughout the alliance life-cycle to identify and 
clarify barriers to effectiveness. Similarly, the recognition in the role of personal 
relationships within the alliance management phase (Kale et. al., 2002), and the factors 
that contribute towards progression (Contribution #2) would likely be valuable in a 
variety of inter-industrial alliance relationships.  
 
The contribution examining the process in which firms collaborate to establish new 
dynamic capabilities in innovation and commercialisation (Contribution #3) would 
likely be especially valuable/applicable to many organisations involved in post-
secondary university, government agencies, and private, for-profit firms involved in 
societies most complex challenges, identified by Porter and Kramer (2011) and being 
within the fields of “health; safety; environmental performance; and employee retention 
and capability.” Specifically within the health sector, the pursuit of corporate shared 
value (CSV) (Porter et. al., 2011) through alliance portfolios would likely be applicable 
to firms addressing pressing challenges related to patient safety; access to care; quality 
of care; patient-centre care; innovative models of care (e.g. homecare); medical device 
manufacturing; original equipment manufactures (OEMs); etc.      
 
Lastly, given the embryonic state of the literature pertaining to alliance portfolios, the 
contribution exploring the evolution, management, and benefits of engagement of an 
organisation’s respective alliance portfolio (Contribution #4) is applicable for fellow 
researchers and management practitioners alike. These initial findings and insights 
provide a direct contribution towards this emerging research field, and provide 
management practitioners in the applicable industries listed above potential clarity in 
terms of how, where and why the alliance portfolio may be leveraged to support the 
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development of dynamic capabilities and subsequently advance an organisations vision 
and resulting strategies.   
 
19.2 IMPLICATIONS & GENERALISATIONS TO MICHENER MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICE 
This research program and its subsequent findings have had a direct impact on the 
management practice of individual alliance relationships, as well as the focus, intent and 
complement of Michener’s overall alliance portfolio. In regards to specific dyadic 
alliances, this research program has clarified and found specific factors (enabling, 
mitigating) that management practitioners within Michener aim to secure to maximise 
the likelihood of success within alliances. The clarification of these specific variables 
has had a direct impact on all phases of the dedicated alliance function (Kale et. al., 
2002), and led to more effective decisions within alliances to maximise the resulting 
value and contribution to Michener, its alliance partners, and the healthcare 
communities in which it serves. 
As a means to cultivate and advance Michener’s capabilities within the simulation, 
home-care and process-driven clinical workflow environments, this research program 
has already impacted on practice within the organisation by suggesting the exploration 
of new sub-portfolios (complements of alliance partners) within Michener’s current 
alliance portfolio. Findings from this study are therefore of direct relevance to the 
ongoing management of Michener’s alliance portfolio, and have resulted in changes to 
the ways in which alliances are approached. Specifically, the study’s findings on the 
critical importance of trust and the achievement of a high personal commitment towards 
the respective alliance relationship have impacted the approach to new alliance 
possibilities, placing far greater emphasis on relationship building and expectation 
management in the early stages of new alliances. As alliances mature beyond the 
selection and confirmation stage, the focus of management is to ensure decision making 
procedures are well defined; expected outcomes articulated; and a common culture 
established within the alliance team. The potential evolution of Michener’s alliance 
portfolio (including the sub-portfolios of international development alliance partners; 
and other non-profit healthcare entities) has been driven by Michener’s overall strategy 
and pursuit of dynamic capability in support thereof (Wang and Ahmed, 2007). 
Similar to the levels of analysis described in the preceding methodology and results 
chapters, the implications of the research findings/results contained within this research 
program will impact Michener in several distinct levels (Rousseau and House, 1994; 
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House, Rousseau, and Thomas-Hunt, 1995). From a macro-perspective, the implications 
of this research program and its subsequent insights have been valuable as Michener 
initiates a strategic review of its core academic business of educating students and 
existing practitioners within the applied health sciences. The engagement of Michener's 
alliance portfolio (including those alliance partners from the clinical, academic, private-
industry, non-profit, and community organisations), has, and will continue to be a 
critical approach in determining both future priorities, and potential collaborative 
alliance partners to enable/pursue these resulting priorities. From a micro (intra-
organisational, departmental) perspective, the insights and resulting applied frameworks 
illustrated within this research program will contribute towards the future directions and 
approaches in how Michener engages its alliance portfolio partners in the development 
of its Business Development, International Development, and Facility utilisation 
strategies. Ultimately, from a strategic management perspective the results outlined 
within this research program, and the application of these findings/results as described 
throughout this chapter, will contribute towards Michener's vision as 'The leader in 
Applied Health Science Education through excellence and innovation.' 
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CHAPTER 20 - LIMITATIONS OF FINDINGS 
 
20.1 – GENERAL LIMITATIONS OF FINDINGS 
As is the case in most research programs, the ability to effectively define and pursue a 
research question requires a series of trade-off decisions leading to an appropriate scope 
of enquiry.  
 
The candidate recognises several limitations to the scope of understanding in the context 
of this research program, including: 
 
 The literature base within strategic management dedicated to the concepts of 
innovation and commercialisation is significant. The candidate purposefully 
referenced a limited section of the respective literature and chose a preferred 
definition for the purpose of this research program. As such, the focus of 
research program should be interpreted (and has been defined as) an 
examination and exploration of the development of dynamic capabilities (of 
innovation and commercialisation) within alliance/alliance portfolio 
environments, rather than an in-depth examination of the 
innovation/commercialisation processes themselves.    
 The choice of case studies (“Org A” and “Org B”) resulted from a series of 
factors, including impact to the organisation; value (both future and historical) 
to Michener; the state of the current literature base; etc. While perhaps 
obvious, it is important to recognise that the choice of alternative comparative 
case studies (Yin, 2009) could potentially lead to different 
observations/results.  
 While the research program corroborated several past insights offered by 
Whipple et. al.(2000) and Kale et. al. (2002), given the industrial context in 
which this research program occurred (that of healthcare education, and the 
associated industries of healthcare simulation/education and medical 
equipment/solutions development) the results may not be directly/similarly 
observed in alternative industries.  
 While the results and findings of this research program related to alliance 
portfolios (Wassmer, 2010) are distinct, the fact that the research focus is in 
its infancy may limit the applicability of these results to alternative 
environments.    
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20.2 – RECOGNITION AND MITIGATION OF POTENTIAL CANDIDATE BIAS  
While issue of potential bias has been recognised and developed in preceding chapters 
(Chapter 8 – Research Setting; Chapter 13 – Ethical Review & Considerations; Chapter 
14.5 – Test for Data Code Bias), the candidate would be remiss in not addressing this 
issue within the context and chapter of ‘Limitations of Research Findings.’  
 
From a participant-bias perspective, the application of the grounded theory approach 
(Suddaby, 2006; Corbin and Strauss, 2008) in itself acts as a control for participant bias, 
insofar as multiple data sources are accessed and ultimately triangulated. Within the 
context of this research program, archival analysis, participant involvement/observation, 
and un/semi-structured interviews were employed as data collection methods 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). As the first method applied, archival analysis (through the 
examination of alliance and contract documents pertaining to Michener’s 
experience/pursuit of dynamic capability with both Org “A” and “B”) provided an 
objective description of the initial goals, aims, and intent of each alliance relationship. 
Subsequently, the experiences and perceptions of each interviewee, as well as those 
experiences and perceptions of the candidate, were in the context of these objective 
“anchor” references. Interviewees were requested to provide their own perceptions and 
describe their own experiences of whether the alliance with “Org A” and “Org B” was 
successful or unsuccessful in the context of these initial Agreement aims, goals and 
objectives, and accordingly, to offer evidence to these insights.  
 
From a bias-control perspective, Michener has an additional benefit insofar that as a 
post-secondary academic organisation, the function of applied research (and resulting 
culture of inquiry) provides an environment where interviewees are accustomed to 
participating in the general research process on a fairly regular basis. Additionally, in 
regards to external respondents, in the resulting Letters of Support from “Org A”, and 
“Org B”, the candidate sought and was granted permission to contact both “past/current 
senior/divisional managers involved in the development/operations” of the alliance 
relationship. The balance of perspectives amongst current and past employees provided 
an effective means to explore difficult concepts and experiences.   
 
Further, throughout the rich interplay of data collection and analysis, the content 
management and analysis platform (Nvivo 9) enabled the candidate to leverage the data 
management and review tools to test and identify key word, concept and theme 
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associations identified (objectively) from the transcribed interviews. This provided a set 
of rich and objective relationships between the data that were subsequently explored and 
clarified through additional interviews.  
 
Lastly, from a data code perspective, the evolution of the data codes proceeded over 
four distinct phases, as driven by the content and interpretation of the respondent data 
itself. As a final test, the candidate randomly selected an interview respondent and 
requested their participation in completing a data-code bias-test (via the methodological 
approach outlined within Chapter 12 - Data Collection & Analysis: Case Study 
Protocol). Upon reviewing the data code bias-control process, the respondent reviewed 
~11 pages of randomly selected responses, consistently selecting the same data codes as 
applied as the candidate. 
 
The employment of the multiple methodological techniques outlined above positively 
mitigated the overall likelihood and impact of participant bias.     
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CHAPTER 21 - FUTURE RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 
 
While making a contribution within the scope of the research program, the candidate 
recognises the opportunity for future research opportunities beyond this chosen 
scope (as related to the current data set and topic area), including:   
 Examination of the micro-level experience related to development of dynamic 
capability between firms (micro-foundations of dynamic capability, specifically 
via the project management perspective) 
 The examination and exploration in the transition between the individual 
alliance function and that of the alliance portfolio function within other 
industries as a means of pursuing generalisability of results 
 The continued exploration of the evolution, management, benefits of alliance 
portfolios across multiple industries to broaden the knowledge base of this 
research field 
 
In alignment to the grounded theory approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Suddaby, 2006; 
Corbin and Strauss, 2008) the candidate recognises the achievement of ‘saturation’ at a 
particular point in time. The point of saturation achieved with the central concepts and 
themes outlined within this research program will continue to evolve within the 
organisation (Michener) in the medium to long-term, suggesting a rich opportunity for a 
longitudinal study of the management and evolution of the alliance portfolio.  
 
Lastly, while unrelated to this research dissertation, during an interview with a 
representative from “Org B”, it was observed that in the long-term (7-10 years), an 
engineering research study focused on the effects of treatment radiation on the materials 
used to build liner accelerators (linacs) would be possible in comparing/contrasting the 
effects of Michener’s KV –beam linac units with those that are MV-beam (clinical) 
linacs. The similarities in simulated or active workflow would be relatively consistent 
and may present an interesting and valuable research opportunity for future OEM 
developments/insights.  
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